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Abstract 
Poverty, lack of opportunities, and general socio-economic malaise have become characteristic 
features of the rural areas in the contemporary low-income world. Amid such a reality, a rarely 
asked policy question becomes important: Where do rural areas --- their economies and 
societies --- fit in the road map to a poverty-free world? Contemporary development policy in 
the mainstream has become somewhat oblivious to this question. Rather the main thrust of recent 
development policy has been around (a) sectoral development projects such as the ones in 
agriculture, fisheries and other sectors, (b) macroeconomic policy reform, and (c) large 
infrastructure projects, often in megacities. Underlying these development interventions is an 
acceptance of a rural-urban dichotomy in economy and geographic space. This dissertation 
through an extensive literature survey starts with the position that important synergies are missed 
in the countryside by separate planning of towns and rural areas. Rather rural regions, 
comprising both rural areas and towns as an integral part in them, need to be the planning unit. 
However, policy models for rural regional development, especially in an agrarian setting, are 
rare. Even as many rural regions continue to de-agrarianize, and at the same time suffer stasis, 
new models are hard to come by. This dissertation through an extensive review of literature on 
development policy experience of the past half a century identifies three equally important 
cornerstones of rural regional development: (a) rural regional productivity increase, (b) capturing 
as much of the multiplier effect of the economic activities within the rural region as possible, and 
(c) removal of the historical agrarian and other institutions that encourage leakage from the rural 
economy, and restrict access of the poor and the disadvantaged to economic opportunities. To 
what extent these can be achieved is determined by the recent changes in the global economic 
forces, nature of agrarian transition in a given region, rural regional political economy, and the 
nature of the state. Rural areas are de-agrarianizing, and getting connected to the larger economic 
processes beyond their borders. Often these changes are not increasing the life chances of the 
households in rural regions. 
This dissertation, through the study of a rural region in the southeast of Bangladesh, identifies 
some concrete processes and institutions that stand in the way households’ ability to attain 
prosperity. Some of the major processes identified are elite capture of state apparatus, emigration 
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and consumptive use of the consequent remittance, delinking of the towns from the economic 
activities of the rural hinterland, rapid de-agrarianization of the rural economy, and the lack of 
pro-poor infrastructure. The study helps to identify an outline and some tools of rural regional 
planning. 
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Glossary 
Bazaar: A market place 
BRAC: An international NGO that originated in Bangladesh. 
Char: Accreted land in large rivers and estuaries 
Charlands: Areas that are accreted 
Dadon: Output-tying loan (When a peasant or fisherman borrows with the condition that the 
produces or catches must be sold to the lender at a lower-than-market price, the loan is called 
dadon) 
Hat (day): The days of the week on which more merchants and buyers congregate at a certain 
bazaar. Nearby bazaars have different days of the week as their hat days. 
Hilsa: A fish in the herring family. Scientific name: Tenualosa Ilisa. 
Hogla: A kind of tall grass with narrow leaves. Hogla can grow up to 10 feet tall. 
Khal: Bangla word for canal. 
Khas: Bangla word for government-owned. 
Mostak: A plant that grows by water bodies. The thin bark of its narrow stem can be peeled and 
used to weave mats that feel cool to the touch. 
Union: The lowest level of government in Bangladesh. It is considered a rural local government. 
Given the area of the country minus urban areas and forests, and the number of unions, their 
average size comes out to be 12 square miles. 
Upazila: Bangla word for sub-district. There are 490 sub-districts in the country as of 2016. 
Ward: Lowest electoral (geographic) units in urban areas. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 The Malaise in the Countryside, and the Plausibility of Rural 
Regional Development 
The world in this second decade of the twenty first century is, in terms of the production of 
goods and services, a richer place as a whole than in any time in history. Some of the economic 
indicators, aggregated at the level of the world, such as hard core poverty rate and per capita 
income, read better than any time since measurement of poverty on a world scale began in the 
late 1980s (Chen & Ravallion, 2012). This aggregate global picture of progress, however, masks 
the unevenness of such poverty alleviation and productivity growth across both countries and 
regions within any given country. For example, a simple arithmetic on the World Bank’s online 
PovCalNet data shows that China lifted 780 million people out of poverty during 1981-2012, 
which account for 71% of global poverty reduction during that period. If China is taken out of 
the calculation, the rate of global poverty alleviation does not look as impressive. Within 
countries too, certain geographic areas, often one or two major metropolitan areas enjoyed much 
success while the rest of the country, especially the rural heartlands saw much smaller economic 
growth and poverty alleviation. 
One persistent pattern over this period was that rural poverty remained entrenched in the 
developing world (IFAD, 2010). There are large areas of countryside, even whole of provinces, 
in the low-income countries where poverty did not decrease. The spatial trend and pattern of 
poverty at sub-national level in low-income countries is one of persistence of poverty in areas 
away from large cities and coastal areas. 
For an overwhelming majority of rural households, often the only source of a decent livelihood is 
in a faraway city, province, or even country. While migration and remittance ensures some 
degree of income, the rural regions in low-income countries are in a state of malaise. The 
economies there do not have much production. Consumption financed by remittance props up a 
precarious economy while those households that are unable to send out a member have few local 
opportunities to escape abject poverty. Many of the rural poor are migrating to urban areas, 
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numerically increasing both urban population and urban poverty (Ravallion, Chen, & Sangraula, 
2007). The much visible urban poverty is mostly a result of the malaise in the countryside. 
Such malaise in the rural areas around much of the world, especially in the low-income countries 
raises the rarely asked policy question: Where do rural areas --- their economies and societies --- 
fit in the road map to a poverty-free world? One commentator identified rural regions as having 
“few immediate prospects” (Florida, 2005, p48). In the contemporary mainstream development 
policy, there is no explicit concern for rural regions. The emphasis is on getting what it considers 
the larger structural issues and policies right, and not worrying about lagging geographic areas 
because in the long term, as the belief goes, there will be an equilibrium. Thus, in the 
mainstream, at least in the short term, rural regions are dispensable units in the mega-scheme of 
things. 
This dissertation however begins with the premise, explained further in Section 1.3, that while 
poverty is experienced at the level of households, and the nation state is often the site of policy-
making, poverty alleviation and national prosperity are not attainable without development of 
rural regions. This normative position inspires an exploration into a policy framework for what 
we call ‘rural regional development’ (RRD) in the low-income world. In the simplest of sense, 
we use RRD as a policy goal to create an opportunity structure for the households in a rural 
region to earn an adequate livelihood, primarily, though not exclusively, in the local economy. 
The choice of the terms ‘rural region’ as opposed to ‘rural areas’, and ‘rural regional 
development’ as opposed to ‘rural development’ is deliberate, and is intended to embody the 
central argument offered in this dissertation. It contradicts a few central tenets (often not explicit) 
of mainstream development policy such as the two-sector (agriculture and industry) model 
(Lewis, 1954; Fei & Ranis, 1964) of development policy and practice. 
The mainstream development policy, which is built on a dichotomous abstraction of the 
economy, saw ‘rural’ as a discrete and stand-alone category that together with another category 
‘urban’ comprised the national economy. Consequently, in the mainstream development policy, 
the literature employs words such as ‘rural sector’ or ‘rural areas’. In further contradiction of 
reality, policies derived from dichotomous models often conflated agricultural production 
increase with rural development. Such dichotomous models do not match the ground reality now, 
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if they ever did. There are significant flows of capital, labor, goods and information between the 
sectors. People’s livelihoods are derived from multiple sectors and geographic locations, both 
rural and urban. The rural regions with high poverty rate often have towns that too are struggling 
as there is no demand to sustain their central functions such as banks, health services, 
manufacturing and processing. The use of the term ‘region’ brings the interdependencies to 
focus, and creates room for capturing synergy in these vast swaths of landscape in the low-
income world. We argue that as a unit of planning, such territorial units offer higher chances of 
alleviating poverty, as it allows for synergy to be captured, and interconnectedness of sectors to 
be addressed.  
The insertion of ‘region’ in ‘rural region’, therefore does not represent a mere semantic quibble, 
rather it recognizes the promise of new approaches. The caveat here is that how a rural region is 
demarcated is not an exact science. However, with introduction being the purpose of these early 
paragraphs, discussion on this caveat can be postponed until later. 
The current landscape of prevailing ideas, institutions, governance structures (both global and 
national), and economy are not conducive to rural regional development. The prevailing 
development policies in the mainstream are centered on neoliberal paradigm. Such policies are 
inherently blind to their manifestations on space, except for an uncritical belief in equilibrium 
over long term. A recent World Bank World Development Report (2009) advocated geographic 
concentration of economic activities, effectively endorsing the ‘cities as engines of growth’ view 
of development. In the practice of development, the efforts are often in the form of projects that 
are in certain sectors (such as fisheries/livestock development, health, and road infrastructure). 
Another category of projects comprise the ones aimed at training rural people for skills that are 
useful in an urban area, essentially preparing them for emigration to cities. In governance, often 
there is no local government unit at the level of rural micro-regions (Dillinger, 2007). As a result, 
rural regional development is not a local government function. Regionalism, in the sense of co-
operation among neighboring small local governments, is unheard of in the low-income 
world1.Thus, rural regional development is not an idea that has a fertile ground waiting to give it 
                                                 
1 This author was laughed at by a local politician when the idea of regionalism for a local infrastructure issue was 
mentioned to him during the field research for this dissertation. 
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robust roots. In addition, the existing literature both recent and from the high days of regional 
planning in the 1960s and ‘70s, we discuss later, does not offer a direction to devise a policy 
framework for rural regional development. 
The assertion that (rural) regional level planning is useful, therefore, risks being not much more 
than a truism unless there is a policy framework that establishes the plausibility of planning at 
the geographic level of rural regions. The question that needs to be answered is: What kind of 
knowledge or framework to base rural regional development policy on? There is a semblance of 
answer, with much caveat, to this question in the context of the industrial world. At the center of 
the answer is what is known as the endogenous development theory (Martin & Sunley, 1998), 
and industrial clusters2 (Porter, 2000; Martin & Sunley, 2003). This strand of thought sees sub-
national regions as the hubs of economic activities especially in the face of globalization (Scott, 
1998)  and the locus of economic development policies and programs (Lovering, 1999, p. 380). 
The literature is almost exclusively centered on post-industrial societies. In the industrialized 
countries, there is another strand of literature that explores regionalism, used in the sense of 
coalition and institution building across local government units in the rural areas (e.g. Hamin & 
Marcucci, 2008; Hall & Stern, 2009; Tsukamoto, 2011). Countries still in a state of agrarian 
transition, or with social and political institutions of early capitalistic society (such as share-
cropping, debt bondage) will likely not benefit directly from such literature. 
For low-income countries at different stages of agrarian transition, the idea of rural regional 
development, we argue, is an uncharted territory that the existing literature, with some 
exceptions such as Douglass (1998) and Friedmann & Douglass (1975), does not quite address. 
The recent publications that used the rhetoric of rural territorial development, such as Scheijtman 
& Berdegué (2008), appear to not take advantage of the entire breadth of literature on origins of 
poverty and past experiences in development practice. Hence, there is a need and potential for a 
fresh start. 
This dissertation is an attempt at putting down the first markers for rural regional development in 
the contemporary low-income world. In doing so it sets out two tasks: 
                                                 
2 Discussed further in Section 3.4. 
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(a) Identifying the indicators/markers of rural regional development that are also poverty 
decreasing and poverty deterring. 
(b) Speculating the shape of ‘planning’ (or policy framework) for rural regional development 
that is informed by the contemporary political, economic, and social forces at different 
scales ranging from global to smallest communities. 
Methodology-wise, approaching these tasks requires a review of literature, and building on past 
experiences using analytical logic. In that sense, the answer to the question cannot escape being 
conjectural in nature. Like many policy proposals (such as the two-sector theory of Lewis 
(1954), modified by Ranis & Fei (1961), the Big Push theory (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943), or the 
sustainable livelihoods framework (Chambers & Conway, 1992;  Carney, 1998), identifying a 
policy framework for rural regional development will likely not be a deductive process3. 
This dissertation reviews existing literature to develop an understanding of the dynamics 
surrounding poverty and rural regions in the low-income world. The overarching research 
question calls for an approach that involves distilling the existing literature in multiple areas in a 
coherent framework that gives a plausible explanation of why the markers of RRD are not 
achieved, and help speculate the shape of planning that might help achieve them. Given the field 
is nascent, the review and the broader framework needs to be extensive, perhaps at the expense 
of parsimony. 
Some of the major topical areas reviewed are: 
1. Notions of poverty, and causes of poverty 
2. Evolution of poverty alleviation thoughts and practices 
3. Rural institutions and power structure  
4. Global commodity chains, trade, and global neoliberalism 
5. The new economic geography  
6. Regional planning, and 
7. The contemporary reality in rural areas, including rural-urban linkages 
                                                 
3 Indeed, Rostow (1960) in his famous second chapter “The Five Stages of Economic Growth” cited the plot line of 
Thomas Mann’s novel Buddenbrooks to illustrate (and in support of) his point. To cite a more famous example, the 
claim of the unfettered “invisible hand” doing everybody good never came with a deductive proof. 
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A review of these topics allows for exploring the desired nature of rural regional development 
within the multitude of issues ranging from, say, global commodity chain to semi-feudal 
institutions such as debt-bondage. Such review of the issues also allows for identification of key 
cornerstones of rural regional development, together with the conditions and courses of policy 
action that might be able to achieve them. A Bangladeshi rural region is used as a case to explore 
how the policy framework plays out in a de-agrarianizing rural region, and the concrete shape of 
planning that might help achieve RRD.  
1.2 How did the Rural Regions Get Here? A Brief History of 
Development Policy and Rural Regions 
Human settlements at all scales and at all times changed and evolved with political, economic, 
and technological developments. The extent of change varied. Some are as drastic as eviction 
from land of hundreds of thousands of people, such as the “enclosures” in England4, or some as 
apparently distant as discovery of petroleum in the Arab Peninsula that set off labor migration 
from the rural regions in the Indian sub-continent. In this section, we offer a brief review of the 
major events and policies that contributed to the current state of rural regions around the low-
income world. 
European colonization and the spread of capitalism perhaps effected the biggest change in the 
trajectory of the economic, social, and political life in the rural regions around the world. At the 
height of colonialism in the late 19th century, practically all of the world except the land to the 
west of the Andes and a few pockets such as Nepal, Bhutan, Tonga and Thailand was under 
European nation states as colonies. The colonial policies and their often-brutal enforcement 
reshaped the societies and economies of the colonies. Local governments, such as panchayets in 
the Indian subcontinent, were replaced by colonial bureaucracy run from emerging large cities.  
Colonial interests introduced monetization into the countryside. Commercial crops were 
introduced, often forcibly. Indigenous manufacturing often was actively discouraged, or 
downright decimated. Economies were reshaped to serve European industrialization and 
                                                 
4 A series of laws in England between 16th and the 18th century allowed for land to be removed from communal use 
that was sanctioned by ancient traditions. The transfer of rights from community to private parties resulted in a class 
of people with no means of production except labor. 
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evolution of capitalism (e.g. Mintz, 1985). The overarching moral imperative of making non-
European societies modern (later infamously reflected in Kipling’s 1899 poem White Man’s 
Burden) provided the moral justification. 
The post-colonial world saw a confluence of interested actors who wanted development of the 
economies of the newly independent nations, with the threat of communism looming. 
Development, with a capital D, in the sense of conscious effort to develop (with evolving 
understanding of what “development” comprises) and/or alleviate poverty by governments of the 
low-income countries and their foreign collaborators is often said to have originated soon after 
decolonization began to take place at the end of the WWII (Escobar, 1995; Cowen & Shenton, 
1996). Until the early 1970s, the alleviation of poverty was not an explicit goal of the 
governments and international organizations of global influence such as the World Bank. 
Development policy of that time, aided by the then nascent field of development economics, 
pursued growth of the national economies but did not explicitly use the words poverty alleviation 
in its rhetoric. Explicit in its rhetoric or not, the poverty alleviation efforts of current times are 
inextricably linked to the ideas and policies since the 1940s and their consequences when 
practiced. 
A summary of the major themes of development and their implication for rural regions is 
summarized in Table 1.
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Table 1 Development Ideas and the Envisaged Role of Rural Regions 
 Colonial Periods 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s onward 
Economi
c 
activity/
purpose 
Provider of raw 
material for 
European 
Industrialization 
Forcible 
monetization of 
economy 
Agriculture to be 
“squeezed” to 
finance (heavy) 
industrialization 
Provide ‘cash’ 
crops as raw 
materials for 
industries 
Green 
Revolution 
(increase 
agricultural 
output with 
state-
subsidized ag. 
inputs) 
Continue to 
increase ag. 
productivity 
To be defined 
by market. 
No explicit 
policy. 
Rural 
developmen
t began to 
be re-
emphasized 
in the 
mainstream 
In the mainstream, 
reservoir of 
migrants 
Politics 
and 
governa
nce 
Local governance 
structure replaced 
by colonial 
bureaucracy 
Rural areas co-
opted into 
nation-building 
projects 
Populist 
nationalism 
Continues from 
1950s, plus 
military rule 
(autocracy) 
Central 
governments 
continue to 
be the major 
player in the 
economy 
Decentralizati
on 
Withdrawal of 
agricultural 
subsidy 
Continued 
decentralizati
on 
Decentralized 
governance 
generally accepted. 
But the geographic 
level and functions 
uncertain 
Major 
theories 
White Man’s 
Burden 
Two-sector 
economic models 
Community 
development 
Growth Poles 
Two sector 
economic 
models, 
Growth poles 
Community 
development 
dropped by 
mainstream 
Rural 
Development 
in the modus 
operandi of 
IRD (winning 
out against 
‘basic needs’ 
in practice) 
Neoliberal 
structural 
adjustment 
Reliance on 
NGOs 
Local 
economic 
development 
Micro-credit 
Economic 
clusters in 
the 
advanced 
capitalist 
countries 
Space-neutral 
policy 
(Neo-) 
Endogenous 
development 
Sustainable 
livelihoods 
framework 
Events Industrial 
Revolution in 
Europe (demand 
for raw materials) 
Decolonization Breakthrough in 
High Yielding 
Varieties in rice, 
wheat, potato 
Labor 
migration to 
the Middle 
East 
International 
financial 
crisis 
Privatization 
East Asia as 
destination 
of 
migration 
Cell phone, IT 
revolution 
Global migration 
intensified 
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Following de-colonization after the WWII, under the emerging hegemony of the U.S., 
international development emerged. While socialism and totalitarian regimes took hold in some 
parts of the world, Development (with a capital D) was essentially a project couched in 
capitalism. Since before the WWII, the mainstream non-Marxist development strategy was 
premised on the extension of the internal market to raise consumer demand for industrial 
products. The well-known Arthur Lewis’ dual economy model (Lewis, 1954) set the tone of 
development policy that was to follow for the next several decades. The development strategies 
in this broad tradition were national development models with little treatment of rural 
development. They are mostly economic models that had national economic growth as the 
central problematic (e.g. Rostow, 1960, Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943). To be concise with the danger 
of oversimplification, the grand objective was growth, the policy model was a conceptualization 
of the national economy as consisting of a dynamic industrial sector, and a stagnant traditional 
sector (Lewis, 1954), and the major policy tool was industrialization. The industrialization was 
generally of heavy kind because the prevailing economic doctrine, shaped by economists Harrod 
and Domar, emphasized creation of capital goods as means of production in the economy that 
would have a high “cumulative influence of investment” (Dobb, 1955, p150 in Byres, 1979; 
Storper, 1991, p. 87 footnote).  In many countries, particularly Latin American ones, much of the 
industrialization was meant to substitute imports under the tariff protection of the sovereign state. 
To raise the capital for industrialization, countries adopted various policies to extract surplus 
from agriculture. Such policies included export embargo or tax on agricultural products, such as 
rice export tax in Thailand (Robinson, 1978; Douglass, 1995), establishment of monopoly over 
marketing of crops (Bates, 1981) by establishing parastatals that controlled marketing of cash 
crops, setting prices rather than let the market set the prices, and over-valued national currency 
so even when export of agricultural produces is not prohibited, it fetched much less money from 
the world market (Schiff & Valdés, 1992). 
Such economic policy of national growth contributed to urban growth in at least two different 
ways: (a) they made agriculture and rural areas less able to support an increasing population, and 
thereby created incentive for migration out of rural areas, (b) big cities, as the location of the new 
industries, were able to employ large numbers as industrial workers, and attracted even more 
who migrated in anticipation (Harris & Todaro, 1970). On top of these twin processes, certain 
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government policies and practices made cities in the ‘developing’ world attractive destinations 
for rural immigrants. Such policies include, among many others, higher investments in urban 
infrastructure, provision of social services, and subsidized food for the urban population. During 
these times urbanization proceeded at a rate higher than what the industrialized countries 
experienced during the Industrial Revolution. At the same time, such re-orientation of the 
economy and society of rural regions around the post-colonial world removed the vitality of 
them, and made their existence ancillary to the large cities. Rural regions in the process became 
reservoirs of migrants to cities and abroad whose remittances sustained the subsistence of the rest 
of the household that stayed behind in rural homes. 
These efforts also marked an abandonment of the 1950s’ brief engagement with trying to 
develop communities directly. Known as “community development”, this model was never given 
a rigid definition by its proponents. However, the central idea was to instigate the community to 
come together to plan for their development. The financing of organizing community through a 
bureaucracy, and construction of infrastructure such as wells and pumps was done by programs 
taken by the U.S. government, Ford Foundation, and the UN. By 1959, there were at least 60 
countries that had community development programs, of which at least 30 had them at national 
level (i.e. via national level ministry or program office) (Holdcroft, 1982). The increased 
patronage of the idea by both the U.S. and the U.K. led to academic programs that trained people 
in methods of community analysis, community organization, social action, and creation of local 
institutions. Community planning as a development model was abandoned by the early 1960s5 
following criticisms that included the capture by the village elites. However, one plausible 
criticism that does not seem to have been labeled at community development at the time was that 
it was concentrated on too small a geographic scale. This particular flaw of community 
development has lessons for rural regional development. 
Following community development, much of the fund began to shift to what is known as Green 
Revolution. The policies of Green Revolution included significant government involvement in 
                                                 
5 While funding evaporated, tools of community analysis continued to grow with integrated rural development 
approach. Academic programs in rural development continued to focus on communities well into the eighties. For 
example, at Asian Institute of Technology such focus on community was not replaced until 1984 when “rural and 
regional planning” was established as a field of study. 
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agriculture through subsidies in irrigation, fertilizer and seed, and research and extension 
services. In many parts of the world, the Green Revolution increased rural productivity, and 
saved significant numbers of people from starvation. But it also resulted in significant disruption 
in people’s livelihoods even where productivity grew. Two major sources of such disruptions 
were: (i) The fact that Green Revolution policies favored the large farmers while the small 
holders benefitted little. In the worst cases, the  increased  need upfront of money to buy inputs 
such as fertilizer, irrigation, insecticide and labor helped force small-holders off agriculture 
altogether (Pearse, 1980; Shiva, 1991), and (ii) great cost to the environment in some places 
(Shiva, 1991). 
Together with attempts at agricultural development, another strategy found its way in to practice 
in the 1960s as a hoped-for cure to several undesirable situations that was prevalent in many 
developing countries: The growth pole strategy.  Though it is often used in singular, perhaps it is 
better to see it as a ‘family of strategies’, as Parr (1999, p. 1195) used in one place6. At the core 
of these strategies was ‘the focusing of investment at a limited number of locations (usually as 
part of a deliberate effort to modify regional spatial structure), in an attempt to encourage 
economic activity and thereby raise levels of welfare within a region’ (Parr, 1999, p. 1195). 
Variations of growth pole idea were used to address several situations. Most common objective 
was to invest and industrialize one urban area, with the hope that prosperity will spread into 
surrounding rural areas. Another objective was to create a counter-magnet to stem the growth of 
a fast-growing large city. Whatever objective growth pole strategy was used for, they were 
almost universally considered a failure, including in the case of solving poverty in the vastness of 
rurality by creating or promoting growth poles in them. 
The 1970s saw the explicit arrival of poverty alleviation as a goal of mainstream development 
efforts. Alleviation of poverty, still overwhelmingly rural in the countries with low level of 
urbanization, became synonymous with rural development (World Bank, 1975). The modus 
operandi came to be known as the undefined or loosely defined (Cohen, 1980) term: “the 
integrated rural development (IRD)”. Within the IRD project areas, they relied on technological 
                                                 
6 But reverted to using the singular form for the rest of the paper. 
12 
 
solution in a handful of sectors such as irrigation, roads, and in certain countries such as 
Bangladesh, provision of cooperative-based micro-credit. The limited success of the IRD model 
is well-documented (e.g. Conyers, Mosley, & Warren, 1988). Much of it resulted from the fact 
that there was no attention paid to creating the institutional capacity at the local level, and the 
fund and technology was all external and hastily put into use in the villages (World Bank, 1987) 
with no awareness of local political economy. Furthermore, despite the rhetoric of “integrated”, 
IRD model looked at rural areas as a detached entity from the non-farm sector and urban 
economy of the local towns. Overall, outside Africa, the IRD projects began to be either 
discarded or not renewed long before the World Bank (1987) review recommended its 
retirement. 
One feature common across all the above policies was the implicit dependence on heavy 
government involvement in the carrying out of the policies via control and subsidy. The rise of 
neo-liberal ideas, central to which is the idea that the government should have as little 
involvement in the economy as possible, in the late 1970s spelled the end of funding for such 
policies, except in parts of Africa. Throughout the 1980s, international aid and funding for 
development work around the world shrank. In its place, the 1980s saw the rise of emphasis 
placed on macroeconomic structural adjustment policies, non-governmental organizations in 
service delivery, and promotion of ideas such as decentralization. One direct impact of neo-
liberal retrenchment of government was that government assistance to farming decreased. With 
the neglect of agriculture, the malaise set further in the rural regions. 
The lack of success of neo-liberal macroeconomic policies in poverty alleviation opened the door 
for what could be called more direct interventions for poverty alleviation. By the mid-1990s, 
need for development in rural space was back in prominence (e.g. Czaki, 2003). However, the 
realities on the ground had changed significantly. During the years when rural development was 
out of mainstream agenda, a rich body of literature accumulated that described the interactions 
and interdependences between urban and rural areas, and the increasing dependence of 
households on work in multiple locations and sectors. Known as rural-urban linkages (Tacoli, 
1998), this body of literature in many ways made invalid the underlying assumption of rural-
urban dichotomy in the models of economy and society of the developing world. Such new 
insights on the ground reality necessitated a new direction in development policy. However, 
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except for rare academic papers (such as Douglass, 1998) and a small number of meagerly 
funded projects around the world that attempted to integrate urban centers and surrounding rural 
areas as a site of intervention such as RUPP in Nepal (Momen, 2009), PARUL in Indonesia 
(Evans, 2002), and micro-regions program in Mexico (De Janvry & Sadoulet, 2004), this newly-
understood reality did not inspire a search for a way to bring urban and rural development in a 
single synergistic framework. 
Rather, inspired by the sustainable livelihoods framework (Carney, 1998) (discussed in more 
detail in Section 2.2), contemporary development practice’s most widely used response appears 
to be expanding rural household’s options of livelihood. A large part of such range of options is 
seeking livelihood in the cities or abroad. Training in trades useful in cities and helping with job 
search in the city became the goals of many donor-funded projects. A large number of 
development NGOs undertook such work around the low-income world, with the DFID as one of 
the big funders until recently. This new tool was added to already existing tools of micro-credit, 
and various sectoral programs. All in all, contemporary development policy has the look of a 
motley collection of tools that continue to include economic thoughts from the 1950s, as well as 
more recent inventions such micro-credit and decentralization. The directionless-ness is 
indicated by the fact that the name of any project, irrespective of any link between project 
intervention and poverty alleviation, can and often end with the words “for poverty alleviation’! 
Examples include, “school building for poverty alleviation”, “village market development for 
poverty alleviation” and similar sectoral projects with the title “poverty alleviation”.  
In summary, rural areas have been shaped by the interests of colonialism, and later nation 
building.  Often it has meant gradual decay of the economy and society in the rural areas and 
their chances at attaining prosperity. Current development policy has chosen two loci to 
intervene with the stated goal of poverty alleviation: (a) the national level, and (b) sectoral 
projects (with or without sector-wide coordination). The rural space is not the loci of 
development in the low-income world7. The hope, though not made explicit, is that rural 
                                                 
7 Europe, via European Union, emphasized sub-national territory-based planning and development as early as the 
1990s, the most famous and ambitious of the programs being the LEADER program. 
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prosperity will be an indirect product of the increased activities in sectors. In the process of such 
policies, rural regions continue to remain in stasis. 
1.3 The March against Poverty Runs through Rural Regions 
There can be two major positions as to the country-side and its role in development policy: 
(a) Ignore them and concentrate resources in one or a few localities to create economies of 
agglomeration. The growth generated by density will trickle down, which together with 
transfer payments (if necessary) will benefit the rural regions. 
(b) Find policy package and appropriate strategy to bring prosperity to rural regions. 
The first position, which is implicitly adopted by the mainstream policy, is untenable on many 
grounds. Perhaps the most prominent recent document to argue this position is the World 
Development Report (WDR) 2009 (Gill, 2009), which claims that growth can be, and needs to be 
spatially unequal, but development does not need to be. In other words, there can be swaths of 
human settlements with little economic productivity, because most productive activities need to 
concentrate. This claim is based on concepts such as “internal economies of scale”, “localization 
economies”, and “urbanization economies” that are invoked to claim the inevitability, and 
therefore need for facilitation of concentration of economic activities. However, how growth 
from this concentration of economic activities can help development across space is not 
elaborated in the WDR 2009 beyond calls for “integrating lagging and leading areas” (p. 238), as 
opposed to separate spatial targeting of lagging areas. The prescribed mechanism of integration 
consists of “institutions”, “infrastructure”, and “incentives”. Read for detailed strategy, the 
prescription has very little enthusiasm for development of the lagging areas. Rather, it 
encourages facilitating migration so people take advantage of opportunities in cities where 
economic activities have concentrated, as the claim goes, efficiently. 
This mode of thought does not elaborate what kind of economic activities and firms it presumes 
will appear in the economy of the low-income countries. Many of the manufacturing activities of 
the early industrializers needed concentration. Well-known examples include Manchester, 
Dundee, and the Ruhr region of the late 19th and early 20th century. The policy proposal of 
facilitating concentration in the WDR is built on the experiences of early industrializers and the 
“east Asian Tigers”, and thereby implicitly assumes similar types of industries appearing in the 
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low-income countries (Bryceson, Gough, Rigg, & Agergaard, 2009). However, the type of 
industrialization in the low-income countries will likely be very different than the type observed 
in the early industrializers (namely, heavy manufacturing and processing in steel, textile, and 
chemical engineering). Studies that conclude polarization (i.e. continuous disproportionately 
high growth of cities) is necessary (e.g. Storper, 1991) often ignore that some forms of 
manufacturing and processing do not necessarily require extreme forms of polarization. Claims 
such as “Industrial location analysis is [...] the logical starting point for theorizing polarization...” 
(Storper, 1991: p8) does not take into account the role of the governments in the creation of large 
megapolises in the low-income countries. 
Polarization in such industry-focused model is claimed to have resulted through the following 
process (Figure 01): 
Figure 1 Purported process of polarization in industrial urbanization 
 
However, that logic has eroded away if it ever was the dominant logic of spatial order in the 
developing countries. Given the diversity of commodity chains, there cannot be a general theory 
relating manufacturing/processing and growth potential of rural regions. It will certainly be, to 
use the cliché, context dependent. There are empirical situations where the problem of 
transaction cost did not stand in the way of manufacturing activities appearing in areas with no 
such history. For example, Bangladeshi village women scattered over multiple villages, 
producing ceremonial headgears at their homesteads that get collected by a broker and is shipped 
to Persian Gulf countries after a final round of processing in a small “factory” clearly have not 
been deterred by the problem of transaction cost. The Japanese just-in-time (JIT) management of 
production work has raised reasons that polarization in the manner of San Paolo (as in Storper, 
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1991) needs not be the case8. On the other hand, polarization amid decline of manufacturing and 
processing is well-known. Thus, manufacturing and processing is diverse enough to set us free 
from a binding assumption that polarization is inherent in growth through manufacturing and 
processing. 
The current mainstream alternative to space-conscious planning is the reliance on policies 
derived from the paradigm that’s often referred to as “global neoliberalism”. One mainstay of 
such policy package is the reliance on attracting or hoping for footloose capital to the country in 
the form of foreign direct investment (FDI). However, even a cursory look at the flow of FDI 
points to the fact that the investments go to very few countries around the world. For example, in 
the early days of FDI outside the developed world, East Asia and Latin America on an average 
received close to 80% of the world’s FDI from 1975 to 1995 (as computed by Dunning, 2001, 
p166 from WB, 1997 data). Even within the more attractive countries, the FDI goes to very few 
cities and special economic zones (Chakravorty, 2000). Amid such reality, it does not make 
sense to pin all hopes on growth in (i.e. concentration or increased density) the big cities to carry 
the national economy forward. In many countries (in fact most low-income countries except 
China and India) with such bleak prospect of the industry or service sector in the cities, rural 
areas will need to contribute to growth of the economies by fostering vibrant economies in rural 
areas. Migration can be an option for some people in the countryside, but cannot be the only 
option for an overwhelming majority.  
Moreover, as confirmed by a recent study of 83 country data from 2000 to 2012, leaving a large 
number of people in disadvantaged rural regions will lead to less poverty alleviation from overall 
growth in the economy (Barbier, 2015). A similar study (Modrego & Berdegué, 2015), albeit 
with a different methodology, of Latin American sub-national territorial units concluded that (a) 
household income converged slowly since the liberalization began, and (b) “there is 
                                                 
8 It has to be noted however that geographic distribution of population in Japan is highly polarized, and continue to 
polarize with the growth of Tokyo region, while the rest of Japan except Aichi prefecture depopulate. It can be 
argued that such polarization occurred despite JIT, not because of it. 
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no consistent effect of agglomeration on poverty reduction across countries” (p. 25). In other 
words, even if the aggregate national economy grows, having large number of people in 
disadvantaged rural areas will eat away at the poverty-reducing impact of such growth. 
Perhaps the most notable example of rural development benefitting from the growth of industrial 
and service sectors in urban areas is the Saemaul Undong (new community) movement in the 
Republic of Korea in the 1970s. A unique confluence of factors in the Republic of Korea in the 
1950s such as the world geopolitics involving the peninsula, foreign aid as high as 15% of the 
GDP for over a decade, a dictatorship helping coordinate the activities of the private sector 
corporations toward national growth, and significant land reform contributed to Korea’s urban 
based industrial growth. The phenomenal growth allowed for transfer payments, in both cash and 
kind (e.g. cement and iron rod for each village) to rural communities throughout the 1970s 
(Douglass, 1983 and 2014). It is unlikely the circumstances of Korea’s economic growth can be 
replicated in the case of the “late industrializers”. 
It should be noted that at the geographic level of urban areas and urban neighborhoods, there is a 
consistent and long-running literature critiquing what has come to be known as “place-based” 
policies. Such line of critique claims that place-based incentives (1) reach the non-poor in the 
targeted place more than the poor there, and (2) are ill-conceived bribes to force the poor to stay 
in poor areas (Crane & Manville, 2008). Such critiques advocate “people-based” policies and 
would gladly see an urban district lose population.  However, at the larger scale of rural regions 
that are often home to hundreds of thousands, a parallel argument is hard to make. It would be 
hard to make an argument in favor of abandoning an entire rural region that has been settled for 
generations. 
Many of the arguments against the potential of rural areas do not apply to many countries in the 
world. For example, many rural areas are not low-density, as is often presumed. Some of the 
rural areas in the low-income world have the population density of the urban areas in the 
developed world (Qadeer, 2000). Such density allows for a large enough labor pool and 
potentially a consumer pool, if purchasing power can be raised. Moreover, when the population 
density is high, per capita cost of social services and infrastructure decreases substantially. 
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Given the above, it is hard to justify why development policy should not explicitly and directly 
pursue development of rural regions, as opposed to seeking development via sectors such as 
agriculture, or pursue development via growth of urban economy. Space cannot be seen as a 
passive recipient of macro-level policies. Specially in the institutional setting of low-income 
countries, relying on macro-economic signals and un-coordinated sectoral interventions will 
continue to be less effective, if not counter-productive. It is fair to conclude that the fight against 
poverty is unlikely to be successful if the strategies remain (1) apathetic to the implication of 
policies on space, (2) or continue to encourage spatial concentration of economic activities in a 
few mega-urban regions. Planning and development of rural regions as the locales of human 
communities is important by itself, as well for the national economy. 
1.4 Finding a Name for What We Want: A Note on Nomenclature 
A common experience in planning is that names quickly acquire meaning far beyond what a 
dictionary definition would suggest. For example, ‘integrated rural development’ is not just a 
goal or principle, it actually is a fairly rigid modus operandi standardized by the World Bank in 
the 1970s. Other terms get co-opted to be used in ways that takes out the initial thrust of the 
term. Examples of such co-opted terms include “social capital” and “participation”.  
Many of the terms suitable to describe the central normative goal of this dissertation are already 
taken. For example, a model of development of a region initiated by the citizen associations in 
that region cannot be called regional development because the term carries an additional 
connotation of government-led effort. Likewise, terms such as “local development” have their 
own specific meanings. A review of the nomenclature and clarification of meanings therefore is 
in order. 
Several adjectives have been used in front of ‘planning and/or development’. They include 
‘local’, ‘regional rural’, ‘rural regional’, ‘micro-regional’, ‘territorial’, and ‘spatial’. None of 
them signal the establishment of a new academic discipline, at least not in a well-known way. 
‘Local economic development’ perhaps comes closest without having been widely known as an 
academic discipline. For example, Bingham & Mier (1993) call three decades of literature as 
aiding practice “while flirting with the establishment of a new academic discipline” (pp. 268-
269). The World Bank’s local economic development (LED) website characterizes “the purpose 
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of local economic development” as “build[ing] up the economic capacity of a local area to 
improve its economic future and the quality of life for all. It is a process by which public, 
business, and non-governmental sector partners work collectively to create better conditions for 
economic growth and employment generation” (in Dillinger, 2007). However, the idea of LED 
cannot be fully understood without being aware to the fact that it was part of the neoliberal 
package to replace the government-led regional planning and development (Polese, 1999). In 
other words, “local economic development” has a connotational meaning that makes it 
unsuitable for the normative goal here, i.e. development of rural regions. 
The other adjectives often used are discussed below. 
1. “Regional rural development” is used by the German international development agency 
(formerly) GTZ in their English language documents. The word ‘regional’ in front of ‘rural 
development’ signals their rhetorical position that rural development has to be done 
regionally. 
2. The use of ‘rural regional development’ signifies that (1) there is an added benefit in viewing 
rural areas as rural regions, (2) rural territories include small and medium towns that should 
ideally tie into the social, and economic fabric of the region, and (3) rural regions stand in 
contrast to metropolitan regions, and in that sense heartland rural regions is often used. As 
mentioned in section 1.1, this is the sense in which we use the term in this dissertation. 
3. In Europe, “territorial development” has taken the meaning of development of the backward 
regions (as opposed to growth in the major centers of economy and production). In rural 
development, the use of the term ‘territorial development’ can be seen as a desire to break 
from the agriculture and sectoral project based rural development.  
4. Two of the most articulate assertions of this desire are de Janvry & Sadoulet (2007), and 
Schejtman & Berdegué (2004). Both sets of authors have similar central characteristics for 
the new approach: (a) multi-sectoral approach to employment, (b) planning rural areas as 
territorial units with a view to local growth, (c) incorporating an urban component. 
5. Current practices of territorial development in the central and Latin America appear to be 
grappling with the right political arrangements. It mostly relies on the nation-state as the 
instigator and carrier of rural development, while contrary voices (e.g. see Bebbington, 
Abramovay, & Chiriboga, 2008) arguing for installing communities as the main actor in 
territorial development can be heard too. 
6. “Micro-regional development” is less commonly used. A micro-region has been conceived as 
“distinct territorial unit with clearly marked boundaries below the regional level, but above 
the village level”  (Schmidt-Kallert, 2005, p. 10). In Latin America the most natural micro-
region is the municipality, which is a local administrative and political unit, similar to a 
district in other countries (Arrizón, Andersson, & Ledogar, 2011). It is meant to emphasize 
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the fact that it is not the large territories such as provinces that are the unit of planning. 
Rather a much smaller area, perhaps one with one or several small towns and the adjacent 
contiguous area is seen as the unit of planning. 
7. “Endogenous development” has established traditions in both economics and development 
policy. In economics, mostly as an extension of Romer’s (1985) work, endogenous growth 
theory claimed that growth is determined and sustained by local processes and locally-bound 
capitals (such as human capital). The policy implication, especially in local development, 
was that growth required investments in education, and institutions. In recent times, the 
European spatial development programs have been called “neo-endogenous” (Ray, 1999), 
with the prefix “neo“ added to make the distinction that recent approach allows for linkages 
to the outside. 
None of the above terms have become their own academic disciplines. However, they are 
beginning to acquire connotational meanings. For example, territorial planning is beginning to 
take shape as a particular model thanks to the Centro Latinamericano para el Desarrollo Rural 
(Latin American Center for Rural Development, commonly referred to as RIMISP) in Chile. 
Micro-regional planning is also becoming a modus operandi with recent funding of such projects 
in Mexico. In contrast, “rural regional planning” is a term that has not taken on any additional 
connotation to its meaning. We will use this term in this dissertation. 
1.5 The Irrelevance of 1960s Style Regional Planning, and the 
Potential for Re-inventing Regional Planning 
1.5.1 The Irrelevance 
While a regional and territorial approach is at the heart of this dissertation, regional planning, as 
developed as a field of study and practice in the 1960s, has little to offer in terms of theories and 
models. The field of regional planning received widespread legitimacy in the early 1960s for two 
reasons: (a) the negative side-effects of the policies up to that point (described in section 1.2) that 
failed to take account of impacts across space, and (b) the emergence of regional science (see 
Isard, 1956 and 1960) as rigorous body of knowledge (Simon, 1990). Over time, regional 
planning became an umbrella field for a number of objectives that include (based on Conyers, 
1985): 
1. Eliminate Inter-regional inequality 
2. Tapping into the potential of backward regions mainly by way of industrialization 
3. Achieving balanced (conforming to the rank-size rule) urban development 
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4. Secondary towns for rural/agricultural development 
5. Regional plans as disaggregation of national plans 
However, the first three objectives became the central problematique of regional planning in 
practice, and the field developed only one tool for all situations. This panacea of a tool, 
concentrated investment in urban areas to create “growth poles” that would presumably spread 
growth into lagging regions emerged as the only tool in regional planning’s toolbox (Parr, 1999). 
By late 1970s, the growth pole strategy got severely discredited. 
Regional planning and regional science’s diminished influence owed partly to the critique of 
growth poles strategy. However, the rise of neo-liberalism in economic policy in the late 1970s 
removed the ideological background and funding for it. Many of the tools to implement 
objectives of regional planning such as taxation, subsidy, and active government spending in 
infrastructure were not compatible with neoliberal ideologies. With these tools removed 
wherever neoliberalism took hold, and the general distrust of growth pole as a strategy, regional 
planning itself faded away9. 
Neither growth pole strategy nor regional science is relevant to the rural regional development of 
the low-income countries. Regional science, as a science that began to spawn academic 
disciplines in the late 1950s, pre-supposed the existence of some laws and rules that govern the 
regions and their sub-systems. The models that attempted to explain these laws were void of 
political economy analysis. For example, the central place theory was developed based on a 
description of Germany, predominantly a flat land that became a nation state long after France. 
Therefore, what is now Germany developed cities of equivalent sizes at regular intervals (i.e. 
central places at uniform distances). The German case can be directly contrasted with the French 
state where earlier state formation allowed Paris to accumulate from the rest of the country and 
emerge as a primate city. Such political economy analysis was absent from the regional science 
investigations. 
                                                 
9 Korea was a prominent exception, where the state continued to pursue balanced development and had the 
wherewithal to pursue such inter-regional planning (Kim, 1998). 
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Other models too were descriptive and had little analytical power. For example, why cities in a 
country should have certain size relative to their position in the urban hierarchy, as stated in 
rank-size model, is never explained. Rather it became a normative goal based on unfounded 
assumptions. Regional science eventually suffered from such lack of analytical power, which 
mostly rose out of inability to factor in the political economy inherent in places. Later definitions 
of regional science reflect this recognition on the part of the leaders of the regional science 
community10. By incorporating political economy, regional science in recent years has expanded 
from a core of quantitative exercise in search of laws (1960s) and become nearly all 
encompassing, considerably diluted and vague. However, this is not a criticism. It reflects the 
recognition that studying and development of regions require consideration of many issues, 
theories, and tools. For the purposes of this dissertation, this history and evolution of Regional 
Science as an academic discipline is therefore instructive. 
1.5.2 The Need and Potential for Re-inventing Regional Planning 
The term “regional planning” almost has a stigma associated with it. For some the stigma is from 
the failure of the tools in the 1960s and 1970s. For others with neoliberal inclinations, it was the 
objective of what they view as meddling with the efficiency (i.e. inter-regional equality or 
developing a region using market-distorting measures) of the market. In the meantime, for 
reasons mentioned in Section 1.3, regions, especially rural heartland regions continue to be 
important. 
Poverty alleviation policy of recent times is still striving to formulate “national” strategies 
disregarding the fact that the processes of descent into or ascent out of poverty is so different in 
different areas of the same country that a case has been made that “national” strategies are rather 
irrelevant (Krishna & Shariff, 2011) and should be targeted at the district and sub-district levels 
(Benson, Chamberlin, & Rhinehart, 2005, p. 549). Having discovered different reasons behind 
descent into and ascent out of poverty in different states and regions within states in India, 
Krishna and Shariff (2011) call for poverty alleviation policy at the state, and perhaps (their 
sample size at sub-state regional level was small, and hence the lack of conviction) at the sub-
                                                 
10 The discontinuation of the first ever Regional Science program (established in 1959) at the University of 
Pennsylvania in 1993 is symbolic of such shift. 
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state regional level. Such call for planning of ‘regions’, albeit often unspecified and undefined, is 
not rare. For example, the World Development Report 2008 calls for a “large-scale regional 
approach or assisting the exit of populations” (p. 49) where “geographic poverty trap” exists. 
However, there is no further foray into operationalizing ‘regional approach’. 
There is a growing recognition that strategies need to be at much smaller geographic units than 
the nation or provinces, even though determination of the size of the geographic scale can require 
substantial scrutiny. For example, one of the lessons that transpired from the community 
development projects in the 1950s is that the geographic scale of villages is too small for policies 
to be effective. This gives a reason to explore geographic scale in between the nation (or even 
province) and small villages. Intuitively, it gives prima facie legitimacy to the idea that a scale 
comprising a contiguous area that is large enough to form a local economy can be a unit of 
analysis and planning. For our purposes, we call this ‘region’. 
Such recognition calls out for some theory or framework for regional development appropriate 
for the low-income countries. The new frameworks will likely have no resemblance to the 
theories and models of the 1960s’ regional planning. But for the lack of a better term we call this 
rural regional planning. 
1.6 Rural Regional Planning: Outline of an Agenda for Research 
As a point of departure, schematically, rural regional planning in the contemporary world can be 
seen as an intervention to negotiate with global as well as local forces with the objective of 
prosperity of rural regions in a way that creates opportunity for all. Many of these forces in the 
contemporary world, such as (a) location specificity of global finance (i.e. FDI going mostly to 
China and/or large cities), (b) economic and political doctrines that shape mainstream policy (i.e. 
neoliberalism), are not conducive to development of rural regions. However, the inspiration here 
is that within the overarching structure, room for maneuvering exists. 
 
24 
 
Figure 2 Rural regional planning as a mediating force between local and global processes 
 
 
When viewed this way, the question becomes what would constitute rural regional prosperity, 
and what will be the shape of a strategy or strategies for rural regional development. The first 
task of this dissertation therefore is to put together an outline or a policy framework for rural 
regional development. This same formulation of rural regional development can also provide 
hints for how an individual rural region needs to be seen and analyzed. There are two major areas 
to analyze and link: (A) the overarching structure of global and national forces, and (b) the space 
economy and political economy of rural regions. The first involves an examination of the 
specific ways global economic, political, and cultural forces influence the economic, social, and 
political life in a rural region. The second recognizes the obvious but potentially ignored fact that 
the rural regions are not a black box. Rather they have a political economy with heterogeneity of 
interests among communities in the rural regions. A policy framework for rural regional 
development will draw from such analysis. 
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Chapter Two: Poverty and Development Policy 
 
2.1 Defining Poverty for Policy Relevance 
We used the word poverty in the first chapter without defining it. The precariousness of life of 
some people in society has been perceived and described in multiple ways. The English language 
has words such as pauper, destitute, indigent, and poor. In development policy, the words “poor” 
and “poverty” have come to be used, to the complete exclusion of the other words. As the 
literature stands now, poverty is defined in one of the following ways: (a) as lack of income, (b) 
as vulnerability and exclusion from society, and (c) some kind of multi-dimensional concept 
involving income and other indicators of well-being and capability (as used by Sen, 1985). 
Since the early 1990s income-based method used by the World Bank to quantify poverty has 
become widely-known, and has a hegemonic presence in discussions on poverty in policy circles 
as well as in popular press. Part of the charm of this formulation of poverty is its simplicity. This 
method (a) sets a poverty line (a monetary amount that is required to have access to a level of 
consumption/welfare and then (b) counts the people with income under this line. An international 
line has been constructed using poverty lines of certain number of poor countries (15 at the latest 
round) and adjusted with purchasing power parity data. The most recent version of this 
international poverty line stands at $1.90 per day that gives a 2012 global hard core poverty rate 
of 12.7%, but as high as 42.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Two major observations have been made about this measure. The first is that the poverty line of 
$1.90 is too low. It is not enough to meet any need beyond the very basic nutritional needs in 
even the poorest of countries. By setting a line this low, it does not capture the hardship of many 
people in the society, and essentially under-reports people’s precarity and hardship. The second 
is that such measurement of poverty was not designed to offer insights into the forces that 
produce poverty. ‘Poverty profiling’, a practice encouraged by the World Bank in the 1990s, 
especially in the 1993 Poverty Reduction Handbook does not provide much insights either. The 
method of “poverty profile” implicitly stems from the idea that the causes of poverty can be 
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understood from the characteristics of the poor. While an exercise in poverty profiling reveals 
useful information such as “which group (e.g. females, fishermen) is the largest among the 
poor”, policy needs more information than what poverty profiling can reveal. 
An argument can be made that income-based neat measurement of poverty and study of 
characteristics of poverty is an inevitable consequence and corollary of the neoliberal ideology 
that viewed economic growth as the answer to poverty. In other words, the method to alleviate a 
problem produced its own definition of the problem. We do not elaborate this idea here, but it is 
important to emphasize that students of poverty policy need to look beyond such measures and 
investigate the social relations that produce poverty. 
Recent developments in improving measurement of poverty have led to multi-dimensional 
measurement (e.g. see Kakwani & Silber, 2007; Wietzke, 2015; UNDP, 2010), as opposed to 
income-based computation alone. Much of this approach is a result of methodological 
improvements to capture the concept of capability by factoring it in the operational indicators of 
poverty. Early choices of indicators in attempts at measuring capability have been dictated by 
available data. Some examples of indicators thus far used include education, and living 
conditions (Krishnakumar & Ballon, 2008). The improved techniques of computing indicators 
take advantage of more sophisticated quantitative techniques such as principal component 
analysis, factor analysis, and structural equation modeling. 
The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) has been publishing multi-dimensional 
poverty index (MPI) for countries for which data is available since 2010. The measure is an 
attempt at going beyond income as the only metric, and including measures of deprivation such 
as nutrition, health, and schooling. It measures more directly the level of deprivation for a 
household. By directly incorporating indicators of quality of life (such as nutrition, and 
schooling) the multi-dimensional poverty index offers a more direct way of measuring poverty 
than the solely income-based method of the World Bank. Comparison of the two at aggregated 
levels such as regions or countries can help shape discussions. For example, when two regions 
with similar income have different nutrition outcomes, it invites a discussion on the social and 
political processes through which income gets translated into nutrition. 
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It is often stated that how poverty is defined sets the tone for how poverty alleviation policy is 
formulated. For example, if poverty is defined as lack of income then, it is stated, a policy of 
raising income via economic growth will follow from that definition. However, it is conceivable 
that a well-considered analysis can define poverty as lack of income and still identify that lack or 
uncertainty of income result from manifestations of power relations in the society. If analysis is 
not truncated, it can discover the deeper causes. Thus, a quantitative definition of poverty in 
terms of income does not preclude the discovery that lack of income is a result of causal factors 
(e.g. lack of access to assets, livelihoods, exploitation) that can flow from social relations. If 
rigorous analysis is conducted, perhaps the definition (i.e. the starting point) cannot misguide 
policy as long the analysis is not curtailed short.  
However, in the mainstream development policy and practice, the income based definition of 
poverty has encouraged an economic growth oriented solution to poverty. Mainstream 
development policy and practice historically shied away from addressing the exploitative 
relationships and rural power structure (discussed in the next section). Since the dual economy 
inspired model of the 1950s, the mainstream development practice apparently remained 
oblivious to the body of evidence (e.g. Bertocci, 1970) that pointed out that exploitative 
relationships and institutions restrict life chances of the poor. The rare mentions of such 
exploitation in sporadic mainstream documents, do not amount to anything more than lip service. 
For example, Voices of the Poor: Can Anyone Hear Us (Narayan, 2000), a report prepared after 
consulting the poor around the world advocated people’s increased participation in the 
formulation of development policy. However, much of development policy in the mainstream 
remains top-down, and at the level of projects, participation is often done perfunctorily. 
This dissertation recognizes that poverty is, to give it a pithy and catchy expression, not in the 
economy but in the political economy. Hence, a framework to analyze rural regional poverty 
needs to have vulnerability produced by social relations and institutions at its core. Taking this 
position would also mean that alleviation of poverty ought not translate to reducing people under 
$1.90 a day income line. Rather, it should be recognized that much higher income can still keep 
households in precarity and hardship. 
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2.1 Poverty as a Manifestation of Social Relations 
While not as neat as the measurement of poverty via a poverty line, a few insights are available 
in the literature that essentially point to social relations as causes of poverty. One of the early 
thoughts in the post-colonial era is from Paulo Freire. While his life’s work was education, his 
analysis touched upon the general predicament of a segment of population. His basic premise is 
that the oppressed adopt the values of the oppressor, and inherently become unable to change 
their condition. Many of the later studies on patron-client relationship discovered that the same 
institutions (such as debt bondage) that offered some security also stifled any opportunity for the 
poor to get better (e.g. Wood, 2003; Bhaduri, 1973). Freire’s answer was a new approach to 
education that can self-empower the oppressed. While those impatient for a finely-detailed 
template for policy and action will not see much in it, Freire’s analysis was one of the earliest to 
raise the proposition that poverty is not merely a lack of income. 
Another analysis that investigates how poverty occurs is the idea of entitlement. Traditional 
societies granted entitlement (however meager) to members of the community in many forms 
that include access to common property resources, ownership of property, right to work, and 
even charity. As societies gradually adopt the institutions characteristic of a capitalist society, 
many such entitlements erode. When the state is incapable of granting alternative entitlements, 
the only source of entitlement in a capitalist society is money. Another idea that can be lumped 
together with the previous two is that of capability, which Sen (1985) described as ability to 
function in society. The idea of capability does not allow for easy operationalization. However, it 
points out that poverty is an attribute of the relationship with society. 
For the convenience of discussion, vulnerability can be thought of as at two scales: (a) within the 
region, i.e. in the regional political economy as expressed in customs and institutions, and (b) the 
region relative to other areas, i.e. relationship of the region either as a whole to other geopolitical 
units, or different interest groups and communities within regions with the outside forces. The 
most visible among the sources of vulnerabilities of households in the first category are agrarian 
institutions. There is a rich empirical literature on this theme from around the world. The most 
prominent agrarian institutions include debt-bondage, exploitative terms in share-cropping, 
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usurious lending, and rules and customs governing access to common property such as water 
bodies and pastures. 
The extra-regional forces (such as global and national) can potentially make entire rural regions 
vulnerable. However, all residents in a particular region do not have the same interests, and are 
not impacted the same way. Thus, outside forces can produce vulnerabilities in several ways that 
include (a) undermining the entire region, and (b) undermining certain groups within a region. 
Such varied impacts of outside forces require room for nuanced analysis. For example, entire 
economic regions can be neglected in national policy, or the major economic activities in a 
region can be sacrificed by the national government, jeopardizing the prosperity of the rural 
region11. On the other hand, certain groups within a rural region can be systematically 
disadvantaged through policy. For example, small holder agriculturalists were often 
disadvantaged by (de facto) government policy (Lipton, 1977). 
A central tenet/pillar of rural regional development needs to be reduction of vulnerability of both 
the region as a whole, and the communities within them. Understanding vulnerability of 
households, communities and regions, therefore, needs to be addressed in any framework to 
analyze rural regions. 
2.2 Chronic Poverty and Poverty Traps  
The malaise in the countryside is not adequately captured by the quantification of poverty using 
a poverty line. The hard-core poverty (i.e. the rate using the lower income line) is decreasing 
faster than absolute (the rate using the upper income line) poverty. It means that households are 
not rising far above hard core poverty line. It is generally accepted that even the income (or 
expenditure) that denotes the upper poverty line does not guarantee anything beyond a precarious 
life. If a higher poverty line that accounts for the needs beyond food is used, poverty rate will not 
appear to be as low, and recent successes in poverty alleviation (Ravallion and Chen, 2012) as 
                                                 
11 For example, NAFTA is considered to have brought a net positive to the US national economy. However, it also 
played some role in certain regions losing the cornerstones of their economies as manufacturing plants left. Another 
such example would be Republic of Korea’s removal of import tariff on rice as part of trade agreements that played 
a role in the further decay of Korean countryside. 
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dramatic. Generations of people who are living a precarious life do not show up as poor in 
official statistics. Such poverty12is often chronic (Green & Hulme, 2005). 
One useful way to see poverty and vulnerability is through the concept of traps. We use the word 
“trap” in the sense of reinforcing mechanism that prevents the poor from being able to rise out of 
poverty. Studies from around the low-income world show that a large portion of the people who 
are poor are also chronically poor (e.g. see Fig 01 of Barrett & Swallow, 2006 reproduced in 
Appendix 2). Analysis of poverty data where “poverty” is operationalized via a cut-off point on 
income scale can show that households rise out of and fall below poverty lines (as in Krishna & 
Shariff, 2011). However, the rise is often not far above the hard core (i.e. lower) poverty line. In 
other words, even after rising out of poverty a significant number of households stay close to the 
poverty line.  Such miniscule rise, where there is a rise, signifies that a trap-effect is true for 
many people. After all, the word “poor” is a somewhat permanent tag. In interviews with poor 
people, we hear “we are poor”, not “we are currently poor”. 
The trap however is different at different scales. At the level of households, how livelihoods are 
constructed offers a good lens to explore if there are any hindrances that tantamount to a poverty 
trap at the level of households. The Sustainable Livelihoods (SL) model offers a good lens to 
explore how livelihoods are constructed. Carney (1998) borrowing from Chambers and Conway 
(1992) provides a short definition of livelihoods that became well-known: “A livelihood 
comprises the capabilities, assets (including both material and social resources) and activities 
required for a means of living.” A livelihood is sustainable “when it can cope with and recover 
from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the 
future, while not undermining the natural resource base.” 
                                                 
12 The word “poverty” has been colonized so much by the World Bank’s $1.25 (and later $1.90) version that the 
English word poverty has taken on a specific meaning of having an income below $1.25. In this sentence, we would 
like to use the word with a wider meaning. 
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Figure 3 Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Reproduced from DFID, 1999) 
 
Used as a descriptive, synoptic tool, SLA’s central idea is that households construct their 
livelihoods from multiple sources based on their capabilities, assets/capitals (e.g. physical, 
financial, human, natural, and social) and vulnerabilities. Lack of some of the capitals can hinder 
households to secure livelihoods. Years of ethnographic and quantitative studies provide insights 
into how the life of poor takes shape. The rural regions are varied in terms of ecology, resources 
and specific nature of economic activities. However, the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework 
(SLF) offers some generalizable facts about the livelihoods. Often the poor do not have physical 
assets such as land. In the absence of land, the able-bodied poor rely on selling their labor, or on 
non-agricultural pursuits such as petty trading that offer a meagre livelihood. When the schools 
and education systems are poor or non-existing, children in the rural regions are not equipped 
with the knowledge and skills to have access to higher earnings. Often the only source of better 
income is beyond the region they live in. The poor often lack the social connections that help 
secure an opportunity for a job or business. It is no wonder that in the case study region, the 
wisdom is captured in an aphorism: “A poor beggar has to marry into poor beggars”, signifying 
that the poor’s social relations are largely confined to other poor people. 
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How can the vast numbers of poor households in the rural regions secure better livelihoods? As 
per the SLF, it is by enhancing one or more of the “capitals” and by reducing the vulnerabilities. 
Some tools to enhance “capitals” have existed long before SLF was conceived as a 
comprehensive and synoptic framework in the 1990s. Examples include micro-credit, expansion 
of education, agricultural input subsidies and extension services. The literature on each of these 
points to the fact that they alone, when applied to household level cannot help households out of 
poverty traps. For example, micro-credit while being crucial to many households is also 
constricted by the stagnant local economies of rural regions. Likewise, expenditure in education 
by itself did not help poverty reduction much (Pritchett, 2001).  
One condition when enhancement of “capitals” can fail to alleviate a household’s poverty is the 
presence of geographic trap. In addition to being intuitively acceptable, geographic trap is 
supported by analysis from quantitative data. For example, Jalan & Ravallion ( 2002) suggest 
that identical households can have different rates of consumption growth because of geographic 
externalities; or geographic variables can impact living standards (Ravallion & Wodon, 1999). Is 
it advisable to have a poverty alleviation policy that targets the poor households in such poor 
regions based on the characteristics of the poor (i.e. in the manner of poverty profiling)? For 
example, if the fishermen comprise a large portion of the poor in a certain region, will it be 
reasonable to devise a poverty alleviation program to help the fishermen, perhaps by increasing 
their working capital and/or fishing equipment?  Available evidence suggests that such a 
program will hit a ceiling defined by the “geographic externalities” or overall poverty of the rural 
region. 
What creates a geographic poverty trap for rural regions? Some oft-cited reasons in the 
mainstream analysis are distance to markets (remoteness), lack of connectivity (i.e. roads), and 
low productivity of soil. However, rural regions can also suffer from high leakage from the rural 
regions, or policies of the government (such as suppression of price) can disadvantage a rural 
region. For example, in many highly-productive rural regions, the profit accrues to a small 
number of owners who take the profit out of the rural regional economy. Many resource rich 
areas (for example diamond mining areas, or forest areas with significant logging, or agricultural 
areas where land is owned by absentee owners) have very high rate of poverty because of 
leakage. 
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The traps at different scales (households and rural regions, or beyond) has prompted Barrett & 
Swallow (2006) to propose the hypothesis of fractal poverty traps. The basic statement of the 
hypothesis is: Multiple low level equilibriums exist at different scales (e.g household, 
community, rural region, and nation). Because of feedback effect across scales, any attempt to 
bring one up to high level gets stifled by the others (Barrett and Swallow, 2006). In other words, 
this hypothesis is an erudite restatement of a widely-agreed fact that households can decide to 
live in a low-risk life of indigence, because the poor community they live in offers no 
opportunity to rise out of that. Offering credit to these poor households will not help them much 
because the low-level equilibrium of the surrounding community (rural region) will suppress the 
household level dynamics and make it stable at a low-level equilibrium. 
Inspired by the fractal poverty traps hypothesis, we can list the traps at different geographic 
levels: 
1. Household: low assets, low level of education and health, low level of social power (e.g. 
as a result of membership in certain castes or tribes) which finds expression in among 
others, diminished entitlements. 
2. Rural regions: lack of physical infrastructure, lack of roads, lack of productive activities, 
high leakage, government policies in distributive allocation, and provision of service. 
3. Nation: neo-colonialism, international division of labor. 
The presence of traps at different scales means that poverty alleviation at the household level can 
only be sub-optimal. Simultaneous intervention at different levels of geographic scale provides 
the best chance for synergy. Poverty alleviation efforts stand a chance to succeed if such cross-
scale synergy is achieved. 
2.3 Some Well-Known Diagnosis of Poverty: Moribund Agriculture, 
Urban Bias, and Isolation from Market 
We discuss the contemporary state of development policy in the next section to help understand 
how rural regional development can take shape within the existing arrangements of bureaucracy, 
politics, society, and economy. However, as a backdrop to that discussion, we offer a brief 
review of some major thoughts about development of the low-income countries in the previous 
decades. As identified in Section 1.2, many of these ideas have had bearing on the current state 
of rural regions across the world. They also offer lessons for rural regional development policy. 
34 
 
One of the earliest diagnosis of the agrarian economies was that the economies of the developing 
world were dualistic, comprising a traditional agricultural sector and an industrial sector (Lewis, 
1956). The diagnosis also crucially identified that there was disguised unemployment in the 
agricultural sector and therefore, labor could be transferred from agricultural sector to industrial 
sector without any harm to the former. The title of the paper that proposed the idea had 
“unlimited supply of labour [for industry]” in the title. This was not a poverty alleviation strategy 
per se as much as it was strategy for national development. Ranis & Fei (1961) offered, staying 
on the same theme of duality, a model that brought together the development of both agricultural 
and industrial sectors. They also predicted a three-stage path to self-sustained growth, based on 
gradual transfer of labor from agricultural sector to the industrial sector. 
While not explicit about poverty, this group of models gives clue to how poverty is implicitly 
viewed. Poverty in this view is a result of moribund agriculture. The most well-known insight 
about the characteristics of the poor within this “moribund agriculture” theme, is the idea of 
forced poverty sharing that leads to a process called involution: “the overdriving of an 
established form in such a way that it became rigid through an inward over-elaboration of detail” 
(Geertz, 1963, p. 82). In other words, blocked from advancing, the culture had settled into 
stagnation. 
In this dichotomous view, poverty alleviation becomes a function of national economic growth. 
Together with the growth oriented approach, the late 1970s also saw the emergence of basic 
needs approach (International Labour Office, 1977; Streeten, 1979). Basic needs approach was 
offered as an alternative to the growth focused policies of the previous decade. It argued that the 
central purpose of development is to meet the basic needs of all members of the society. Thus, 
basic needs became the precursor to the now-familiar Human Development Index, and even 
provided the basis for measuring income poverty. According to the basic needs approach, the 
poor are the ones whose basic needs are not met. Operationalizing and measuring basic needs 
was always going to be subjective and context-dependent. However, that inconvenience aside, 
the major policy strategy coming from this approach was the argument in favor of government’s 
involvement in the provision of essential social services such as education and health services, 
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and safety nets. This new position led to a separate realm of policy called “social policy” (for a 
recent revival of “social policy”, see Dani & de Haan, 2008 and de Haan, 2005). 
Another set of ideas of poverty and underdevelopment was proposed in the twenty years 
following the 1950s that insisted that poverty and underdevelopment was essentially produced by 
the relationship between underdeveloped countries and their counterparts. The two major theses 
in this strand are “development of underdevelopment” (Frank, 1966) and “dependent capitalism” 
(Baran, 1957). The former thesis claimed that the underdevelopment in the colonial countries is a 
direct result of how colonies were brought into the realm of mercantilism and later, capitalism in 
the European countries. Within countries too, metropolitan areas re-oriented the country-side to 
produce underdevelopment. The latter (Baran) explains underdevelopment as a result of 
dependent mode of capitalism. It would follow that poverty in this strand of explanations is a 
result of relationships between the developed and the low-income countries. These theories while 
intuitively appealing in light of historical experiences, automatically leads to a policy 
prescription of shutting out of the world capitalist system dominated by the powerful developed 
countries. Without judging the empirical merit of these two theses, it is fair to say that current 
day and age, for better or worse, has come far from the time these were proposed. If at all useful, 
these ideas are probably for another time in history. 
The 1970s saw the urban bias hypothesis, propounded by Lipton (1977). It has been stated 
variously at various times. One formulation is that rural poor stay poor because there is an urban 
bias in de facto government policy. The bias is evidenced in urban areas receiving more 
investment than their fair share. At another place, he explains “fair share” as an amount that 
would be justifiable via consideration of efficiency and equity, without explaining how to 
measure efficiency and equity. This urban bias is brought out by an “unholy alliance” between 
the rural elite and the urban based government. Discussion on urban bias has been a continued 
theme in development policy. As late as 2010 there was a special issue of the journal Progress in 
Development Studies on this topic. This issue followed two special issues (1984 and 1993) of the 
same journal. 
The discussion and disagreements on urban bias have centered on both (a) the evidence (data and 
modeling), and (b) the interpretation of data. Much of the early debate centered on agriculture 
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policy. It was demonstrated that agricultural pricing policy suppressed agricultural prices, and 
the agricultural input subsidies went to large landowners. However, even after elimination of 
“price twists” through structural adjustment in the 1980s, why did the rural areas continue to see 
higher poverty? Eastwood & Lipton (2000) had some answers that are pertinent to understanding 
the prospect for rural regional development. Their answer (summarized by Jones & Corbridge, 
2010) points out: 
(a) the ability of better-educated and better-placed urban people ‘to exploit new 
economic opportunities in the wake of price liberalization’; (b) faster urban 
fertility transitions and the continued ‘town-ward movement of young people, 
educated people, and in Asia and Africa, males’; (c) the ‘prospect of real income 
gains from liberalization’ in previously very restricted or protected urban formal 
activities; and (d) the existence of ‘low-income, immobile and often regionally 
and ethnically specific groups, which – as in China – have proved weak in reaping 
rural “spread effects” from national growth’ (even after ‘the successes of poverty 
reduction in 1970–87’). (From Eastwood and Lipton, 2000: 1–2). 
What Eastwood and Lipton (2000) might also add is the inertia caused by the government 
policies of the1950s and ‘60s, and the nature of bureaucracy and the subtle ways bureaucracy 
works. For example, the processes with which large metropolitan areas grow demonstrate 
significant policy bias. Often the economic logic of clustering of manufacturing activity is 
shaped by government policies and nature of bureaucracy. The processes that bring about urban 
primacy are often subtle, and come into effect by reinforcing each other. For example, in the case 
of Bangladesh, the commercial banks in Bangladesh could sanction their big loans only from the 
headquarters in Dhaka. Letters of credit often requires approval from the headquarters. This fact, 
among others, contributes to the confluence of forces that encourage ready-made garments 
factory owners to set up their operations in Dhaka13. There are other factors that contributed to 
the confluence of mutually reinforcing forces that perpetuated and accentuated the primacy. 
Examples include investments in education in the big city, urban food rationing, and 
                                                 
13 Interview of the then First Vice-President of the Chittagong Chamber of Commerce, Mr Nurul Haque (published 
in Daily Ittefaq, Jan 24, 2004) 
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centralization of bureaucratic decision-making in Dhaka. Such stories abound from the low-
income world that shows a collection of policy decisions, often sectoral, create perpetuation of 
growth of one or two cities at the expense of towns in rural heartlands. 
Another major way urban bias occurs in allocation of resources. As Lipton (1984) identifies, 
urban bias in certain types of allocation (such as number of doctors, schools per unit population) 
is evident. However, for some other items of expense, it is harder to measure. Quantifying urban 
bias in terms of some index or quotient is inherently fraught with subjective judgment in every 
step of the computation. To further complicate the computation the relevant data is often not 
available or misleading. For example, a project for rural area will often be headquartered in a 
city, where a large portion of the project budget is spent. While quantification proved to be hard, 
Lipton has argued that there is an urban bias of outcome (i.e. most poor and disadvantaged 
people live in the rural areas, and rural areas are stagnant). 
For our purposes, we do not need to decide, especially in a binary “yes or no”, on if urban bias 
exists. There are too many countries, policies, investment decisions, and measures of outcome to 
aggregate to pass such a judgment. Urban bias literature brings to the front some mechanisms 
that are of interest to rural regional development. Perhaps its biggest contribution is a list of 
processes to understand and guard against. We incorporate these into the framework to analyze 
rural regional planning, and in the case study. 
Table 2 Different  ways of looking at poverty 
Theory Cause of Poverty Attributes of ‘the 
poor’ 
Way out of 
poverty 
Oppression 
(Freire) 
Subordination Systemically trapped  Self-
empowerment 
Dualistic dev 
(Lewis 1954, Fei-
Ranis, 1961) 
Moribund 
agriculture 
Low productivity 
poverty sharing 
(Geertz,1963) 
Industrialization/ 
growth poles 
Below poverty 
level equilibrium 
trap (Nelson, 
1956) 
Whole economies 
cannot escape low 
production cycle, 
because of low 
level of growth is 
offset by 
population growth, 
Trapped (no mention 
of characteristics of 
poor) 
“Big push”, 
Critical 
Minimum Effort 
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that growth 
appeared to 
encourage 
Development of 
underdevelopment 
and Dependent 
capitalism (Frank, 
1967) and Baran, 
1957) 
North-South 
integration 
Exploited/uneven 
capitalist dev. 
Delink from the 
‘core’ 
Urban bias 
(Lipton, 1977) 
Resources are 
invested in urban 
areas 
(in other words, 
state’s policies 
contributes to 
creation of 
poverty) 
Helpless victims of 
state policy 
Invest in rural 
areas 
Neoliberal 
paradigm 
Generally not 
interested in 
poverty. However, 
implicit answer in 
the paradigm is 
“not being able 
participate in the 
market” 
Without enough 
income to be able to 
purchase a list of bare 
necessities 
 
Proto-entrepreneurs 
Bring productive 
activities within 
the realm of 
unfettered 
market 
Political economy 
view 
 
(Dis)empowerment 
Lack of social 
power 
(oppressed by a 
landed class and 
the agrarian 
institutions such as 
share-cropping) 
Households unable to 
gain power 
Self-
empowerment, 
insurgencies, 
political reform 
The neo-liberal worldview (discussed in Section 1.2) is not primarily a model to explain poverty. 
However, the central tenets of neo-liberalism have been extended to come to a belief that poverty 
stems from markets not functioning properly; and the poor are those who cannot participate in 
market. The staunch belief in market has led to the belief if market does not work, it is the 
governance that is the problem. 
In direct contrast to neoliberal view is the political economy view. We discussed the core of 
political economy view of poverty in Section 2.2 without naming it. As we mention in the next 
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section, this view of poverty is rarely mentioned in mainstream documents. One important 
exception was the World Development Report (WDR) 2000/1 that identified three cornerstones 
of poverty reduction: (a) opportunity, (b) empowerment and (c) security (WB, 2001, pp. 38-40). 
Of these three, only “opportunity” benefits from growth. Robert Chambers, who had a significant 
sway over mainstream policies famously identified “person bias”14 as one of the biases in 
development practice (Chambers, 1983). However, in practice the political economy variables 
are rarely addressed. 
2.4 Contemporary Development Policy and Practice 
Poverty alleviation and/or development are the stated goal of significant cash outflow and the 
raison de etre of giant organizations such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
the national agencies for international development such as the USAID. It is interesting to notice 
the choice of words of such organizations in stating their objectives. USAID’s goal is to fight 
“extreme poverty”. The World Bank’s stated objective is “a poverty-free world”. The ADB’s 
goal is to “alleviate poverty and help create a world in which everyone can share in the benefits 
of sustained and inclusive growth”15. In addition to the large international organizations and the 
national agencies, there are a large number of international and national NGOs (such as the 
Grameen Bank and the BRAC in Bangladesh, Sewa in India) that have large operations toward 
similar objectives. In addition, private foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation actively fund and promote projects and programs to improve the living conditions of 
the poor. The amount of monetary outlay is very large ($60 billion dollars from OECD countries 
alone)16. 
One question that an uninitiated person might ask is: What kind of knowledge or theories is 
informing the strategy or lack thereof and “ad hoc-ness” of the development of all these diverse 
                                                 
14 It is used to refer to the penchant of the development practitioners to design and implement development work in 
close association with the powerful in the project area. For example, during visits development workers would 
accept the hospitality of the rich rural elite, and give the elite their ears. 
15 http://www.adb.org/about/main; Accessed on January 28, 2016. 
16 While this might appear to be a large amount, it actually comprises only a small part of the annual budgets for 
recipient countries. Many of the poster-child countries for aid-dependency such as Ethiopia, actually have less than a 
sixth of the annual budget financed by foreign aid. 
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actors? The mission statements and policy papers and other publications such as the World 
Banks’ annual development reports offer an insight into the paradigms and theories. However, 
such publications often do what can be derogatorily called lip service to multiple goals, and 
strategies. Another place that appears to be instructive in search of the underlying theories is the 
actual funded projects and programs. However, there also the stated goal of a project can 
contradict the modalities of the project. For example, a project that works in so-called marginal 
areas with high poverty to offer skill training is likely not a place-based development program. 
Rather it is a project to prepare residents to emigrate to places (likely to cities) where the skill is 
rewarded. Such a project does not seek the prosperity of the community in situ, rather provides 
an “escape valve” in the sense that rural regions are places to escape from. There can be other 
ways in which the stated goals and methods of programs and projects can be unhelpful in 
understanding the underlying theories. For example, the World Bank published well publicized 
studies such as “Can anyone hear us?” (Narayan, 2000) that highlighted disenfranchisement and 
social exclusion of the poor. Such themes were emphasized in a World Development Report 
2000/01 (World Bank, 2000) too. However, the WB’s actual funding rarely reflects the 
recommendations of such a well-publicized study.  
Despite such hodge-podge of goals, objectives, methods, funds, and sectors, some of the major 
ideas in the mainstream are clear. While clichéd, much of the contemporary policy can be 
categorized as neoliberal with some social policy (i.e. direct spending on health and education, 
and on vulnerable groups, often meager) thrown in. 
Many activities can be seen to be tied rhetorically to poverty alleviation. One can build schools 
where children from poor households cannot go, and call the project “Education for Poverty 
Alleviation”. A river can be excavated for the landed elite to use for increasing fish stock and 
harvesting, and yet it can be titled ‘fisheries for poverty alleviation’. Understanding the theory 
(or lack thereof) behind such pronouncements and actions is perhaps the central part of the 
inquiry into the confused melee that is Development (in capital D) in the 21st century. 
With the risk of failing to capture the nuance in the universe of development thought, 
development policy can probably be thought of in terms of following levels: 
41 
 
1. At the supra-national level, there is discussion about aid and how aid is used. Much of 
this debate risk being one around a motion that is set as a binary proposition: Foreign aid 
is/has been good. A frivolous re-phrasing of the question might read: Is money a good 
thing, or is knife a good tool? The details in the discussion about foreign aid offer some 
hints about development strategy. In the 1950s, the principal argument in favor of foreign 
aid was to address the lack of capital that the developing countries needed to jump start 
their economy Easterly, 2002). Staunchest of its supporters defend it as crucial to 
preventing calamities, such as famine or epidemics, or just reduction of suffering (Barder, 
2011). For example, one example of good use of foreign aid that a ‘pro-foreign aid’ 
economist chose to cite was the success in preventing famine in Ethiopia after the 
drought of 200817. Recent proposals for re-inventing foreign aid (Easterly, 2008) 
addresses how aid could be better used. However, the broad directions emerging from the 
discussion is broad brush, and considerably short of the point of having operationalized 
concepts. 
2. There was a similar ‘binary’ debate about whether globalization is good (Harrison, 2007) 
. That debate too generates broad and general observations about international trade, and 
neo-liberal policies around the developing world. 
3. The other level of policy-making is at the national level as seen in documents such as five 
year plans or national policies, or country strategy papers. In the first decade of the new 
century these documents (Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers), prompted by the World 
Bank, emphasized national growth, and sectoral policies. 
4. The 1990s saw a proliferation of small projects that by-passed the state bureaucracy. ‘A 
small cattle development project here and a child immunization program there’ 
represented the development approach of the major bilateral donors. The idea behind 
such avoidance of state bureaucracy was the distrust of the state. The late 1990s saw a 
move away from such policy by some of the major donors such as the Netherlands, 
                                                 
17 In a debate with William Easterly in 2014 at the Center for Global Development. Available at 
http://www.cgdev.org/media/william-easterly-vs-owen-barder-event-video 
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Denmark, and the UK.  “The 1997 (DFID) White Paper was critical of … proliferation of 
small projects and of chaotic marketplace of aid flows which had resulted in a 
“Balkanisation of the Third World”, making it virtually impossible for countries to 
generate comprehensive pro-poor national plans and discouraging of reforms to improve 
government effectiveness (DFID, 2000, p. 9418). The White Paper announced (inter alia) 
a move ‘away from supporting specific projects to providing resources more strategically 
in support of sector-wide programmes or the economy as a whole’ (DFID 2000: 38) in 
(Mosse, 2005). 
Thus, sector-wide approach (SWA) was born. The Dutch international aid agency defined 
“sector” as “a coherent set of activities at macro, meso and micro level in defined institutional 
and budgetary frameworks for which the government has formulated policy”. The NZAid 
defined it as “encompass[ing] a wide range of thematically linked activities, involving 
government, non-government and private participation”. The sector-wide approach resulted in 
pooling of resources from multiple donors and working with the concerned ministries. Such 
approach guided money into sectors such as health, education, fisheries. At least 10 donor 
nations were committed to SWAs (NZAid, 2006) in recent years. 
As the purveyors of sector-wide approach would agree, it is an approach, not a strategy. Hence, 
how it plays out in a given geographic and territorial setting is not pre-defined in the approach. 
Like SWA, there are other national level approaches and policies. Household focused 
“development work” such as micro-credit, nutrition and health services constitute another 
prominent activity in development work. Several international donors adopted the SLF in 
designing their development work (described in the previous section). It is difficult to derive 
from the sustainable livelihoods framework specific policies and programs in a given situation. 
The primary reason is the fact that the framework is all-encompassing, and hence has 
innumerable interventions that are conceivable and can be accommodated within the framework. 
For example, income in a smallholder agricultural community can be raised by making 
                                                 
18 Paragraph 317 
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interventions at multiple points in the SLF diagram. Thus, as a policy tool, the framework is only 
suggestive with its way of viewing well-being. 
In practice however, the policy implication of sustainable livelihoods is that migration came to 
be accepted and even emphasized (e.g. see Ellis, 2003) as a major means of poverty alleviation, 
almost at the expense of rural regional development. Programs and projects informed by this 
framework emphasized taking advantages of markets for labor, and goods and services at 
multiple locations, both rural and urban, and local and trans-local including beyond national 
borders. 
While sustainable livelihoods framework has found a narrow expression in projects that include 
encouraging migration, it allows for a more nuanced and expanded pool of options and entry 
points. For example, the framework identifies vulnerabilities and local processes as a 
conditioning force for choice of livelihoods. Drawing from the logic of the framework it is 
possible to identify community development as the tool to sustain livelihood. However, 
livelihoods framework inspired projects rarely advocate (and back that up with funding) using 
local development as a locus of intervention.  This is surprising because the vulnerabilities and 
opportunities are produced in the rural regions. In an unintended way, SLA took development 
practice back to “a cattle development project here, and skills training there”. 
Together with discussion at the two opposite points of the geographic scale (households and 
nation), there are also discussions on and funding of themes such as infrastructure (e.g.  road 
building), and governance reform (decentralization, capacity building of local governments). 
However, place-based policies are rare. There have been a number of place-based projects in the 
Latin American countries (Olfert et al., 2014) in recent years. However, even with 
decentralization policies, place-based policies are far from being an accepted approach in the 
developing world. 
Considering the discussion on poverty as a manifestation of social relations, it is surprising that 
the field of international development is apparently oblivious to the idea. Combing through the 
project documents, policy papers, and statements of vision, and even blogs of the major players 
such the World Bank, it is hard to find any mention of social relations (or institutions such as 
debt bondage, skewed asset ownership, and discrimination) as sources of poverty. For example, a 
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review of eight donors (e.g. The World Bank, the Asian Development Bank) in Bangladesh 
revealed that these agencies had  never contemplated such structural interventions in their aid 
programs for Bangladesh (Islam, 2011). In fact, mainstream development projects can even 
facilitate existing power relations and politics by suppressing the emergence of an alternative, as 
famously demonstrated by (Ferguson, 1990) through the study of an irrigation project in 
Lesotho. Outside the mainstream, there is a small stream of rights based approach. However, 
they remain minor and meagerly supported. 
2.5 Conclusion 
With an eye on RRD, it becomes clear that the definition of poverty via a low poverty line is 
grossly inadequate for policy. The WB’s measure of poverty estimate is almost certainly a lower 
estimate of poverty. Because of the hegemonic presence of WB’s data, it appears that the English 
word “poverty” has acquired the connotation of being below $1.90 income per day. However, 
from the perspective of RRD knowing the number and proportion of poor, defined using such a 
low line, is of little relevance, except may be for use in setting a baseline or yardstick in project 
evaluation. What is important is that precariousness and vulnerability in securing a livelihood is 
recognized. The figure below summarizes this chapter to produce an analytical framework to 
explain how lack of livelihoods is produced. It is self-explanatory, so an explanation of each of 
the boxes is withheld here. 
Figure 4 How Lack of Livelihoods is Produced 
 
The figure would also reveal that targeting of the poor often is thwarted by surrounding society 
and economy. It is common for studies to find that approaches that say “let’s take care of the 
most distressed first and work up from there” do not work (e.g. Hajdu, Ansell, Robson, & van 
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Blerk, 2013). A more wide-ranging approach with a view to generating and/or capturing synergy 
holds better promise. 
Synergy makes both intuitive sense, and has prima facie evidence. Targeting of the poor 
specially in the form of a project can miss important synergies. For example, micro-credit gives 
better result in the areas where the other sectors are also developed. Among the six 
administrative divisions in Bangladesh, micro-credit showed better performance in the divisions 
which are and historically were more developed (Dhaka, Chittagong, and Sylhet) than the other 
divisions (namely, Rajshahi, Barisal, and Khulna). 
Thus, while the experience of poverty is personal, an analysis of origins and perpetuation of 
poverty immediately points to the larger forces. Targeting the poor alone, while useful specially 
in the aftermath of structural adjustment programs in the 1980s, has shown to be inefficient. 
Planning for rural regional development as way to poverty alleviation and beyond (i.e. attaining 
prosperity) cannot happen from targeting the poor. RRD stands a much better chance if synergy 
across sectors and across geographic scales can be effected. 
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Chapter Three: Issues in Developing Rural Regions and 
a Framework for Analysis  
3.1 Regions and Rural Regions 
Region is perhaps the most vexing concept both in the social sciences and in planning. In the 
dictionary a region is defined as: A broad geographic area distinguished by similar features. Such 
similar features can be biophysical or social. For certain purposes, a region can be based on 
functional relationships such as regional water catchment areas.  In planning, regions are seen as 
territorial units between the level of nations and the territories of “municipal and communal 
government jurisdiction [in England]” (Glasson & Marshall, 2007, p. 8). Defined this way, it is a 
contiguous area comprising both towns and rural areas. 
Other ways of defining regions in planning are: 
1. Functional relationships resulting from biophysical system, often watershed, such as the 
Tennessee Valley. Resource management or conservation needs can necessitate a 
demarcation of region based on conservation and management criteria. Settlements 
around forests, river basin, or low-lands often give rise to such needs. 
2. Functional relationship based on a local economy: Intuitively the local economy consists 
of a contiguous area with one or more towns and surrounding area.  
3. An administrative unit as the unit for planning: With decentralization, particularly 
devolution, the jurisdiction of a local government can become a planning region.  
In urban planning, consideration of planning for regions came long after urban design. When it 
did, drawing the boundaries of a region proved not a straight-forward exercise. One of the 
stalwarts of the field in the U.S. even remarked with palpable sarcasm that “A region is an area 
safely larger than the last one to whose problems we found no solution” (Jacobs, 1961, p. 410). 
In certain situations, delineation of the boundary becomes crucial. For example, in a certain type 
of economic analysis called base analysis (Richardson, 1985) where the economy is divided into 
two sectors, (a) activities bringing money from outside and (b) activities serving the region, 
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where a boundary is drawn becomes important in the computation of the ratio of these two 
sectors. Another situation where drawing a boundary can be important is when the choice of 
geographic scale has political implications or politics determines the scale at which analysis is 
conducted, as evidenced by a growing strand of literature known as politics of scale. 
For rural regional development, a rural region can come to be defined in any of the above three 
ways. However, for some very practical usefulness an administrative unit such as a district or a 
collection of sub-districts has an advantage as the unit of planning for rural regions. Examples of 
such advantages include availability of data reported at the geographic level of the rural regions 
and its sub-divisions, and some pre-existing bureaucracy at the level of the geographic unit. As 
explained in the next chapter, for the purposes of this dissertation, a collection of contiguous 
administrative units is chosen as the case to study. 
Once there is a way to delimit a region, there is a need to pay heed to the literature on regional 
planning in Europe that warns that regions are not territories of homogenous communities with a 
common set of aspirations (Paasi, 1991). Literature from agrarian societies corroborates the 
recent claims in European regional planning literature that such relationships are often of 
conflicts, and goals and aspirations among the communities rarely align. For example, as urban 
bias literature points out, the interests of the rural elite are in direct conflict with the small 
farmers and aligned with the urban-based government, even though rural elites and small farmers 
reside in the same cluster of villages.  A regional political economy view therefore becomes 
important. Regional policy that is blind to the equality and equity aspects (such as unequal 
benefits of road building, or subsidy benefitting mostly elites) will likely not bring widespread 
prosperity. 
3.2 Rural Regions and Contemporary Global forces 
Rural regions have always been subjected to the forces beyond their borders.  As mentioned in 
section 1.2, colonialism, and post-colonial development policy reshaped rural regions in 
significant ways. Their legacies continue. However, in contemporary world, no other force 
shapes the rural regions more deeply than globalization. 
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The literature on globalization is vast, and full of disagreements including ones over the 
definition, and the nature of impact on lives and cultures around the world. For our purposes, in 
the subsections of this section, we identify a few aspects of globalization that can potentially 
impact the ways rural regional development strategy is shaped. 
3.2.1 Neoliberalism on a Global Scale 
The history of neoliberalism, from its origin as a philosophical standpoint to it being an 
economic policy paradigm on a global scale, is well-documented (see Harvey, 2005 and Peet, 
1999, pp. 17-64). However, a short revisit of the history is in order for our purposes. 
Several developments converged in less than two decades, from late 1960s to late 1980s, to 
establish neoliberalism as the overwhelmingly dominant mode of thinking of our time. The fast 
track of events comprised both domestic affairs in the advanced capitalist countries and the 
experiences of national development efforts in the developing countries. The influential domestic 
events were stagnation of economies in the 1970s, and the rise of monetarist school in the U.S. 
and England. On the international front, an agreement emerged that closed economies were less 
likely to flourish (Balassa, 1981). Beginning in the late seventies, economic policy veered toward 
less intervention from the government. On the global economic scale too, the paradigm that 
global economy needed to be based on open trade gained considerable support. 
In international development, these developments combined to produce what has been called the 
Washington Consensus (Williamson, 1990) of the major players in international development. It 
emphasizes growth via free market and the necessary institutional reforms to facilitate that, and 
the openness of national economies to the world outside. To be specific, global neoliberalism 
engendered and found expression in following domestic policy objectives: 
1. Reduce barriers to trade, 
2. Restrict government involvement in the economic sphere, 
3. Reduce size and scope of government economic activity (mainly privatization of state-
owned enterprises) 
In the sphere of international economic relations, global neoliberalism demanded: 
1. Cross boundary circulation of capital 
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2. Freer trade in goods and services, 
3. Removal of restriction to invest. 
The efforts to reorient developing economies to meet these objectives officially came to be 
known as Structural Adjustment Programs (SAP). Thus, SAP became synonymous with global 
neoliberalism, and more loosely, globalization. 
3.2.2 The Finance Capital, FDI, and Global Commodity (value) Chain 
The most distinguishing feature of the most recent round of globalization is the extent to which 
the global finance capital circulates across the world. While FDI gets more press, foreign 
portfolio investment in the form of bonds and shares attract significant global capital. As is now 
famous, some of the external money prior to the Asian Crisis of the late 1990s went to land 
speculation. Such money exclusively goes to stock exchanges that are located in big cities only. 
Even Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), which results in manufacturing and processing, go to a 
small number of countries and within countries, a small number of economic zones and big cities 
(Chakravorty, 2000). Only a small number of locations around the world are part of the 
production process. For example, 80% all of the garments industries in Bangladesh are in the two 
largest metropolitan areas.  
As discussed in section 1.3, FDI as it currently shapes manufacturing and processing, holds little 
hope for arrival of investment in the rural regions, except in some specific parts of countries such 
as China. Rather, by encouraging expansion of big cities, FDI is encouraging emigration out of 
rural regions. 
Much of the world’s production of final goods is manufactured in commodity chains that 
straddle continents. To choose one of many examples, ready-made garments are designed in one 
place, and sewn in another place with materials produced in multiple other places. Most of the 
value (i.e. profits) in the commodity chain accrue to the brand owners who are in the developed 
world (Kaplinsky, 2000). Except for rare exceptions such as contract farming, most such global 
value-chains avoid rural regions. When integrated to global commodity chain, rural regions often 
get assigned the most risky and lowest paying segments of the value chain. For example, volatile 
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prices of agricultural products such as cotton, and coffee have had devastating impacts on rural 
regions. 
Together with the gradual permeation of global neoliberalism into the policy hierarchy and even 
popular perception, a significant change occurred in the global production, and to a lesser extent 
consumption system. Beginning in the late 1970s, a large part of the world’s manufacturing 
relocated to labor, and outside the traditional industrialized world. In 1980, the share of 
developed world in the global manufacturing value-added was 86%, which by 2000 came down 
to 76% (UNIDO, 2004, p 135). Folker. Fröbel, Heinrichs, & Kreye (1980) claimed that three 
factors made such relocation possible: 
1. Availability of cheap labor in the developing world, 
2. Development of management techniques and technology for flexible and geographically 
sparse production, and 
3. Reduction in cost of transportation and communication. 
They however did not include the neo-liberal export oriented industrialization (EOI) policy 
package (with tax break and export processing zones) that was adopted by the states in the 
developing countries as a factor. 
A combination of these factors gave birth to what Froebel et al (1980) claimed to be “single 
world market for labor power, …for production sites.” They also claimed that this rise of 
manufacturing in the Third World contrasts sharply with its hitherto role as producer of raw 
materials, and coined the term New International Division of Labor (NIDL). 
This prediction of one market however did not come to pass. As mentioned in Section 1.3, what 
has happened is the selective relocation of manufacturing activities by trans-national 
corporations (TNCs). For example, as mentioned in section 1.3, East Asia and Latin America on 
an average received close to 80% of the world’s FDI from 1975 to 1995 (as computed by 
Dunning, 2001, p. 166 from WB, 1997 data). Thus, only a handful of countries received the 
investments. Clearly, if such selective relocation is significant enough to be called a new division 
of labor is open to discussion. Furthermore, “cheap labor” is not as strong a determinant of 
relocation as it is made out to be (Kiely, 1998), Singapore being a glaring example. Also, de-
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industrialization in developed countries does not automatically mean industrialization in the 
developing countries. 
The most important observation relevant to our issue at hand is that FDI tend to concentrate in a 
small number of cities and regions. These areas are often the export processing zones or special 
economic zones within the vicinity of a large metropolis or port city. Export processing zones 
became the chief tool to attract FDIs that further builds on cheap labor. Even in China where the 
first wave of foreign direct investment was channeled to township and village enterprises (TVEs) 
(Zhu, 2000), export processing zones took over in the later years of manufacturing growth. One 
estimate indicates that by 1984, 79 EPZs were functioning in 35 countries; by 1989, the number 
of zones reached 200, employing more than 1.5 million workers, with another 100 EPZs being 
built , (Hart, 1995 in Mittelman, 1995). From 1970 to 1997, the net flow of FDI into developing 
countries increased from under $5 billion to $150 billion (UNCTAD, 1999). This inflow of 
money ended up in and around the large mega-urban regions of East and Southeast Asia (with 
Korea being a notable exception where banks were nationalized and used as a source of capital) 
(Douglass, 2005). The soaring growth of the mega-urban regions during the same period is a 
testimony to the new space economy that FDI helped create. 
3.2.3 Global Migration, Remittance, and Social, Economic, and Political Life in 
Rural Regions 
The result of the above process is global migration from rural regions. The impact of remittance 
on rural regions is unclear. Studies point to remittance being used more for consumption in the 
rural regions than being re-invested in them. The hypothesis of fractal poverty traps discussed in 
Section 2.3 is relevant here in that higher availability of resources in household through 
remittance cannot elevate the household by much because the (low level) equilibrium of the rural 
region suppresses the household to a low equilibrium. 
 It appears that the discovery of and insight into migration has not discredited any model of 
development. Rather adherents of different models have taken up migration and fitted it into the 
model of development they trust. For example, the World Bank in a study of remittance to Latin 
America and the Caribbean (Fajnzylber & Lopez, 2008) concluded that it is good policies and 
institutions that are missing in taking advantage of remittances, which is hardly a new theme for 
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the philosophy underlying the World Bank. The adherents of sustainable livelihoods will look at 
livelihoods and would like to develop migration as a livelihood option by making migration 
smooth and rewarding (e.g. De Haan & Rogaly, 2002; Ellis & Harris, 2004). 
While migration can be seen as an expedient measure and remittance as crucial to livelihood 
security, some adverse impacts of migration is fairly well-known. It generally takes the youth out 
of the rural regions and often upset the sex ratio, lowering the ratio when men migrate more (as 
in Bangladesh until the advent of ready-made garment sector where the workforce is 
overwhelmingly female), and raising it when females migrate (as in the Philippines). Among 
many impacts of such loss of youth is that the community vitality often suffers. The rural 
regional economy becomes a site of consumption. Households who cannot send out a migrant 
cannot find much opportunity within the rural regional economy. Perhaps the most famous 
paragraph describing the precariousness and dysfunctionality produced by migration is the not so 
atypical case of a Mexican village named Napizaro by Jane Jacobs, that John Friedmann quoted 
in his UN-HABITAT award speech: “Napizaro is described [by Jacobs] as a sad settlement 
where leave-takings are sorrowful and absences long, and where women live dreary, lonely 
lives.” According to Jacobs, if remittances were to stop, the village would go right back to the 
grim life that existed before immigration to California happened only a few generations ago 
(Jacobs, 1985). 
While not as grim as Napizaro, rural regions from where large migrations happen often have 
trouble maintaining the basic household functions such as raising a child or the vitality of 
community. Economic globalization has only exacerbated that trend. 
3.2.4 Larger Forces and Room for Maneuvering 
E.A.J. Johnson (1970) in his influential book demonstrated that human settlements across time 
and continents were organized according to the prevailing logic of that time. For example, the 
urban system in England got organized through the system of cathedrals and parishes, or the U.S. 
urban system in the Mid-West was organized for the convenience of administration. Market as a 
force of spatial organization, Johnson demonstrates, is a fairly recent phenomenon. Indeed, the 
latest round of globalization as the primary force behind the spatial reorganization on a world 
scale did not take root at the time of Johnson’s book. 
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Given the rise of global neoliberalism, it is imperative to ask what is the logic underlying the 
space economy of the contemporary developing countries?  
The preceding discussion somewhat had all the elements of the answer. Global neoliberalism is 
the overwhelming and overarching force that is re-orienting the space economy of countries and 
regions. How do global neoliberalism and other expressions of globalization interact with rural 
regions? The changes in the world economy and state policies over the last quarter of a century 
have created a distinctive logic. The main forces in this new regime are: 
Table 3 Global Forces and their Spatial Specificity 
Forces Mechanism and Spatial specificity 
Flexible (post-Fordist) production Manufacturing spread over multiple 
countries, often in small production units 
(global commodity/value chains) 
Post-Washington consensus Washington consensus plus governance is 
the new orthodoxy in the mainstream. 
Footloose Financial capital Stock exchanges in “world cities”. Often the 
money is into speculative land markets, not 
manufacturing. 
Industrial capital Industrial estates, mostly in mega-urban 
regions. 
Removal of import and export barriers Prospect of local industrialization 
diminished for many sectors in many 
regions and countries. 
Increasing spatial reach of agro-food 
systems, often global 
Rise of contract farming, considered by 
many to be the only way to save peasant 
farms. 
Legacy/inertia of spatial polarization The growth pole strategies and rural 
stagnation set in motion massive 
urbanization rates in many developing 
countries. 
The role of government The prevailing ideology restricts the role of 
government in the economy and social life. 
The WTO agreements tend to reduce 
government role in the economy. However, 
governments pursue a policy of subsidizing 
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the largest city(ies), often because of “world 
city” ambitions. 
The global forces have resulted in 
innovations such as public private 
partnerships as a tool of providing what 
used to be services from states. 
Rise of capitalist institutions Common property rights shrinking. “Moral 
economy” cannot be invoked to secure 
livelihoods. 
Progressive social policies (“neoliberalism 
with a human face”) 
Food distribution for the poor, food for 
work, continue to be the efforts to avert 
absolute poverty. 
As a general rule, contemporary urban and regional planning as a field of practice is in an 
intellectual environment where the overarching big picture is always bleak. For example, belief 
in omnipotence of big picture will predict that cities under the forces of globalization will cater 
more to capital than to communities and place-making. However, successful planning theory and 
practice allows community centered planning even when faced with the logic of global 
capitalism in land value and use. 
Rural regional planning faces the same larger overarching forces. It is easy to dispel rural 
regional planning as something anachronistic and contrary to the logic of contemporary global 
capitalism. Mainstream worldview as expressed in the WDR 2009 (WB 2008), and other recent 
publications of the WB essentially insists so. However, the option of subjecting rural regions as 
dispensable in a mega-scheme, as outlined in Section 1.3, is not entirely convincing either. 
The task at hand is to chart out the plausibility of the spaces of hope. 
3.3 Contemporary Rural realities and Rural-Urban Linkages 
In finding a space of hope or room for maneuvering for planning for rural regional development, 
some of the hints come from the overarching forces as discussed in the previous section. Another 
set of hints emerge from the nature of society, economy, and politics in the rural regions. In this 
section, we explore the contemporary rural realities, with an eye on rural regional development. 
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3.3.1 More than Crop-Fields and Villages 
Rural areas were never “crop fields dotted with homesteads” as abstract rural-urban dichotomous 
models reduced them into. As we consider new policy paradigms for development of rural 
regions, it is important to notice that rural areas moved even farther from the “crop-fields and 
villages” character in the recent decades. The share of agriculture in the local production in rural 
areas steadily decreased over the years (Rigg, 2006). Rural areas now often are host to diverse 
economies comprising non-crop agriculture, trade, artisanal manufacturing and processing, and 
even tourism. Over the last two decades, households have become more multi-locational, and 
multi-sectoral in their livelihoods. Household members increasingly tend to live in different 
places to participate in different labor markets. Often household members work in both farm and 
non-farm activities to spread risk. For example, a review of 33 household surveys from 18 
African countries found that on average, 45% of rural household income was from non-farm 
rural activities, even in “subsistence” farming communities (Reardon, 1997). In South Asia, the 
figures are no less dramatic. Following data from previous decades show the importance of non-
farm activities in the economy and livelihoods in the rural areas. In India, 34% of rural income 
was from NFA in 1994 (Lanjouw & Lanjouw, 1999). In Bangladesh, 52% of people were found 
to have NFA as their primary occupation in 2000-2001 (Hossain, 2004). In the recent years, the 
share of NFA can be assumed to have only increased. 
Official statistics often miss these activities in two well-known ways: (a) in agrarian societies 
households see themselves as agriculturalists even when only a small portion of the household 
income is derived from agriculture. They respond to survey questions accordingly; (b) Often 
many of the non-farm activities are classified as “other”. 
While rural areas always had significant processing and manufacturing activities, the rate of 
diversification increased more in the 1980s and 1990s than previous decades (Start & Johnson, 
2004), perhaps continuing at a higher speed now. The data on “proportion of a rural regional 
economy that is non-agricultural” however does not tell if it is a sign of precariousness or 
prosperity. The range of activities that comprise the “non-agricultural” is extremely diverse, and 
is probably indicative of the stage of economic development of the rural regions. Dependence on 
non-agricultural sources can increase as a last resort when agriculture cannot support a steady 
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source of income. In that sense, increased reliance on non-agricultural sources indicates barely 
coping, as opposed to thriving. For example, in many underdeveloped countries, the poor have 
resorted to occupations such as peddling, working as transportation worker, and seasonal 
migration to cities that are merely a coping strategy in the absence of steady sources of 
employment (e.g. Davies', 1996 description of Malian Sahel). However, in certain situations 
expansion of non-agricultural activities such as tourism, rural manufacturing and services can 
result from expansion of choices and increased purchasing power in the rural economy. 
Empirical case studies suggest that both types of rural regions are appearing around the world. 
However, looking at poverty figures it is safe to assume that there are more rural regions of the 
first category than of the second.  
During the decrease in agriculture’s role in rural economy, the nature of agriculture changed too. 
Increased share of commercial farming and diversification away from traditional crop agriculture 
has changed cropping patterns.  Often commercialization is happening in small farms as well as 
through plantations. Agricultural inputs require significant investment. And hence, even small 
family farmers are no longer peasants in the original sense of the word, i.e. small land-owning 
family producing for self-sustenance without buying labor from market. The emergence of 
global food chains introduced and increased contract farming in the developing world 
countryside toward the end of last century. This mode of production appeared in great numbers 
(e.g. tomato farmers in India producing for global ketchup brands) and found its existence often 
as next-door neighbor to family farms (Barrett et al., 2012; Cahyadi & Waibel, 2015). 
Along with such changes in the economy in rural areas, an increasing trend is the growth in 
migration to international destinations. With the inability of agriculture to provide a reasonable 
level of income, extensive landlessness, and a stagnant economy contributed to ever increasing 
number of people to seek employment in metropolitan areas or abroad. Consequently, a steady 
stream of remittance flow into rural economy. However, remittances generally have failed to 
spur productive rural regional economies. 
3.3.2 Rural Land, Land Use, and Environment 
The nature and extent of change in land use is not the same across different countries and rural 
regions. Some rural regions, particularly the ones in Southeast Asia experienced drastic changes, 
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where foreign direct investment was substantial, and big cities expanded outward to rural areas 
forming mega-urban regions (McGee & Robinson, 1995). Rural regions in South Asia and 
Africa, however, generally experienced much less change in the economy and in the physical 
landscape. 
Environmental degradation, in other forms, however, has taken place in both Africa and South 
Asia. In the case of Africa, much of the continent experienced soil erosion (Blaikie, 1985). In 
Asia, the environmental degradation resulted from the abuse of inputs such as fertilizer and 
insecticides. The loss of agricultural land to uses such as housing, infrastructure, and 
industrialization has accelerated in past two decades. In the absence of any zoning control, 
settlement patterns in the dense rural regions such as the island of Java, the country of 
Bangladesh, and the province of Kerala are putting strain on the economy, health and 
environment. Rural environment is rarely pristine in the developing world. Rather rural 
industrialization, polluting practices in agriculture, poultry and aquaculture, and in some parts of 
the world unique practices such as brick-making in large kilns have been putting significant 
strain on the ecological health of rural areas. With changes in climate, and rise of sea level, some 
rural regions are under further strain. In recent years, environmental strain has created pockets of 
poverty. For example, experts are warning about impending pockets of poverty in the coastal 
areas of Bangladesh as tides get higher and increased salinity makes soil unsuitable for 
cultivation19. In the case of Bangladesh, out of 2.75 million acres of land in the coastal areas, 
approximately 600 thousand acres are uncultivable now. 
The environmental threats add further urgency to planning at the level of rural regions. 
Especially in the case of climate hazard mitigation, one plausible hypothesis that can be offered 
is that because of the location specific impacts of climate variability and change, rural region is 
the appropriate scale as opposed to much smaller community level adaptation20. 
                                                 
19 As pointed out by BRAC and BCS Economic Association to the Planning Commission in a seminar (reported in 
Amader Orthoneeti, Aug 04, 2011) 
20 In any case, climate change adaptation has not been informed by the role of social relationships in producing 
vulnerability (Taylor, 2014) 
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3.3.3 Rural-Urban Linkages21 
The recognition of the new rural partially rose because of a rich volume of literature that 
accumulated since the late 1980s, and has come to be known as rural-urban linkages (Tacoli, 
1998;and 2006). Early research used various terms such “interaction”, “exchange”, “relations” 
with “rural-urban’ to describe the new discoveries of the time. By late 1990s, however, they all 
were subsumed under the term “rural-urban linkages” (giving birth to another acronym, RUL). 
Like many other terms in the development studies, RUL have been put to indiscrete use. 
Countless policy documents, academic papers, and conferences have borne RUL in the title 
while the contents at best partially deserved a title with words “rural”, “urban”, and “linkages”. 
Tacoli (1998), in a summary of the literature, identifies two categories of linkages being reported 
in the literature: 
1.  Linkages across space (flows of people, goods, money, information, wastes) 
2. Linkages between sectors (agricultural and non-agricultural synergies - backward and 
forward linkages, etc.) 
There has been an increasing recognition of the linkages across space. This strand of thought has 
been furthered by the influential sustainable livelihoods literature (Carney, 1998). It has been 
demonstrated that households, particularly the poor households in rural areas, straddle both urban 
and rural economies in search of their livelihoods. Households are both multi-sectoral (in terms 
of occupation) and multi-spatial (meaning members of or entire household change places at 
different times of the year or in the course of life in search of livelihood). The flow of goods and 
capital has also been recognized to merit an explicit place in policies. Traditionally such flows 
have been conceptualized as flow between a town and its hinterland. But it is important to note 
that such interaction is not between one single town and its hinterland. It is not a dendritic 
hierarchical pattern, rather a complex network of flows. It is common to find villages or small 
towns producing goods (e.g. pottery, certain special woven items or utensils, or specialty 
condiment) that they sell to multiple other villages and towns, not to one single town. It is also 
                                                 
21 Much of this section has been taken from Momen (2006). 
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important to note that the national statistical offices in developing countries are ill-equipped to 
report such flows, hindering policies to be informed by such linkages (Douglass, 1998). 
There was also a wave of studies exploring the linkages and interdependences between 
agriculture and other sectors (e.g. Haggblade, Hazell, & Brown, 1989);. Another group of studies 
had a focus on interactions between towns and hinterland in different economic and geographical 
contexts. Many of these studies were conducted to contribute to the debate on the pattern of 
spatial accumulation in capitalist systems and role of urbanization in development (e.g. Harriss 
& Harriss, 1984). With the renewed interest in rural-urban linkages, they became relevant again.   
Thus, the term rural urban linkages, has come to acquire a multiplicity of meanings. Though not 
mutually exclusive, the following three processes comprise the broad meaning that has been 
ascribed to the term “rural urban linkages”. 
1. Household dependence on both towns and rural areas for securing livelihoods (livelihood 
perspective), 
2. Value-addition chain (how rural agricultural produces and other goods are processed, 
transported, and marketed at wide range of geographic locations, both rural and urban). 
3. The linkages between agricultural activities and manufacturing, financial services, 
administrative services etc. 
Such usage has been formalized in the definition of rural urban linkages by the Governing 
Council of the UN Human Settlements Program: “[C]omplementary functions and flows of 
people, capital, goods, employment, information and technology between rural and urban areas” 
(UNCHS, 2004: 22). 
The volume of empirical literature about rural-urban linkages is large. In policy, two impacts are 
evident. First, it eliminated the false “rural produce price vs. urban wage” debate in development 
policy (Vali and Jamal, 1993).  Second, curiously it encouraged calls for “strengthening rural-
urban linkages” that would often mean facilitation of flow (a component of which is road-
building) between towns and rural areas. Such prescription is oblivious of the possibility of 
easier draining of human and other resources out of rural areas to the towns and cities, a process 
termed “backwash” effect by Myrdal (1957). Policy prescriptions of “positive” rural urban 
linkages are also available in the literature (e.g. von Braun, 2007). What constitutes positive is 
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rather vaguely discussed. However, simultaneous rural and urban development in a regional 
setting was not advocated until recently when the rural territorial development programs in South 
America began to be proposed in this new millennium (e.g. Scheijtman & Berdegué, 2008). 
3.3.4 Conclusion: Contemporary Rural Reality and Prospect for Rural Regional 
Development 
What transpires from the literature on rural de-agrarianization and rural-urban linkages is that 
rural regions are more and more getting sucked in to the matrix of global urbanization. The 
determining forces are often outside the geographic boundary of rural regions. The other 
important aspect to notice is that while rural areas are transforming in the ways described here, 
they are not improving the life chances of the poor to any significant extent as exemplified by the 
stubborn rural poverty and precariousness of life. 
Many of the bodies of literature that once provided guiding lights are also increasingly becoming 
irrelevant. The rich literature on agrarian transition that attracted brilliant minds for the entire 
twentieth century is less relevant now. Marxist development theory is centered on agrarian 
transition, the indicator of which is production of free labor. In this vein, changes described in 
this section prompted Bernstein (2006) to claim that the agrarian question of capital is not 
relevant anymore. One simplified statement to draw from his analysis is that capitalism has 
entered agriculture, and peasants, in the sense of producing for self-subsistence without use of 
hired labor, do not exist in any significant number anywhere. Now that even the smallest of 
farmers must buy inputs from the market, agriculture cannot stay independent of market. 
Rural-urban linkages, especially migration have prompted several policy responses. As 
mentioned earlier, Sustainable Livelihoods inspired projects often try to facilitate migration. A 
full volume of Development Policy Review (year 2011, Vol 33(4)) was dedicated to the idea of 
“translocal” development, whose central idea is that “local resources” need not be the only 
source of poverty alleviation (Zoomers, Westen, & Terlouw, 2011). While we agree that there 
are resources around the world such a job in, say, the Middle East, we re-iterate that local 
synergies are important, and strategies need to focus on local while taking full advantage of 
extra-local sources (as opposed to solely relying on emigration out of the rural regions). 
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3.4 Thoughts and Models of Local Territory-Based Development: A 
Few Examples 
As stated in Chapter One (Section 1.6), we viewed rural regional planning as an intervention to 
negotiate with global as well as local forces with the objective of prosperity of rural regions. As 
identified here, rural regional development in this sense, especially with an emphasis on poverty 
alleviation in the context of globally influenced de-agrarianizing political economy, has not been 
attempted in the mainstream. However, there have been attempts in the past to cater to one or 
more aspects of RRD. Armed with the review of the contemporary forces at work (Section 
3.2.4), and the past experiences of development (in Chapter 2), we can glean insights from the 
experience offered by such models from the past. 
3.4.1 Integrated Rural Development (IRD) 
In the mid-1970s, IRD appeared and quickly became the most widely heralded approach to rural 
regional development in the developing world.  However, it is a stretch to characterize integrated 
rural development as a model to integrate both rural and urban components in one framework, 
given that in practice IRD projects almost exclusively worked in rural areas, and was confined to 
agriculture sector. However, as a model that temporally preceded the other frameworks listed 
here, it provides a backdrop to contrast against, and hence its inclusion on this list. 
IRD historically came soon after rural development became an objective of World Bank lending. 
In the early 1970s the Bank felt a need to tackle rural poverty. As the then Director of the 
Agriculture and Rural Development Department (Yudelman, 1976), and the WB’s sector policy 
paper 1975 noted, lending to capital intensive modern industrial sector since the 1950s did not 
reduce rural poverty. Large scale investment in “off-farm” infrastructure (such as irrigation) and 
subsidy toward Green Revolution inputs such as seeds, fertilizer, and insecticide also noted to 
have failed to offer substantial help to the rural poor. This period was also the time when the 
efficiency of the small farms began to be accepted. Therefore, the central strategy of rural 
development became 
“…the encouragement of technological change at the farm level. [Rural Development] 
program now included the financing of research, extension services, training facilities, 
marketing, credit, rural transportation, and small-scale irrigation. The emphasis was thus 
shifted from lending for "off-farm" infrastructure (such as irrigation projects) to rural 
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credit as a mean by which farmers could obtain capital to finance "on-farm" investment” 
(Yudelman, 1976, p. 309). 
Consequently, the cornerstone of rural development became subsidized credit. In addition to 
agricultural growth in the small holder sector, the WB, influenced by the “basic needs”22 
argument (ILO, 1977), identified that rural development also needed other components in rural 
development projects such as potable water supplies, shelter, rural electricity, health and 
educational services, and roads. As Yudelman (1976) observes “[a] mix of components in rural 
development projects is usually justified on the grounds that a mix of investments in any given 
project produces a synergistic effect” (p. 313). 
With such beginning, rural development efforts of the WB and many other agencies began to be 
carried out as integrated rural development programs or projects (IRDPs). The exact components 
of an IRD project varied from project to project. At its fullest, the IRD approach attempted to 
strengthen rural economy by means of capital formulation in cooperatives, coalition building 
among cooperatives for group credit and dissemination of knowledge, and supplemented these 
efforts with improvements in irrigation and other infrastructure (hence the word “integrated”). 
For example, the IRDP in Bangladesh was extended with WB-support in 1974 to include an 
intensive area-based program. Rural works, small-scale irrigation, rural credit, strengthened 
cooperatives, increased agricultural inputs, improvement of extension services and livestock and 
fisheries development were incorporated into a national project titled “RD Project I”. The project 
was coordinated and monitored by IRDP from the capital city, Dhaka. However, where at its 
barest, e.g. India, IRD has been claimed to be nothing more than subsidized credit scheme for the 
rural poor (Dreze, 1990). 
The IRD projects that had multi-sectoral components were seen as Area Development Programs. 
The use of the word “area” signifies a territorial unit. In practice these areas were always a 
village or clusters of villages. As one review notes: “rural areas were seen as closed systems” 
(Guimaraes, 1991, p. 21). There was no urban component, or no awareness of the multi-
locational and multi-sectoral livelihoods. Reviews of IRD projects continued to point out 
                                                 
22 In short, this approach seeks, through the governments direct intervention, the direct provision of basic needs of 
humans such as nutrition, education, and health services, as opposed to helping the poor earn more. 
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inadequate impact of IRDPs (e.g. Ruttan, 1984). Project evaluations by the proponents of IRD 
modus oparendi generally painted the failure as a problem of implementation (Guimaraes, 1991, 
p. 18). In an extensive evaluation of 184 WB-sponsored IRD projects, a study revealed several 
flaws in the approach such as 
1. Difficult integration with existing (government) institutions  
2. Great complexity of multi-sector projects  
3. Adverse macroeconomic frame conditions  
4. Lack of conceptual basis for implementation  
5. Inflexible, rigid top-down planning methods  
6. Lack of compatible technical solutions for the regions concerned  
7. Inadequate knowledge of communities and failure to involve them (World Bank, 1987). 
As noticeable here, the evaluation does not question the theory of IRD. Nor does it identify the 
lack of an urban component. To be fair to such an evaluation, the literature on rural-urban 
interactions and linkages began to appear only in the very late 1980s. 
The word “integrated” in IRD, therefore did in no way attempt to be like the objective that city 
planning in the high-income countries at the time was seeking: comprehensiveness. With the 
benefit of hindsight, and specially the literature on farm-nonfarm linkages, multi-sectoral 
livelihoods, and livelihoods opportunities in an age of increasing economic integration, two 
major lessons stand out: (1) not using urban components to benefit the rural poverty diminished 
the chances of success in poverty alleviation (see review of UFRD below), and (2) structural 
problems (such as skewed asset ownership and consequent power differential) can stand in the 
way of poverty alleviation (Khan, 1979). The idea of multi sectoral planning at local level 
espoused by IRD approach is generally accepted, and helped the survival of the logo (as 
evidenced by the presence of Centre for Integrated Rural Development in Asia and the Pacific, 
CIRDAP) headquartered in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
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3.4.2 Saemaul Undong (New Community) Movement in South Korea23 
The core of Saemaul Undong was community mobilization and an appeal to civic pride in rural 
communities, together with the policy package of Green Revolution, i.e. subsidized input for rice 
cultivation brought to villages by the central government. The government also bought rice at a 
higher price to sell at a lower price in the cities that were growing as a result of industrialization. 
The program also had a component of in kind (cement, steel) donations to communities that 
could mobilize and ask for such construction materials. 
The community mobilization and aggressive appeal to civic pride helped garner voluntary labor. 
However, without a powerful central government to help with cash and in kind and to purchase 
the rice, it is difficult to imagine Saemaul Undong getting any traction. 
While Saemaul Undong increased agricultural production with the help of the rich central 
government and large bureaucracy, it never operated beyond the scale of villages. The program 
also did not have an urban development component. Even though rural wages grew close to 
urban wage, rural outmigration to large cities (as opposed to smaller towns) began soon 
afterward as the huge subsidy could not be sustained. 
As we look at the Saemaul Undong with an interest in putting together a strategy for 
development of contemporary rural regions three unique features that Douglass (2014, p. 165) 
illustrates loom large: 
“One was radical land reform as a foundation for both rural and urban-industrial 
growth.  Another was the ability to use urban industrial growth to subsidize rural 
development rather than the other way around, which was the common experience in 
other countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America.  The third was the capacity of 
government to mobilize rural households that was based on a sense of common purpose 
imbedded in the general acceptance of a strong developmental state in rural Korea.” 
These conditions do not exist in most developing countries. The land ownership is often skewed, 
and thereby any improvements in productivity tend to (disproportionately) benefit the landed 
                                                 
23 This section is derived from Douglass (2014) and Douglass (1983). 
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elite, who have diversified into other spheres of economy. A rich central government in the 
context of growing urban industrialization is also not the reality in all but a few countries. 
3.4.3 Urban Functions in Rural Development (UFRD) 
Drawn directly from E.A.J. Johnson’s (1970) application of central place theory to the 
organization of space in developing countries, the model of urban functions in rural development 
(UFRD) was proposed by Rondinelli and Ruddle (1978) as a strategy for integrated rural 
regional development (Rondinelli & Evans, 1983). The central idea of UFRD comprised two 
components: (1) rural development needed urban services, and (2) unlike growth center/pole 
strategy where investment concentrates in one or two primate cities, this approach advocates 
filling in gaps in the urban hierarchy by starting from the bottom through investments in small 
towns and market centers, and thereby, as the claim goes, offers more spatially equitable growth. 
With Christaller’s Central Place Theory providing the framework, it was observed that rural 
regions often lacked small towns of sufficient size and urban functions. Recognizing the 
important role played by market centers, small towns and villages in the rural economy, they 
looked for ways to strengthen the urban hierarchy and to link urban centers with their 
surrounding areas in such a way as to provide better access for the rural population to markets, 
farm supplies, social services and other necessary urban based facilities. The underlying 
assumption was that the presence of the functions in the close proximity of rural areas will 
“increase production and exchange between rural and urban areas” (Ruddle and Rondinelli, 
1978: 30). 
Based on the belief in rural development roles to be played by towns and cities in rural regions, 
UFRD identified seven functions that were to be performed by towns in rural development such 
as 
(1) consumer convenience centers for purchasing non-durable and durable goods 
(2) centers for higher order public and private services 
(3) linkage to (inter-)national markets for selling rural products 
(4) production supply and support centers 
(5) agro- and resource-processing centers    
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(6) non-agricultural employment for rural labor  
(7) centers of information and knowledge (From Douglass, 1998). 
The UFRD model became influential as it came in a 1975 paper commissioned by the US 
Agency for International Development, who was willing to fund programs based on this model. 
The commissioned paper was published in 1978 (Rondinelli & Ruddle, 1978), more than 2 years 
after programs were implemented in the Bicol River Basin in the Philippines, Bolivia, (the then) 
Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Cameroon, Guatemala, and Indonesia. 
The projects had difficulty in implementation. Much of the difficulty stemmed from the fact that 
planning and implementation was done centrally. The bigger issue of interest here is that the 
theory behind the framework can be questioned. Perhaps the most important critique is what 
Douglass (1998) called one-sided view of the role of “cities in rural development” without 
examining the reverse relationship.  
In the most famous experiment of this principle in the Bicol river basin in the Philippines in the 
late 1970s, provision of services such as consumer convenience centers, linkage to (inter-
)national markets for selling rural produce, production supply and support centers did not result 
in the development of rural areas. The reason was that in the absence of a thriving economy and 
purchasing power in the rural areas, there was little demand for such services. An evaluation 
study a decade after the commencement of that program found that the towns themselves were 
stagnating (Koppel, 1987). Apart from failure to see the role of rural economy in the health of 
the urban centers, the UFRD failed to take cognizance of another well-known fact that even 
when services and facilities are physically proximate, social (power) structure might prevent a 
large section of the population’s access to them (Begg, 1992). Another lesson to transpire from 
Bicol river basin is that accessibility can be, to state the obvious, a two-way street. For example, 
the road-building program significantly reduced transportation time and costs between Bicol 
region and the Manila metropolitan area, and in the process allowed unprocessed rice to be 
transported out of the region. The end result was that rice mills in the market centers and towns 
lost demand for their services, resulting in 25% reduction in milling capacity in the program area 
between 1981 and 1984 (Koppel, 1987). 
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In conclusion, the UFRD approach ignored important theories on either end of the rural-urban 
continuum. On the urban end, like Christaller’s Central Place Theory, UFRD sees urban centers 
as nothing more than locations of service (or central functions) for the hinterland. However, 
urban areas are also locations of production and consumption. By ignoring this fact, the model 
misses important ways to achieve vitality of towns and market centers. At the rural end, UFRD 
sees rural poverty and low productivity as a function of lack of accessibility to services. With the 
benefit of hindsight, these misguided underlying theories appear to have prevented UFRD from 
creating mutually reinforcing relationships between the towns and their hinterlands. 
3.4.4 Agropolitan Development 
While UFRD was getting underway with inadequate review of its underlying theories, another 
fundamentally different model of rural regional development was being offered, first as a 
conference paper (Friedmann & Douglass, 1975) and later published as a journal article and 
book chapter (1978). According to the authors, the Agropolitan model is a spatial model to 
accommodate many of the lessons emerging from the failure of the growth pole strategy, and 
industrialization of the 1960s and ‘70s. Two of those lessons were: (1) The economic policy of 
industrialization and its accompanying spatial policy of growth center resulted in inequality and 
poverty, and (2) the primary objective “development” could not be economic growth, but “social 
development with focus on specific human needs”.  As the term suggests, the town was to be not 
just a market center but more importantly a “polis”, or political decision-making center, made 
possible by devolution of power to local levels. By emphasizing devolution as one of the 
cornerstones, agropolitan model was ahead of its time. Some form of decentralization, mostly 
“deconcentration”, to use (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983) categorization, and devolution would 
later appear in the 1980s and 1990s in some countries, most notably Indonesia. 
Considering these lessons and in the absence of any policy of accelerated rural growth that could 
be evaluated (the WB’s IRD and South Korea’s Saemaul Undong were only a few years old in 
the mid-1970s), the authors ventured into a world of plausibility by outlining how a new spatial 
policy could be operationalized: 
1. Instead of encouraging emigration from rural areas, invest in them so agropolis or “city in 
the fields” can emerge. 
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2. Instead of using village, use larger spatial unit such as district. 
3. Diversify opportunities for productive work and, more specifically, by joining 
agricultural to non-agricultural activities within the same territorial community. 
4. Use labor effectively by directing it towards a greatly intensified development of the 
natural resource base of each agropolitan district, including improvements in agricultural 
production, major conservation and water control projects, rural public roads, expanded 
rural services, and agriculturally oriented industries. 
Such agropolitan districts are then envisaged to be linked to be regional networks by building up 
and improving physical channels of communication among agropolitan districts and to larger 
towns. Such linking provides the basis to sustain higher order goods and services. In terms of 
governance, the model proposed what later came to be known as a devolved form of 
decentralization. The authors even ventured into the method of financing such districts that 
included reinvesting large parts of local savings in the district, some form of communal labor 
extracted from the residents (voluntary or evoking social contract), transferring of fund from 
industry to agriculture, and reversing the adverse terms of trade between peasants and city 
populations. 
Contrasted with the alternative of industry-centric growth pole strategy, agropolitan districts had 
some intuitive appeal. However, as the authors hinted, several major changes had to happen 
before agroplitan district model could be attempted. Many of these changes never took place. For 
example, local governments were weak. Most of the countries at the time were extremely 
centralized and many were autocracies. The colonial legacy meant that former colonies did not 
have a system of local governance because pre-colonial local governments were eliminated by 
colonial bureaucracy. Another major issue highlighted by the Agropolitan model was the need 
for land reform. Except for Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam, and West Bengal, examples of land 
reform are non-existent. Perhaps more important than any list of factors that were necessary for 
the implementation of the agropolitan district strategy was the historical juncture that was the 
late 1970s. The advent of neoliberalism meant retreat of governments, and the onset of aid 
fatigue of the 1980s meant that development was not on the agenda of the international 
community.  
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As one of the authors claimed later (Friedmann, 1985), agropolitan development needed political 
commitment to succeed. Perhaps one lesson from the fate of agropolitan development is that 
“political commitment or will” is not a free good. Furthermore, creation of locally based 
planning is predicated on local political capital and capacity, an assumption that is rarely 
fulfilled.  
However, it is fair to assume that both limitations are less constricting now than they were in the 
late 1970s. Literacy rate is higher now, and so is political awareness in the rural areas. Many 
low-income countries decentralized in recent decades, thereby created sub-national governance 
structures. Together with such changes, there is another important ideological change that has 
occurred: The acceptance and in most circumstances, the promotion of the idea of local 
development. With rise of neoliberalism, development is seen as a responsibility of not the 
central state, but of the localities (Polese, 1999). Given this new policy environment, the 
“political will” that Friedmann observed to have been missing might just show up, giving a new 
lease of life to the idea of agropolitan district. 
As an interesting aside: The term agropolitan has returned to use in the title of projects in 
Indonesia and Malaysia in recent years. However, as a proof of words getting co-opted, the 
programs that are being called “agropolitan” are nothing more than agri-business development 
programs based in small towns (e.g. Rosdiana, Inayati, & Murwendah, 2014). In the 
reconstructed use of the word “agropolitan”, the “polis” part (meaning that agropolis was seen as 
a political unit in the manner of bodies of citizen in ancient Greece) has been lost. It has rather 
come to mean “agriculture-led rural economic growth”. In this sense of the word, it is no wonder 
that agropolis has a counterpart in “minapolis” (fisheries-led development). 
3.4.5 Poverty Alleviation through Rural Urban Linkages 
Poverty Alleviation through Rural Urban Linkages (Renamed in 2002 as Partnerships for Local 
Economic Development, in Indonesian, Kemitraan bagi Pengembangan Ekonomi Lokal or 
KPEL). 
PARUL was launched as a project in Indonesia in 1999 with Bappenas (central planning agency) 
as the executing agency, with funding support provided by UNDP and technical assistance from 
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UN HABITAT. The concept of PARUL in succinctly described by Evans (2002), who served as 
the Chief Technical Adviser in the program.  
PARUL aims to integrate lagging regions into the mainstream economy, by 
connecting producers to markets within the region and beyond, focusing on 
clusters of economic activities associated with key local export commodities. 
Central to this approach is an institutional component based on public-private 
partnerships between [local] government and the business community [both 
producers and medium to large tradesman], whose function is to generate 
initiatives, and mobilise resources to strengthen rural-urban linkages for 
production and trade. (Citing Evans, 2001.) 
Thus, PARUL deliberately attempted not to be comprehensive across all economic activities, but 
focused on one sector (one produce or commodity to be precise) that had the potential to earn 
money from outside the region. Examples of such chosen produces of high export potential 
include, cashews in South Sulawesi, coconut in North Sulawesi, and off-shore fisheries in Papua. 
In that, it is similar to Perroux’s original non-spatial growth pole theory (Perroux, 1955) where 
one sector in the economy generates growth in other sectors (as steel and mining did in England 
in the 19th century). 
Through establishing public-private partnership between small-scale producers, larger businesses 
and local government, PARUL attempted to facilitate the marketing of produces outside region. 
Such approach, at least in theory, should ensure that small producers, many of whom are poor, 
are able to enjoy the benefits from the export. The entry point in PARUL’s strategy is therefore, 
choosing one agricultural produce in each region and facilitating its production and marketing 
while ensuring that the incomes benefit the poor. In this regard, it is similar to the “one district 
one product” policy advocated in Japan. The one district one product policy and PARUL stand to 
offer lessons about one value-chain based development effort. 
It is unclear, however, how incentives in one agricultural produce create forward and backward 
linkages within the local economy. Creation of marketing linkages might not guarantee that most 
of the value-added is retained in the local economy. More practical problems, as documented by 
Evans (2002), include the fluctuating exchange rate of dollar and produce prices; and the 
unwillingness of trans-region or international importers to commit for a long time. Despite such 
problems, PARUL seem to address the fact that export is necessary and value-added should be 
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retained in the locality among smallholders. There appears to be a dearth of evaluation studies of 
the project’s interventions, but a study on clusters of small and medium enterprises (including 
non-KPEL clusters) in Indonesia found that little social networking among SMEs were achieved 
and there were little cooperation and economies of agglomeration achieved even when they are 
geographically concentrated (GOI & JICA, 2004). 
3.4.6 Rural Urban Partnership Program (RUPP) in Nepal 
The RUPP was undertaken in 1997 by UNDP and the Government of Nepal. The Program was 
undertaken with the explicit goal of local development via strengthened rural-urban linkages. In 
doing so the Program selected 12 municipalities, and implicitly took them as the centers of their 
local economies. For each municipality, several rural market centers within its market zone were 
selected for RUPP support. For each municipality and its rural markets, a Partnership 
Development Committee was established. This committee comprised leaders from both the 
municipality (the elected mayor, and the leaders of the NGOs and business communities) and the 
elected Chairpersons of the villages where the rural markets are located. With this committee as 
the overseer, the RUPP office based at the 12 municipalities pursued a string of interventions 
aimed at “urban-based local development”. 
These interventions included: 
1. institutional development towards better governance; 
2. enterprise development and creation of economic opportunities; 
3. improvement or provision of small-scale infrastructure; and 
4. training and capacity building. 
The core of the “institutional development” was mobilization of community at the level of (sub-
neighborhood) alley ways (tole in Nepalese). Such community mobilization was successful, 
especially in the municipality and its rural centers studied in (Momen, 2009). The enthusiasm 
generated by the establishment of small associations of neighbors paved for the other 
interventions such as group owned small enterprises aimed at increasing rural-urban linkages 
with the financial and technical help of RUPP. The Program also spent small amounts for 
improving micro-structure such as paving a trading place, improving a mountain trail, or a small 
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service road. RUPP operated on a small budget, and hence did not invest in any large 
infrastructure. RUPP did not attempt to help with productive activities such as agriculture except 
for financing some small enterprises in artisanal manufacturing and processing. Perhaps RUPP’s 
biggest success was in the area of putting together institutions such as Partnership development 
Committee and offering effective training and capacity building. 
As described in further detail in Momen (2009), a few lessons stand out: 
1. Most enterprises contributed significantly to the poverty alleviation of the entrepreneurs, 
but indirect linkages in terms of job creation and profits were considerably limited. The 
amount of support available to group enterprises was generally small (typically US$270–
335), which ensured that only the poor had an incentive to apply for a RUPP loan. But 
this also meant that the enterprises were not big enough to have any meaningful effect 
through linkages with the hinterland. 
2. Even though there is potential for economies of scale at an institutional level for trading 
and marketing activities (e.g. disseminating market information, cooperative-based 
marketing), RUPP enterprises were far too few and small to be capable of using any such 
collective action. 
3. As municipalities are the primary vehicles for the implementation of RUPP, villages 
outside the municipality’s jurisdiction were beyond their operational reach. This left 
RUPP with small-scale manufacturing, processing and trading enterprises as the vehicles 
of the generation and retention of multiplier effects. 
Along with the experience with RUPP enterprises, the governance of development work in the 
Nepalese context also stands out. As per the statutes in Nepal (Local Self-Government Act 
(LSGA) of 1999 and the Rules of 2000), the District Development Committees are required to 
play a leading role in the development of the districts. However, in the district studied in Momen 
(2009), as in most other districts in Nepal, the DDC has yet to exert its power and influence for 
reasons that include the inertia of centralized planning, the lack of able manpower and a lack of 
resources. In its absence, a municipality based program that is not geographically comprehensive 
of the district plays an expedient role. 
3.4.8 Regionalism and Local Governments 
Regionalism, in the sense of neighboring local governments cooperating for common good, is 
rare both in the developing world and the advanced capitalist countries. There is a general 
pessimism about getting smaller local governments to cooperate. For example Hall & Stern 
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(2009) reports ‘reluctant regionalists’ (i.e. local governments unmotivated to cooperate) in 
Canada. In the developing world, it is even rarer. For example, in Indonesia, (Firman, 2009) 
reports, the new local governments created by splintering a large local government did not have 
the incentive to cooperate. In Indonesia’s case, there were even hostility between splinters and 
the mother local governments. 
Such experiences raise the question of nature of government for rural regional development. 
While there are countries such as Indonesia where large scale devolution (and subsequent re-
centralization) was implemented, there are countries where whatever decentralization was 
carried out is nothing more than de-concentration (i.e. establishment of local offices of national 
ministries). In countries such as Ghana, districts are the units of devolution (Owusu, 2004). In 
others, districts are units of administrative de-concentration and funding. In countries such as 
Bangladesh, there is no local government or central government’s administrative unit at the 
district level. Rather it is at sub-district level. With such diverse administrative arrangements 
existing around the world, rural regional planning has two options: (a) couch itself in the existing 
arrangements of governance, or (b) make governance and administrative reform as part of the 
planning exercise.  
3.4.9 Strengthening rural-urban linkages 
Though not offered as a model, “strengthening rural urban linkages” is often a recommendation 
found in reports on rural-urban linkages. Tacoli et al (2005), von Braun (2007) are among many 
examples that call for increased linkages in recent times. This is perhaps the most perplexing of 
all the prescriptions. This prescription is oblivious to the historical experience that increased flow 
is not a good or bad thing for poverty alleviation per se. When “strengthening” is recommended, 
it is often left un-analyzed. The implicit belief is often that increasing of flow of goods and 
services between an urban center and rural area would somehow benefit rural areas. Such 
assertion is oblivious to the process of backwash that Myrdal in his famous work so convincingly 
argued (Myrdal, 1957). Many evaluation of road projects warn of this danger of resources and 
capable people leaving rural regions with improvement in accessibility, including the review of 
Bicol River Basin Development Project done in section 3.4.3. 
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While not inherently so, strategies of strengthening linkages also leave room for dyadic form of 
settlements, because it translates into connection between villages or village market centers with 
rural towns. Such dyadic pattern precludes direct trade or establishment of forward and backward 
linkages between one cluster of villages with another. 
In rural regional development, some tools such as facilitating trans-village trade, or even 
facilitation of migration can be relevant and useful. However, uncritical promotion of rural urban 
linkages (often taken to mean building roads) is not an approach that promises to help the poor 
and the most vulnerable. 
3.4.10 Regional Network Strategy of Reciprocal Rural-Urban Linkages 
While dust was still settling in after the rapidly increasing empirical body of literature on  rural 
urban interactions and flows that came to be known as rural-urban linkages, Douglass (1998) 
proposed a framework for rural regional development that sought to emphasize the importance of 
reciprocity of rural and urban linkages in rural development. As a backdrop to doing so, he 
examined the different ways urban areas have been assumed to be capable of spreading 
development: (a) as growth pole with industrial base to spread growth into surrounding rural 
regions, (b) as the node to make urban functions available to the rural hinterland (in the manner 
of UFRD above) without recognizing that a poor rural area cannot sustain these very services 
such as banking. As it turned out, programs such as the Bicol river basin development project 
that were inspired by the “urban-sided” view of rural-urban linkages did not help lift the rural. 
In laying out the framework he starts by demonstrating a contrast between a virtuous cycle when 
rural and urban relationships are well articulated and a truncated cycle of regional development 
and rural urban linkages where limited rural growth (from mono-cropping, lack of diversity in 
the economy, leakage from the local economy) leads to stagnation in towns. 
Douglass’ major contribution is that he sees rural regions as potentially a network of a diverse set 
of activities that do not need to be centered in a large urban center (in the manner of a growth 
pole). For example, based on the Indonesian cases that he studied, he found small communities 
of villages with long traditions and comparative advantage of different productive activities 
(pottery here, animal husbandry and milk there). A collection of them in a region, when 
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supported via government programs to not allow urban expropriation, is an alternative to a 
growth-pole style agglomeration. Such regional networks, in his framework are the locus for 
specific strategy. 
Figure 5 Douglass' (1998) schematic presentation of rural-urban network 
 
In several ways, the “regional clusters” offers a plausible framework. However, a framework still 
needs to a strategy to be translated into action. In addition, the process of globalization and rural 
de-peasantization has proceeded further since the 1990s. A rural development strategy in this 
second decade of the new century needs to respond to these changes. 
3.4.11 Territorial Development Programs in Latin America 
The Latin American Center for Rural Development (commonly known as RIMISP), established 
in 1986, has been instrumental in developing a general principle of rural development that in 
English can be translated as rural territorial development (RTD). The core of the principle has 
two cornerstones: (a) economic transformation, and (b) institutional transformation (Schejtman 
& Berdegué, 2004). Like most ideas, the proponents of territorial development model offered it 
in response to something that was perceived to have failed. Thus, to understand RTD we need to 
describe both (a) its core concepts, and (b) the model with which it is supposed to stand in 
contradistinction. The model RTD is supposed to replace, among others following features (from 
Scheijtman & Berdegué, 2008): 
1. Centered on agriculture alone, 
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2. Targeting of poor without taking advantage of non-poor agents, 
3. Ignore the potential effects of strengthening rural-urban linkages, 
4. Often ignores the heterogeneity of rural areas and suffer from “one size fits all” syndrome 
5. Use project resources to compensate market failure that reappear after the project. 
In response to above shortcomings, RTD is envisaged as having a component of productive 
transformation (meaning pro-poor production and distribution) of the rural territorial unit. As a 
condition for sustaining the productive transformation, the proponents also see “institutional 
transformation” as an indispensable component. The first element of institutional transformation 
is some form of devolution. These two transformations are described by  
Productive transformation is a process of change in the prevailing production 
patterns in order to articulate the area’s economy with more dynamic markets in a 
competitive and sustainable way which means the introduction of innovations in 
products, processes and management. Institutional development as the process of 
configuring an institutional architecture has the objective of promoting the 
concerted action of local agents, both among themselves and with relevant 
external agents; and of changing the formal and informal rules that perpetuate the 
exclusion of the poor from the processes and benefits of productive 
transformation (Schejtman, 2009). 
This general formulation of territorially based rural development meets several of the concerns 
that derive from analysis of poverty as emanating from social relations and institutions. 
However, devil as they say, is in the details. From the perspective of planning for rural regions, 
the interest is in the details of how productive and institutional transformations are achieved. 
3.4.12 Creation of Cluster 
At its simplest, a cluster is defined as a spatial concentration of (mostly small and medium) firms 
of the same sector (Schmitz & Nadvi, 1999). In policy-making, cluster as a strategy is seen as a 
way to offer small enterprises in a sector to attain collective efficiency through positive 
externalities gained from being sited in close proximity. Some of the sources of such collective 
efficiency are opportunity to share information, specialized services required for production, and 
technical and administrative services aimed at the sector firms. This strand of literature evolved 
from a long-standing literature on industrial districts dating back to Alfred Marshal, who 
observed that industries in certain sectors over time can concentrate and form a “compound” 
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relationship. For him, such compound relationships happen through, among others, “growth of 
subsidiary trades”, “local market for special skill”, and “the use of highly specialized machinery” 
(Belussi & Caldari, 2009).  
In the 1980s, several studies of geographic concentration of small scale firms in the same sector 
elevated clusters as a policy goal. The classic cases for clusters are all European, with a large 
number of Italian ones. Their characteristics such as common institutions to support marketing of 
all firms in the area, inter-firm cooperation, knowledge spill-over, and collective buying of inputs 
immediately became policy goals. One crucial aspect of clusters that gets less mention is the fact 
that the classic cases cited (e.g. the Third Italy in Piore and Sabel, 1984) are all spontaneously 
evolved, i.e. not created with any conscious policy.  Creation of clusters through conscious 
policy, especially in the developing world is rather rare (Ceglie & Dini, 1999). 
There are descriptions of clusters such as Sinos Valley shoe cluster in Brazil or garments in 
Tirippur and Ludhiana, India (cited in IDS Bulletin, Issue 21, 2004). In agrarian societies, many 
artisanal manufacturing and processing such as fish-drying, and rattan furniture making show the 
characteristics of being in a cluster, i.e. concentrating geographically while having common 
institutions and processes to create positive externalities for each firm. However, the question 
“can clusters be created with conscious policy” remain? One way to create clusters in the low-
income countries has been the adoption of value-chain approach, where firms along a value 
chain are supported and connected with the hope that synergy would appear in the chain. The 
level of success of value-chain projects is nothing encouraging, even though some enterprises 
benefitted from the support from development NGOs24. 
3.5 A Sample of in situ Development Experiences 
There have been certain success stories of in situ development and local cluster formation from 
around the developing world.  A sample of the more celebrated ones are discussed here: 
1. San Francisco Valley in Brazil agricultural cluster (cited in World Development Report 
2008): A public institution provided irrigated land to smallholders, who were large 
                                                 
24 Per personal communication with the project officer of a recently concluded value chain project by CARE-
Bangladesh 
78 
 
enough in number to produce enough mango and grapes that could demand local 
processing of the fruits. The same institution also facilitated growers’ association. The 
increased productivity and establishment of fruit-based value chains in the region (as 
opposed to export fruit to extra-regional destinations) helped increase the economic 
health of the region as a whole. 
2. Marikina (Philippines) shoe cluster (from Scott, 2007): The Marikina shoe cluster near 
the northeast of Manila grew to be an industrial cluster through the geographic 
concentration of a large number of small firms that were vertically integrated to perform 
several stages of shoe production. However, with import liberalization in the 1980s, the 
shoe cluster gradually lost business to much cheaper Chinese imports. 
3. Upper Valley of Rio Negro region in Argentina experienced broad based regional 
economic growth that did not leak out of the regional economy. The region had a fairly 
equitable land ownership. The building of a rail road, and promotion of the regional local 
government to the status of a province enabled growth that could be shared within the 
region, as opposed to being extracted out of the region by small number of extra-regional 
owners. The growth of the fruit agriculture created both backward and forward linkages 
within the rural regional economy (Vapnarsky & Manzanal, 1986). 
4. Chiloe island (Chile) salmon industry that grew to be the second largest in the world but 
left out locals from benefits (Hayward, 2011). 
5. Rafaela, Argentina (Center for Entrepreneurial Development) (Ferraro & Costamagna, 
2000) in (Sanchez & Bisang, 2011) is not a rural region, rather a town that has risen to be 
one of the most renowned cases of local economic development. It is known for the 
success of the urban local government, with the help of a grant from the Inter-American 
Bank, in leading planning for the urban economy that featured public-private partnership-
led growth as a major policy goal. While the success of such urban local governments is 
occasionally reported, the success of rural regional government in attaining growth is 
much rarer. 
6. Upper Limari Valley in Chile experienced significant growth in the regional economy 
primarily through the growth of grape as an agricultural product  (Gwynne & Ortiz, 
1997). The growth happened as a result of the fact that grapes in this region could be 
harvested during the off-season in the North America. The growth was facilitated by 
government provided irrigation. However, it is instructive that with growth in the 
regional economy, may smaller farmers were forced to sell off their land as big operators 
attained more efficiency and could buy off the smaller producers. The region is still 
prosperous with prosperity leaving out significant portions of the population. Currently, 
climate change is threatening the regions suitability for grape production.  
What is common to these experiences is that when forward and backward linkages within the 
local economy are present, they create a localized widespread growth.  However, as the case of 
Marikina shoe industry points out, in a globalized economy an entire collection of industry can 
be jeopardized by cheaper production elsewhere (in this case China). Also, sometimes a 
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successful cluster of economic activities can find root while leaving behind a large number of 
residents, such as the Chiloe Island (Chile) salmon industry’s growth did. Such growth is not 
rural regional development, as we defined here. 
3.6 Outline of a Rural Regional Development Strategy 
3.6.1 Rural Regional Development: Defining by contrasting 
Schematically, we situated rural regional development between the overarching global forces and 
the local context (Section 1.6), and set out to explore the markers of rural regional development 
and the political and bureaucratic details of how planning for rural regional development might 
take shape. By requiring a synoptic view of the rural region, rural regional planning would 
require some form of government at the driver’s seat. It is hard to imagine rural regional 
development happening without some conscious coordination at the least, if not downright 
planning from the government. The two other actors in the stylized triad of actors (namely, 
market and civil society) will likely not have the leading role. As discussed here, market under 
the contemporary forces of capitalism does not seem to instigate rural regional development in 
high-poverty areas. Civil society groups, while potentially crucial for regional development are 
generally too weak and under resourced in the low-income countries to take the leading role in 
regional development. 
Available literature bearing the title of regional development or territorial development does not 
go far in helping identify the markers of rural regional development. For example, the content of 
a recent report by the Inter-American Development Bank is instructive here. It bears the 
ambitious title “Evaluating the Impact of Regional Development Programs: Impact Evaluation 
Guidelines” (Winters & Rubio, 2010). The report seeks to contribute to the field of program 
evaluation, a field that seeks measurable indicators wherever possible. The report however, could 
not go beyond identifying general principles for regional development in two areas of 
intervention: (a) institutional and (b) productive transformation. By institutional transformation it 
meant changes in governance structure (e.g. devolution), and “productive transformation” is used 
as an umbrella term to denote enhancement of the economy. Once seen this way, regional 
development becomes “productive investment combined with institutional transformation” (p 8). 
Across authors, the language to describe territorial development is remarkably similar. For 
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example, as discussed in Section 3.4.12, Schejtman & Berdegué (2004 and 2008) define rural 
territorial development as comprising the same two broad goals. In Winters and Rubio (2010), 
the objectives toward the goal of regional development (such as “The regional development 
program [needs to] identif[y] productive activities for investment from different sectors 
including both agricultural and nonagricultural activities.”) are fairly general and do not include 
much detail. The lack of specificity of evaluative indicators in the report implicitly concedes the 
fact that there are multiple ways in which rural regional development can be conceived and take 
place. 
While the literature on regional/territorial development do not allow much detail, broader 
literature discussed in Chapters Two and Three here leads further toward a framework for rural 
regional development. Before we assemble a framework and a strategy, it is perhaps useful at the 
beginning to determine what rural regional development is not. We propose that a program over 
a large area does not make it regional per se. Thus, a project to build schools or a livestock 
project across one or more districts does not make it ‘regional’ unless there are components 
aimed at capturing synergistic effect toward regional development. In short, it is not regional 
unless it captures spatial synergy. 
Another essential element in the definition of rural regional development is, we propose, what 
Olfert et al. (2014) consider the definition of “place-based” policies: “geographically immobile 
public expenditures or investments in particular places or regions…” (p. 8). What is 
“geographically immobile” is not straightforward, and in certain situations cannot be given an 
operational definition. For example, a training program for some skill in a rural region can be 
seen as a way to enhance local human capital. However, if it is intended to prepare rural people 
for a job in a city the training program is not geographically immobile, and is not a rural regional 
development intervention. 
With these key characteristics of rural regional development in mind, we propose a policy model 
for rural regional development. As has been evident in the literature on territorial development, 
neo-endogenous development, and regional development, it has not been easy to find out a 
strategy beyond some vaguely worded milestones toward rural regional development. As we 
identified, such milestones include: (a) Focus on territory not some sectors, (b) take advantage of 
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local resources, not least of which is social capital, (c) ensure local participation, and (d) design 
appropriate institutions at the local level. 
3.6.2 The Three Cornerstones of RRD 
Such general statements are agreeable and offer a starting point. However, to move further 
toward a strategy of rural regional development, we propose three key conditions of an approach 
to rural regional development. Figure 6 and Table 3 below summarize the key cornerstones or 
conditions of what would constitute rural regional development. An approach or a set of 
cornerstones, however, is not a strategy. Nevertheless, we propose these as the guiding lights for 
rural regional development strategy. 
1. Increase productivity in the rural regional economy 
2. Maximize capture of multiplier effect of local economic activities 
3. Eliminate or bypass the institutions and customs (such as debt bondage, exploitative 
terms in sharecropping) that prevent redistributive justice. 
We describe each of them below. 
1. Increase productivity in the rural regional economy 
Rural regional economies are stagnant in much of the developing world. While growth does not 
automatically equate with poverty alleviation, there is a need for raising the economic 
productivity in the rural regions. As we argued, low-income countries often do not have an urban 
based sector (manufacturing or service) that can allow for massive transfer payments to rural 
regions (c.f. recent success stories such as South Korea, especially Saemaul Undong; Japan, and 
Malaysia). The rural regions themselves need to contribute to growth. Furthermore, often 
densely populated, the rural regions in the low-income countries have large enough population, 
even though there is not enough aggregate demand in the rural regions because of the current low 
purchasing power of the poor. Transfer payments, when not contributing to local economic 
growth, cannot sustain local productivity. 
In the process of pursuing growth in the rural regions, an option that is often ignored is the 
possibility of intra-regional trade. The current mantra in development policy and practice is 
export of one or more rural products. For example, development NGOs and/or government 
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projects will often help with export of a rural product to big cities and/or developed countries (as 
in PARUL in Indonesia discussed in Section 3.4). In the absence of other options, such export 
can be an effective way of increasing the income of a substantial number of households, if such 
operation can ensure a fair deal for the poor. However, such income in one product chain needs 
to have a local economy-wide effect. 
The hypothesis of fractal poverty trap (section 2.3) is important here. As stated in the hypothesis, 
bringing one scale (e.g. household) to a higher equilibrium is hard if the higher scale (the rural 
region) that the household is a part of is at a low-level equilibrium. The classic debate of “Big 
push” of Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) vs. “unbalanced growth” of Hirschman (1958) is relevant in 
the case of rural regions. The “Big Push” in the case of a rural region might include simultaneous 
and coordinated investments in health, education, skills training, finance and physical 
infrastructure. “Unbalanced growth” would mean concentrating investment in one or a few 
intervention areas and expect that through linkages growth will spread to other sectors. Our 
reviews (section 3.5) suggest that there might be instances of both happening in the past. 
However, a crucial element is retention of multiplier, which we list as the second key dimension 
of rural regional development. 
What would “Big Push”, in the sense of creation of increased economic activity based on 
increasing returns resulting from coordinated interventions, look like in the rural regions in the 
low-income countries? Potential list of economic activities includes both taking advantage of 
existing economy and introduction of new ones. Literature on rural industrialization, once a 
thriving field, has dried up in recent years. Some of the strategies we can surmise are: 
(a) promoting indigenous pre-existing economic activities, including manufacturing, that 
because of some bottlenecks are not prospering, 
(b) taking advantage of global value-chains if it represents a just deal for the rural regions and 
firms or households undertaking them. As we pointed in our review of contemporary rural 
reality, often the producers based in rural areas get into exploitative relationships with city-
based or international corporations. However, recent developments have seen fair-trade 
certification, albeit benefitting a small number of rural regions, 
(c) where applicable, help increase productivity in agriculture, pisciculture, and livestock. 
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One common mode of development activity is to help farmers and peasants with increasing 
productivity of the crops they already cultivate, or incentivizing the ones that are important for 
national economy. However, cropping pattern does not have to stick to historical patterns of an 
area. Certain agricultural practices, such as floriculture have appeared in rural regions where 
historically there was no such practice. Judging from the experience of Bangladesh floriculture is 
not just a peri-urban phenomenon. Much of the country’s flower production takes place in rural 
regions far away from Dhaka City, the country’s largest center of consumption. Such examples 
of successes, often promoted as best practice, in growth in local economy so far appear to be 
serendipitous. As is the case with best practice literature it is hard to decipher a pattern and 
theorize. 
2. Maximize capture of multiplier effect of local economic activities 
As a statistic, local GDP masks the extent of retention of multiplier because it does not account 
for the leakage from the rural region. A rural region with high productivity can still not see much 
prosperity if the land there is owned by absentee owners. Likewise, a natural resource rich area 
can have high poverty if the income resources accrue to people or entities outside the region. For 
rural regional growth to happen, retention of most of the multiplier effect within the rural 
regional economy has to happen. Such retention can happen only through a set of tightly knit 
forward and backward linkages of local economic activities and enterprises. When linkages exist, 
multiplier effect is retained in the rural region. When a cluster forms (Section 3.4.12), multiplier 
effect gets localized. 
However, cluster is not the only way to retaining linkages. Ensuring just wage or share of value-
added for rural households and firms can itself ensure a larger portion of the value-added 
retained in the rural regional economy.  
3. Eliminate or bypass the institutions and customs (such as debt bondage, 
exploitative terms in sharecropping) that impoverish the poor 
In terms of poverty alleviation, the most important cornerstone of rural regional development is 
perhaps removal of exploitative relationships. Such exploitative relationships can result from two 
sources. There can be inequality because of presence of local power elites within the rural 
region, or, there can be outside elites or corporations with control over the resources and 
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production process in the local economy. Does existing literature offer any insight into how 
exploitative relationships can be redressed? Experience has shown that infrastructural provisions 
alone almost never redress these relationships. As observed after studying the same area and 
households in western Nepal 20 years apart: “[S]tructural forces which generate exploitation, 
oppression, and disenfranchisement” cannot be removed by infrastructural provisions (such as 
roads) alone. 
This key dimension of poverty alleviation and consequently, rural regional development is rarely 
addressed in contemporary development practice (Section 2.4). Is there a way to bypass this 
constraint and still achieve poverty alleviation? Perhaps one way to by-pass the pre-existing 
inequality in access to assets is to help create new economic activities that can create new assets, 
the distribution of which can be impacted by policy towards a more equitable pattern. 
The right-based approach by itself is unable to translate into significant economic gains for the 
disadvantaged. The case of South America is instructive here. South America saw several major 
social movements, some ethnically-based, in the last two decades. A review of five social 
movements of different interest groups (family farmers, indigenous people, stake-holders in a 
dam project, rainforest conservationists) leads to the conclusion that social movements do 
significantly less for economic inclusiveness than political inclusiveness (Bebbington, 
Dharmawan, Fahmi, & Guggenheim, 2006). In other words, social movements lead to increased 
access to political processes and even reform in the political and bureaucratic institutions. 
However, changes in the economy in ways that benefit the poor are harder to achieve. Political 
inclusiveness is a necessary, but not sufficient condition.  
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Figure 6 Three cornerstones of rural regional development 
 
What kind of planning will achieve these three cornerstones? There is enough experience in the 
literature to suggest that all three must be pursued simultaneously. To cater to one, we cannot 
hinder the advancement of the other. For example, raising rural productivity through plantation 
mode of agriculture can show aggregate productivity increase for a rural region. However, the 
leakage is typically high in plantation mode of production, and the second cornerstone of 
“retention of linkages” is rarely achieved. In a world oblivious of spatial dimension of 
development, and skeptical of RRD, is it possible to demonstrate instances of all three happening 
in any part of the world? Some of the examples of in situ regional development discussed earlier 
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in Section 3.5 offer some insights. However, thoughts and insights must be put together into a 
strategy for RRD. 
3.6.3 Toward a Strategy for Rural Regional Development 
One of the reasons why rural regional planning (as opposed to sectoral planning or planning at 
community scale) is important is that it allows creating complementary set of actions toward a 
synergistic effect within a rural region. This spatial synergy is rural region specific, and cannot 
be described a priori or independent of context. For example, constructing a small boat landing 
station in a village of poor fishermen can complement the act of offering them loan in 
eliminating the institution of debt-bondage. Without the boat landing station, the fishermen 
cannot break free of the power elites in existing boat landing stations some distance away even if 
they get some operating capital. Because of such region-specific nature of synergy, a general 
strategy must stay fairly abstract and at the level of concepts. 
The conceptual models of regional/territorial development proposed so far in the literature 
implicitly use rural regions as the unit of analysis. With regions as the unit of analysis, variables 
in the framework are attributes of the region. A conceptual framework by RIMISP, reproduced 
below in Figure 7, illustrates this point. In this conceptual framework for rural territorial 
development, examples of variables include (a) actors (the categories of which are public, private 
and society), and (b) geography as an umbrella term for both distance and bio-physical 
characteristics. Such conceptualization is useful and necessary. However, we propose that it 
needs to be complemented by frameworks using other units, such as households, and 
communities in the rural region. We hypothesize that a complementary framework that is built 
from households as the unit of analysis is also needed. However, just the way in physics, where 
quantum theory and relativity have not been brought together into one theory, household level 
frameworks (the most well-known of which is the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework) have not 
been combined with region-scale frameworks. The result as seen in the contemporary 
development practice is that household-based interventions such as micro-credit and skills 
training position themselves within the structural, institutional, and infrastructural setting of the 
community and take it as given. While “regional” projects, which have been few and less funded, 
become some regional sectoral project. 
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Figure 7 A framework for rural territorial development by Scjeitman and Berdegue, 2008 
 
We might approach a strategy for rural regional development by venturing an answer to the 
question: What needs to be done to bring about the three cornerstones of rural regional 
development? To venture an answer to this question, one point to start is the household. As 
identified in the reviews of Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and geographic trap, household 
level assets and vulnerabilities condition the livelihood outcome for the households. However, 
households are not homogeneous in occupation, or asset ownership. Regional planning needs to 
cater to this diversity of interests and values. 
Intervening in regional level variables such as decentralization, or road building has been found 
to miss the fact that households of different social power and asset profiles benefit differently. 
Community building at smaller units such as villages can cater to such needs. However, 
community building is rarely practiced in the mainstream. Only the rarely funded “rights-based” 
projects in radical movements design their interventions at the level of communities. Rural 
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regional development stands to benefit from explicit consideration of the communities within the 
regions while pursing the region scale interventions. Understandably the capacity of the 
communities to participate in the political processes varies. Often there is apathy, resignation, 
and fatalism that keep communities from participating. What builds capacity, and unleashes the 
power of the community is inadequately understood. There are success stories such as the 
Saemaul Undong described here. Despite useful studies (such as Bebbington et al., 2006), where 
capacities of different communities are compared with an eye on theorization, there is little 
theory. May be the phenomenon is diverse enough to prevent a generalized description (which 
theory essentially is). However, in a given region, the capacity of communities to participate in 
the planning of the rural region remains relevant in its development. 
We conducted our literature review up to this point with an eye on what worked and what did 
not. It would appear that there is no fixed ingredient in the recipe for rural regional development. 
Case studies of road projects, which is a popular intervention, suggest that road construction is 
neither a guarantee of poverty alleviation, nor a harbinger of disaster for the poor (Hettige, 2006; 
Bryceson, Bradbury, & Bradbury, 2008). Other policy tools such as decentralization or 
devolution has so far rarely led to rural regional development. However, that should not be taken 
to mean that decentralization is not a necessary tool. 
With no set ingredient to rural regional development, it is tempting to subject the strategy of 
rural regional development to a salad analogy, meaning that no ingredient is a must, and infinite 
combinations of possible planning interventions are possible. However, probably a nutritious 
meal metaphor is more appropriate in the sense that certain nutritional values are required 
(carbohydrate, protein, vitamins, hydration, fat, fiber), whatever source they come from. For 
example, redistribution of land via land reform is politically untenable given the current political 
climate around the world. However, some form of tenancy arrangements help with creation of 
household assets as well as creates the environment for retention of multiplier that plantation 
mode of production cannot. While political devolution has not happened, some organization is 
needed that takes a synoptic view of the rural regions in planning interventions for the 
development of the rural region. Some form of assistance with household asset creation is 
important. However, financial assets (specifically micro-credit) need not hog all the attention 
when tools are considered. 
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We identify some of the conditions to simultaneously achieve the three cornerstones identified 
here. 
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Table 4 Key Dimensions Rural Regional Development Strategy 
Key 
dimensions 
of the 
strategy 
Impediments Possible ways to 
achieve the key 
dimension 
Roles of Governments at different levels Possible 
indicators of 
success 
Increase 
productive 
activities in 
the rural 
regions that 
help increase 
income of 
residents of 
the rural 
region 
Global investments stay 
away from all but a few 
regions in the world. 
Remittances finance 
consumption, but rarely 
lead to investment in 
enterprises of any kind, 
agricultural or non-
agricultural. 
Rural areas often lack 
infrastructure sometimes 
resulting from historical 
government policy (urban 
bias). 
 
The logic of polarization. 
 
“Backwash” effect 
Two stylized 
alternatives: (1) Big 
push, or (2) “thrust 
sector/pressure point”? 
 
Economic activities 
(both manufacturing and 
services) that take 
advantage of local 
resources (that include 
(1) local natural 
resources, (2) local 
traditional skills, (3) 
civic association, both 
local and or of migrants’ 
such as home town 
associations) 
 
Being part of global 
value-chains 
For the advanced capitalist countries, 
there is a policy package called cluster 
advocated for regional competitiveness 
(within the framework of neoliberal 
economic policy). There is scant literature 
on how clusters can operate in less 
industrialized nations. 
 
Removal of impediments to creation and 
sustenance of firms. Sporadic success 
stories show multiple ways by which 
enterprises were created.   
New 
enterprises 
Higher per 
capita income 
 
Retention of 
multipliers  
Short forward linkages of 
most crops. 
When forward and 
backward linkages of 
Facilitation of producer associations. Proportion of 
economic 
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Linkages 
within the 
rural region 
Significant local 
production accruing to 
absentee landlords 
Value-added is not high. 
Diversification of product 
has not happened. 
Even when value-added 
happens in the rural 
regions, the reward (i.e. 
price or wage) is too low 
(e.g. in contract farming), 
and most risky part of the 
value chain takes place in 
rural regions.  
the farms and firms are 
significantly with other 
entities within the rural 
regions. 
 
Producer associations 
(for both production and 
marketing) 
 
Rural manufacturing 
and processing 
 
 
 
Incentives for activities in forward 
linkages to be sited locally. 
 
Facilitation/creation of local demand. 
activity in 
intra-region 
trade 
Extent of 
forward and 
backward 
linkages 
within the 
region 
Extent of 
value-added in 
the region 
Addressing 
local power 
structure/Redi
stributive 
justice 
Historical sources of 
exploitation (e.g. skewed 
land ownership, caste 
system) 
 
The rise of the local 
political elites (often the 
same as historical landed 
elites) with the help of the 
post-colonial states 
Alternatives to 
traditional sources of 
rural power (such as 
land) to be created. 
 
Cooperatives. 
Governance reforms and 
rights based community 
mobilization 
 
 
 
Often devolved government at the level of 
rural regions is emphasized (e.g. the 
recent territorial development in Central 
and South America). Devolution can 
mean less access to central government 
resources. Furthermore, in many countries 
there is often no government between 
municipality and national sovereign 
government. Building a political culture 
of planning and accountability at rural 
regional level can take years. Should rural 
regional development efforts be 
postponed until then? Or the idea of RRD 
can bring about a political change in the 
locality? This is an empirical question. 
Level of 
participation 
of the 
disadvantaged 
people in both 
political 
sphere and 
economic 
activities 
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It is hard to provide specific details of a strategy for rural regional development in a general 
framework. The economic, bio-physical, social and political contexts are too diverse for that. 
Therefore, it is appropriate that a case of rural region is studied in its context to elucidate some of 
the processes deduced from literature. Given the issues examined so far, and the outlines of the 
strategy of rural regional development identified in this section, we outline a framework to 
analyze a rural region: what to explore and how to investigate the relationships between issues 
and factors in the rural region. 
3.7 Rural Regional Development: A Framework for Policy and Analysis 
With the insights from the preceding information, it is possible to put together a framework to 
explain RRD. Such a framework will also help analyze a rural region. For an analysis, a case 
study method is appropriate because the phenomenon of interest (i.e. rural regional development) 
is context dependent (Yin, 1989). Households are the units of welfare, intra-household political 
economy notwithstanding. With households at the center, an analysis of rural regions then 
becomes a study of (a) how a rural region, and the communities within them become a filter to or 
reservoir of outside forces, and (b) how rural regions condition the level of welfare of the 
households. 
Borrowing from the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, it is useful to start at households’ 
ability to sustain a livelihood. Such ability, as outlined in the sustainable livelihoods framework 
is conditioned by household assets and vulnerabilities. As discussed in section 2.1, 
vulnerabilities can be seen as results of intra-community social relations such as the ones 
growing out of unequal land ownership in agrarian societies. It can also result from the 
vulnerability of the rural region as a whole in the face of global and national forces (Section 3.1). 
Rural regions are not homogeneous entities with common interests among all residents. The 
intersection of intra-regional political economy and extra-regional forces such as national (de 
facto) policies and global economy define the nature of vulnerability and opportunities of the 
households in the rural regions. 
Understandably, each rural region is unique. How the general framework in the figure on the 
following page plays out can vary from one rural region to another. The framework will offer a 
direction as to what data to collect. As Figure 8 below shows, the development of a rural region 
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needs to be seen as a complex process. It needs a collection of mini-frameworks to be brought 
under one large framework. In doing so, it will lose parsimony. However, rural regions at this 
moment in history, if ever, do not lend themselves to single variable explanations
94 
 
Figure 8 A framework to analyze rural regional development 
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Overall, rural regional development needs to be seen as a global-local process. On the global 
side, the specifics of how the global forces manifest in a rural region of interest is important. As 
identified here, processes to be analyzed are global commodity chain, national policies, and 
participation in national and global markets (including labor market). On the local side, we need 
a framework to analyze local political economy. With our interests in historically agrarian rural 
regions, the exploration of political economy involves study of agrarian institutions under 
advancing capitalism. From planning and policy perspective, a substantial part of the analysis 
needs to go to the ability of the communities for change. The case study was guided by all these 
considerations. 
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Chapter Four: A Case Study of a Rural Region 
 
Based on a review of literature, we identified the cornerstones of rural regional development, and 
a framework for RRD. One of the objectives of the study was to gain insights about the 
framework, and the nature of rural regional planning in a concrete case. To do that we chose a 
study of a rural region to explore how the ground realities of a rural region in Bangladesh match 
the framework we assembled in Section 3.6. In that sense, this study is a case study aimed at 
“theory testing” (Yin, 1989). However, because of the expansive focus of this dissertation, the 
study of the case is less rigorous. As pointed out in the previous chapter, instances of successful 
rural regional development in high poverty agrarian areas is rather rare. Some of the supposed 
region-wide success stories (such as Rio Negro valley, Limari valley in Chile, or the city of 
Rafaela in Argentina in section 3.5) are often that of increase of regional GDP with far less 
success in poverty alleviation. In other cases, growth in the production in rural regions are not on 
a steady foundation (e.g. the Marikina shoe cluster in the Philippines lost to competition from 
China). Therefore, learning from success is rather hard as finding successful RRD in the recent 
past is hard. We chose a rural region to study that experienced some poverty alleviation in recent 
years, and has connections to the global economy (in this case mostly to the global labor market), 
and has been de-agrarianizing. 
4.1 The Study Region 
The study area comprises the southern 4 sub-districts of the district of Noakhali in Bangladesh. 
The district is one of the 64 administrative districts of Bangladesh. It is in the southeast of the 
country, roughly 40 miles off the highway connecting the two largest cities in the country 
(namely Dhaka and Chittagong). The southern four among the eight sub-districts of Noakhali are 
chosen as the rural region to study. The study area comprises roughly 570 square miles. There 
are three municipalities. However, one of them, Kabirhat municipality was declared a 
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municipality only in 2009, and with a population of only 14000 in an “overbound”25 urban area,  
looks at best like a large rural market.   To be coterminous with government offices and units of 
statistical aggregation, four contiguous upazilas (sub-districts) around the municipalities were 
chosen as the case. These upazilas are Noakhali Sadar, Kabirhat, Companyganj, and 
Subarnachar. While delimiting a “local economy” is not an exact science, the four sub-districts 
can be seen as a rural region where three municipalities and the contagious area surrounding 
them make a large enough area for a local economy. 
                                                 
25 An urban area whose official boundary includes large areas of rural character is called “overbound”. 
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Figure 9 Map of Bangladesh showing the rural region studied 
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4.2 Brief Description of the Research 
We study this rural region in Bangladesh as a case to possibly gain some analytic generalization 
about the process of rural regional development, and offer some thoughts on the nature of 
planning for RRD. To get to what hinders or promotes development of rural regions in such a 
setting, we use the following empirical questions as a vehicle to explore, and subsequently arrive 
at some general descriptions about rural regional development: 
• How are the assets and vulnerabilities that condition household livelihoods produced? 
• How are the households of different levels of asset ownership and occupations conditioned by 
the characteristics of their immediate communities and of the rural regions (such as 
infrastructure, bio-physical characteristics, and economy)? 
• Through what channels is the rural region’s economy impacted by policies and spending of 
the state? How does the rural region interact with the global processes such as global 
migration and commodity chain? 
Each of the above questions requires its own research. The research design in the sense of  
“…the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research questions 
and, ultimately to its conclusions” (Yin, 1989) for each of the first three researches is briefly 
described below. By answering these questions with both field and library research, we offer an 
answer to the overarching questions set out in the introduction of this dissertation. 
Research method-wise, the research is designed to be what in the field of research methodology 
is called “case study” in the way defined in a seminal book by Robert K Yin (1989). A short note 
on case study is pertinent here: When the phenomenon under study is so intertwined with its 
context, it is difficult to subject it to a quantitative estimate and design a study to control for 
contextual variables, as is often done in agricultural field trials or in clinical research. Rather by 
analyzing a case discursively within its context, generalizable lessons emerge. For example, the 
well-known book Street Corner Society (1943), cited in Yin (1989) is based on a case study of 
one neighborhood and inter-personal relationships therein that provide great generalizable 
insights into how low-income youth move up or down in life. 
With the power of such case study in mind, the three studies toward the goal of this dissertation 
are: 
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(a) Study of globalization and the state of Bangladesh: a library research was conducted to study 
the contemporary processes of globalization, the de jure and de facto policies of the state in 
Bangladesh. 
(b) The physiography, economy, history, demography and infrastructure of the rural region, as 
well as the development efforts of both government and civic associations. Government 
statistics, maps, and historical documents were consulted, and field visit, interviews of 
knowledgeable residents, community leaders, and elected officials were conducted. 
(c) Survey of households and businesses with their livelihoods, assets, and vulnerabilities as the 
focus of inquiry. 
A brief description of the three studies follows. 
1. Study centered on globalization and Bangladesh: Following topics were reviewed through 
library research: 
(b) Experience of structural adjustment policies (privatization, withdrawal of subsidy from 
agriculture) 
(c) Bangladesh economy in global commodity chains (such as ready-made garments) 
(d) The State in Bangladesh (system of governance, state of decentralization/devolution, politics 
and civic engagement) 
(e) Major policies of interest (agriculture, land, industrialization, environment) 
2. The Study Centered on the Rural region 
Following topical areas were the subject of library research: 
(a) Demography 
(b) Political and governance system 
(c) Infrastructure and economy 
(d) Existing literature with the case study rural region as the geographic subject of interest. 
(e) Review of the development projects in recent years 
3 Household survey 
To get an insight into the assets and vulnerabilities of households and businesses in the rural 
region, a semi-structured survey of households was conducted for each of the following 
categories: (1) Landless and smallholder households with no income from outside the locality, 
(2) Landless and small-holder households with significant income from outside the rural region, 
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(3) Middle farmers with no income from outside the rural region, and (4) Middle farmers with 
significant income from outside the rural region. 
With four sub-districts, the above four categories mathematically give 16 categories. But as it 
turned out the households in the northern areas of the study area have similar asset profiles and 
perceptions, while in the southern parts, especially in the areas that accreted within the last 50 
years, there was a different asset ownership structure, and livelihoods profile. Figure 10 maps 
two important proxies for household welfare: (a) housing condition, measured by the 
construction material of the structures, and (b) proportion of households with electricity 
connection. 
102 
 
Figure 10 Percentage of households with electricity and concrete or brick and mortar 
structure 
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Figure 10 shows there is little difference between sub-districts. Field interviews and observations 
also suggest livelihoods profiles of the four categories vary little from one sub-district to another.  
Hence, instead of describing 16 categories (4 sub-districts X 2 land ownership categories X 2 
principal locations of livelihoods), we describe the four categories of households in Section 6.6. 
For each of these categories, we interviewed 15 households from each of the four sub-districts to 
understand the interaction of household livelihood decisions and outcomes with the community 
and rural regional variables. Our purposes do not call for any precise estimation of any statistic 
(such as, to choose one of dozens of variables considered in the study, proportion of farmer 
selling to wholesaler), and therefore no probability sampling was used. We did a purposive 
sampling that snow-balled. The interviews were complemented by cross-check with observation 
and interview of neighbors. 
In addition to the rural households, 5 households each from Maijdee and Bashurhat towns were 
interviewed. The households were selected from different neighborhoods of the towns. 
The research also made use of survey of businesses, their linkages and mapping of commodity 
chains. Interviews of political leaders, local journalists, and bureaucrats helped gain further 
insights.  
The field research was conducted over 4 months beginning in October 2011. Further interviews 
over phone were conducted in the succeeding 2 years. 
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Chapter Five: The State and the Economy in 
Bangladesh 
 
5.1 Environment and Population 
Mostly a deltaic land mass, Bangladesh with an area of 56 thousand square miles is generally flat 
with approximately 10% of the landmass in hills. Three major rivers, the Ganges, the 
Brahmaputra-Jamuna and the Meghna flow through the heart of the country into the Bay of 
Bengal. Historically, this part of South Asia always had high population density, mostly due to 
the high soil fertility that could provide for a dense population. 
The adjusted populations in million in the last four censuses were 89.9 (1981), 111.46 (1991), 
130.52 (2001), and 142.32 (2011). The country historically has had a high growth rate of 
population. The crude birth rate (number of live births per 100 population) in the 1980s and 
1990s went down. However, growth rate is still 1.2 (in 2013), and with a large base, even such 
reduced growth rate means that more than 1.73 million people are being added to the population 
every year.  
Figure 11 Bangladesh Population Pyramid (2011) 
 
Source: Reproduced from BBS (2015, p. 12) 
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With such high population figures for a landmass roughly the size of the U.S. state of Iowa, 
Bangladesh always had the world’s highest human-land ratio (trailing only city-states such as 
Singapore). Sixty percent of the land mass in the country is used for agriculture, which is way 
higher than the corresponding figure for earth as a whole:  35% in 2000 (Ramankutty, Evan, 
Monfreda, & Foley, 2008). Over the years, the net area under cultivation has steadily decreased 
due to conversion from agricultural to settlements and infrastructure. The estimate of the extent 
of loss varies. Estimation by the Planning Commission (2009) puts it at an alarming 1% annual 
loss. The Soil Resources Development Institute (Hasan, Hossain, Bari, & Islam, 2013) however 
estimates that  between 1976 and 2000, the annual loss was 0.137% (13,413ha per year), and 
between 2000 and 2010, 0728% (68,760ha per year). Even taking the lower end of predicted 
population growth rate of 1.2% over the next decade, and because of the absence of any laws26 
preventing conversion of agricultural land to homestead or other non-agricultural use, the 
country is projected to continue to lose agricultural land in the near future. 
Bangladesh is also considered one of the most vulnerable countries to sea level rise and climate 
change. Close to 17% of the land mass of the country is less than 1 meter (3.78 feet) above the 
sea level. The country is one of the most ecologically sensitive ones in the world. In the recent 
decades, salinity has increased in the southwestern part of the country, partly because of reduced 
downstream water flow resulting from a dam built on the Indian side of the river Ganges (Padma 
in Bangladesh). Estimates vary, but experts believe that 3.7 million acres of land in the country 
are now affected by varying degrees of salinity. Recent economic growth and poverty alleviation 
has come with significant harm to land, drainage, air and soil quality, and ecological resources. 
No comprehensive report of the state of environment was published since 2001. However, there 
is one phenomenon that works as an indicator of the quality of environment in the new century: 
Brick making in kilns. There is a construction boom underway since the 1990s. In the absence of 
stone aggregates and other alternative building materials in the country, brick is the construction 
material of choice for a variety of uses, including as aggregate in concrete mix. The high demand 
for brick has been met by increasing number of brick fields (kilns and storage space), almost all 
                                                 
26 There is a rural land use law under consideration by the cabinet.  
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of whom were built on land converted from agriculture. The growth of the Bangladesh economy 
in the 1990s has also been accompanied by growth of brick fields. In 1990-91, “bricks and 
tiles”27 as category was not even in the top ten 4-digit industrial categories in terms of value-
added and employment. By 2005-06 it was in the top three behind the more well-known woven 
and knitwear sectors with a 7.1% share of the industrial value-added, and 5.7% of the industrial 
employment28. There are some 5,000 brick fields in the country. In violation of laws, they have 
cropped up in the middle of crop fields, next to children’s schools, and not far from homesteads. 
The brick kilns are harming air quality to unhealthy levels. To meet the demand for clay, brick 
field owners are buying top soil from the farmers jeopardizing the fertility of the agricultural 
land. While the construction sector and service sector is registering high GDP growth, it is 
/coming at some cost to the environment. Another major growth area is saw mills. There is no 
government statistics on how many of them are in the country. However, newspapers report of 
them emerging close to the forest borders is common, even though they are not supposed to get a 
permit unless proposed to be located at least 10 km from the forest borders. 
The growth of saw mills, and brick kilns at random locations should be taken as a warning sign 
that the growth experienced in the recent years is not on a robust footing. 
5.2 Land Ownership 
The land ownership pattern in the country bears the imprints of colonial history, as well as 
policies of the governments that came in the post-colonial period. Some changes brought by the 
colonial bureaucracy in the sub-continent still have profound impacts on the economic, social 
and political life in Bangladesh. The British East India Company gained political and military 
control of Bengal following the Battle of Plassey in 175729. As was the experience of colonies 
around the world, South Asia’s economy and political and governance institutions were re-
                                                 
27 Bangladesh Standard Industrial Code: 2692. 
28 Source: Census of Manufacturing industries, 1990-91 and Survey of Manufacturing Industries, 2005-2006, cited 
in Ahmed, Bakht, & Yunus (2011), p9. 
29 After an armed revolution against the rule of the Company in 1857, the sub-continent was taken over the by the 
British government. 
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oriented at the service of the colonial interests. In Bengal, they found expression in following 
ways: 
1. Becoming a food basket for the bureaucracy and the army of colonial administration, 
2. Producing cash crops such as indigo (until economically feasible synthesis of indigo was 
perfected in the late 19th century), and jute, 
3. Providing a tax base mostly by taxation of peasants. To keep tax collection efficient, in 
1793, the colonial administration put in place a system, known as the Permanent 
Settlement, where landlords could hold their land in perpetuity, and pay a fixed amount 
as tax. This made landlordship a desired commodity, and Bengal's capital was used to 
buy landlordships whenever a tax-defaulting one was put up for auction. While much of 
Europe was industrializing throughout nineteenth century, Bengal's capital was chasing 
land as an unforeseen consequence of the Permanent Settlement. 
After de-colonization in 1947, what is now Bangladesh became the East Pakistan. Like most 
other developing countries, the government of Pakistan pursued an industrialization policy at the 
expense of agriculture and by deliberately increasing income inequality in the distribution of 
income in favor of rich industrialists (Griffin, 1965). In addition to having a sectoral (agriculture 
vs. industry) and spatial (urban vs. rural) implication, these policies had an ethnic and regional 
impact too. The East Pakistan, which is now Bangladesh, saw disproportionately less public 
expenditure even though the export of Jute produced in East Pakistan brought most of the export 
income for the national economy, and the East had the larger population of the two halves of 
Pakistan. 
Soon after Pakistan was formed, the system of landlordship was abolished in 1950. A new law 
tried to (a) end rent receiving interest in land that was instituted in Permanent Settlement, and (b) 
set a ceiling of landownership at 33.3 acres per family. However, in 1961 the military regime led 
by the West Pakistani generals raised it to 125 acres to gain support of the large landowners. 
Another political transition, namely the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 was followed by 
another attempt at land reform. A 1972 Presidential Order once again established a land ceiling 
of 33.3 acres. Another attempt at land reform, and the last to date, took place in 1987, five years 
after a military dictatorship seized power. All three attempts at land reform were centered on 
establishing ownership ceilings, and expropriating excess land to distribute among the landless. 
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All three attempts failed near completely. The manner of this failure is a commentary on the 
nature of the state and its co-optation by the elites. This point has implication for rural regional 
development. We return to that in Chapter Seven. 
While attempts at reform failed, Bangladesh continued to have large number of smallholders 
notwithstanding regional variations30. Seventy nine percent of the 11.8 million farm households 
are small, i.e. owned less than two and a half acres of land at the time of the 1996 agricultural 
census. In 2008 Agricultural Census, out of a total of 28.67 million households in the country, 
4.48 million households (15.62%) were absolutely landless. Out of 15.62% landless households, 
4.25% households were in urban areas and 11.35% are in rural areas. The share of landless 
households had increased from 19% in 1960 to 56% in 1996. On the other hand, while in 1960, 
1% large land owning household had command over 4.7% of land, in 1996 it had gone up to 
8.2%. It is believed that such trend has continued. 
5.3 Economy, Urbanization, and Poverty 
5.3.1 The Economy 
Bangladesh has traditionally been an agrarian economy and society. The Permanent Settlement 
of 1793 resulted in Bengal’s capital to be spent on acquiring landlordships, which stood in 
marked contrast to Europe of the late 18th and 19th century where capital was financing 
industrialization. The perception in the 1960s and ‘70s of Bangladesh being a land of 
smallholders held true for a small, but well-studied part of the country, especially the Comilla 
district that borders the region studied here. The rest of the country still had large land owners. In 
the country-side capital was still being accumulated. However, as the semi-feudal hypothesis 
offers, the surplus capital was being used not for mechanization of agriculture, but rather for 
usurious lending and land purchase (Wood, 1981). 
Green Revolution’s new technologies in agriculture (irrigation, high yielding variety, and 
fertilizer) began to spread from late 1960s, but picked up in the seventies. Empirical data from 
early eighties suggest that Green Revolution technologies were adopted by the farmers with all 
                                                 
30 The northwestern parts of the country historically had large landowners, while the eastern part, especially the 
well-studied district of Comilla had a smallholder character. 
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sizes of landholdings (Orr, 2012). Productivity was higher in smaller farms. The profit however 
was less on smaller farms because they paid about 25 percent higher water charges and about 
10% higher wage rates than the large farms (Hossain, 1988). 
As in any agrarian society, significant part of the economy is non-agricultural such as artisanal 
processing and manufacturing (pottery, weaving, manufacturing of agricultural implements, 
construction) and other non-agricultural activities. Certain manufacturing activities such as 
weaving sector were producing products of international fame and demand (such as muslin, a 
cloth made of fine cotton yarn) in the pre-colonial periods. During the colonial period, such 
industries died as products from English industries were promoted and local industries 
suppressed, sometimes ruthlessly. At the end of the colonial period, there were few large 
manufacturing industries of note in what is now Bangladesh. 
The share of agriculture in the national GDP has steadily declined ever since industrialization 
began in the 1950s. In 1972, the year after independence, agriculture constituted more than half 
of the national GDP. By 2002, that share plummeted to a quarter. The share of labor force in 
agriculture also declined. Still as high as around 50% of the nation’s labor force was engaged in 
agriculture31. The growth rate in agriculture hovered around 2% during the period. Much of the 
growth in agricultural production resulted from conversion to high yielding variety as opposed to 
yield increase within the same variety. Furthermore, much of the growth in agricultural sector 
resulted from growth of the livestock and fisheries sub-sectors. 
Table 5 Changes in the sectoral composition of Bangladesh economy 
 1980 1990 2000 2010 
Agriculture 33.2 29.5 25.6 20.2 
Of which crops and 21.5 19.3 14.6 11.3 
                                                 
31 Such data, while often used, do not account for the fact that an individual considered to belong to “agriculture” 
sector can have significant income from “non-agricultural” sources. 
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horticulture 
Industry 17.1 20.8 25.7 29.9 
Of which manufacturing  11.1 12.5 15.4 17.9 
Construction 4.8 6.0 7.8 9.1 
Services 49.7 49.7 48.7 49.9 
of which wholesale and 
retail trade 
11.3 12.2 13.4 14.4 
Financial services 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.9 
Transport and communication 8.5 9.3 9.2 10.8 
Source: Various statistical yearbooks 
What is striking in its prominence is the growing share of the “service” sector in the economy. 
“Service” is a residual category that includes everything from hair dressing to intercity bus 
service, legal service to pulling a rickshaw in addition to activities such as   wholesale and retail 
trade, hotels and restaurants, real estate, higher value-added services such as transport, 
communication, business services and financial intermediation, and the IT sector (WB 2008). 
With such a vague definition, this category is heterogeneous and masks more than it reveals 
about the nature and trends in the economy. 
What were the drivers behind such changes? One well known vehicle of such changes in the 
numbers is the rise of the ready-made garments industry. Bangladesh’s manufacturing sector 
specializes in export-oriented, low-value added garment production. The garment industry’s 
share of manufacturing employment increased from 44 percent in 2001 to 51 percent in 2009. 
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Garment production accounted for 51 percent of formal manufacturing employment in firms with 
at least 10 employees in 2009. Woven (or ready-made) garments and knitwear are the two main 
product lines. Most formal garment employees (79 percent) work in the woven garment 
subsector, and the other 21 in knitwear. Since the late 1990s, garments sector consistently 
accounted for about three-quarters or more of Bangladesh’s export earnings, and 18 percent of 
GDP32 . The garments industry directly employs 4.2 million workers excluding the employment 
in related businesses. Nearly 90% of these workers were employed either in Dhaka or in 
Chittagong. 
Foreign direct investment in Bangladesh has never been higher than $1 billion a year, placing it 
below countries such as Albania or Belarus. Countries such as Thailand or Malaysia receive ten 
times as much FDI as Bangladesh. 
Almost two million additional young people are added to the labor force every year, and the 
country lacks the ability to create jobs to accommodate all of them. Migration out of the country 
and consequent remittance has become an important feature of the economy. There are an 
estimated 8.6 million Bangladeshis living outside the country. They send an estimated 14 billion 
U.S. dollars every year. The share of remittances in GNI was 9.9 percent and in GDP 10.5 
percent in fiscal 2011. Remittances are the largest single source of external financial inflows for 
Bangladesh. It has been more than ten-times larger than average annual medium and long-term 
official loans in the past decade (WB, 2012). Much of the money goes directly to the households 
which are in rural regions around the country. However, most of the money is consumed, and 
very little is saved. A recent survey by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics found that in 2012, 
43% of the remittance-receiving households spent every penny they received (BBS, 2014). 
Overall, the saving is only 13.47 percent of the total remittance income. Seventy-eight percent of 
the remittance-dependent families have no alternative source of income as per the same survey. 
The migration out of rural regions, both to domestic urban and international destinations, is 
reflected in the sex-ratio in the rural regions. The figure (Figure 12) below shows a remarkable 
                                                 
32 Bangladesh Investment Development Authority, available at http://www.bida.gov.bd/site/page/c9ffe4ad-1b7e-
4c85-b77e-b7d9427d4533/Garments-&-Textiles 
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imbalance in sex ratio. The urban areas have more males than females, and most rural unions33 
have more females than males. Data was not available to compute sex-ratio map for the working 
age (i.e. 15-64). It is fair to assume that areas with low sex ratios (in pink in the following 
figure), have even lower sex ratios for that age group.  Such low sex-ratio clearly shows how the 
economy has shaped up: Urban areas (especially big cities) offer much higher incomes and 
attract migrants. As an indirect indicator, the sex-ratio map shows the negligence the rural 
regions have suffered. Developing them will help remove some of the imbalances. 
                                                 
33 A union is the lowest unit of local government comprising a few villages. Given the area of the country without 
urban areas, and the number of unions, their average size comes out to be 12 square miles. 
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Figure 12 Sex ratio at ward/union level, Bangladesh (2011) 
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Remittance inflows through formal channels in FY2007 were recorded at US$6 billion – almost 
9 percent of GDP and half of gross merchandise exports.  Migrant workers, who are mostly 
unskilled workers, amount to as high as about 6% of the labor force (World Bank, 2008). 
With growth, inequality is rising at a high pace. The economy grew at around 6% in the past 10 
years. Much of the growth benefitted a small segment of the population. The share of the GDP of 
the poorest 20% of the population went down of from 6.52% in 1992 to 5.22% in recent years. 
On the other hand, the number of personal bank accounts with deposit of more than Tk. 10 
million, an indicator of accumulation of wealth, grew from 5,162 in 2001 to more than 40 
thousand in December 2014 (AmaderShomoy.com, Mar 12, 2015 citing the Bangladesh Bank). 
Table 6 Increasing Inequality in Bangladesh 
Year of Survey Share of GDP of 
the poorest 5%* 
Poorest 10%** Richest 5%* Richest 10%** 
1995-96 0.88% 2.24% 23.62 34.68% 
2000 0.67% 1.84% 30.66 40.72% 
*Ministry of Finance (GoB) Bangladesh Economic Study, 2003 
**CPD, Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2000, reported in Prothom Alo (Bangla daily), Sept 10, 2003 
 
The larger trend in Bangladesh is that the country is beginning to see local conglomerates. While 
relevant data is hard to collect, conglomerates are producing and increasing their collective share 
in retail. The share is miniscule relative to the countries where capitalism is at an advanced stage 
and where almost all items at any store are produced by a small number of conglomerates (e.g. 
ConAgra in the U.S.). However, the trend is one of rapid rise of these conglomerates, albeit from 
a small base. In the advanced capitalist countries, conglomerates have re-oriented rural areas by 
re-orienting agriculture. What shape Bangladeshi conglomerates will take is an open question. 
One interesting idea to consider in this connection is the idea of lumpen geography (Walker, 
1978). While developed with the U.S. in mind, the idea of lumpen geography claimed a reservoir 
of geographic space that can be used when capital needs it. Will the increasing availability of 
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liquid money in the hands of corporations make them seek land all over the country? Certain 
speculative answers can be put forward. We return to this question in the final chapter. 
5.3.2 Pattern and Trend of Urbanization  
Bangladesh has six officially designated city corporations, which are the highest form of local 
government. These include the capital city Dhaka, port city of Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, 
Barisal, and Sylhet. There are 320 further municipal towns that range in population from 3,000 to 
750 thousand distributed over the national territory (represented by small polygons in Figure 12). 
The rate of urbanization in Bangladesh since the early 1970s has been close to 6%, while 
population grew at 2.2% overall. Bangladesh added an additional 4 million to its urban 
population between 2001 and 2011. Of these, Dhaka’s population increased at a higher rate and 
number34. Outside the six city corporations (Dhaka, Chittagong, Rajshahi, Khulna, Barisal, 
Sylhet), the rate of growth was much lower. A stylized version of growth in Bangladesh in the 
new millennium is (after Rahman, 2012): 
• Manufacturing-driven (especially ready-made garments) metropolitan growth in Dhaka and 
Chittagong 
• Service sector driven growth in the secondary cities 
• Remittance and urban consumption-driven rural non-farm growth  
 
                                                 
34 The definition of urban areas changed between 2001 and 2011 censuses. There appears to be discrepancies with 
popular perception if numbers are compared without being aware of the definitions. 
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Figure 13 Growth of urban and rural population in Bangladesh 
 
Source: Reproduced from Muzzini & Aperadicio, 2013, p.17 (Based on UN, 2011) 
 
There is a strong inclination for primacy in the urban system on the country. Dhaka is the host to 
37% of the urban population in Bangladesh. In 2001, Dhaka was 2.05 times the size of the next 
three cities combined. By 2010, this number rose to 2.12, signifying a trend for Dhaka’s growth. 
This growth is entirely fueled by migration as less than 15% of the current residents of Dhaka 
were born in Dhaka. Causes of such growth is widely recognized to be centralized government 
and investment. It is probably hard to quantify what factors are fueling Dhaka’s growth. 
However, certain anecdotal facts demonstrate how Dhaka is inescapable in the economic, social, 
educational and political life in the country. To cite an example beside the more well-known 
facts about industrial (i.e. garments industry) location, even the decision to transfer an 
elementary school teacher from one government school to another is made in the headquarters in 
Dhaka.  
Non-farm economic activities in Bangladesh remain highly concentrated in Dhaka and 
Chittagong. In 2006 Dhaka alone had 81% of all non-farm enterprises employing 10 or more 
workers (10+) and accounted for 72% of national employment in 10+ enterprises. Chittagong 
followed with 12% of 10+ non-farm enterprises and 23% of 10+ employment. These estimates 
are based on the 2006 Economic Census for Bangladesh (BBS, 2007). Some activities such as 
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schools, NGOs and extra-territorial organizations are excluded in these estimates. Non-farm 
activities account for about 40 percent of total employment even in rural areas of Bangladesh. 
According to Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2005, about 62 percent of household 
income in rural areas was generated in the non-farm sector (World Bank, 2008). That number is 
expected to have only increased. 
Slightly dated statistics show that 78% of the bank loan disbursed in the country is disbursed in 
Dhaka and Chittagong, and only 11% in the rural areas (as reported in Ajker Kagoj, November 
04, 2006 citing a study by DFID and JBIC). About 10 percent of Bangladesh’s population lives 
in the Dhaka metropolitan area, which contributes 36 percent of the country’s GDP. Chittagong 
metropolitan area, home to 3.4 percent of the population, contributes another 11 percent of GDP 
(Muzzini & Aparicio, 2013, p. 22). Outside the metropolitan economy, there is little 
manufacturing other than brick-making (Figure 14). The economies of the rural regions (i.e. 
small towns and rural areas) outside agriculture comprise some large industries in textile and 
food and beverages. Other than those industries, household consumption (e.g. retail stores such 
as groceries, hotels and restaurants, small tailoring shops, and labor-intensive furniture-making 
in small units) comprise much of the economy. The economy of the rural region (southern part of 
Noakhali district) studied here has similar characteristics. 
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Figure 14 Non-Metropolitan Employment by Industry 
 
From: World Bank, 2008, p8 (Based on Bangladesh Investment Climate Survey of 2007) 
Note: FTE = Full time equivalent 
 
Outside the six largest cities, the towns in Bangladesh are little more than administrative outposts 
and sites of consumption of “services”. Their role in the economy of the areas surrounding them 
is insignificant. Often, they get by-passed in the physical transport of goods between their 
hinterland and large centers. The decade of 2000 to 2010 for the first time saw a decline in urban 
population in some of the secondary towns in Bangladesh (see Marshall and Rahman, undated). 
It is likely that such state of rural towns is both a symptom and a cause of malaise in the rural 
regions. 
5.3.3 Poverty and Its Geographic Pattern 
Between 2005 and 2010, national poverty figures decreased. However, in as high as 124 upazilas 
(out of 509), poverty increased. Among these, 44 had an increase of more than 10% in poverty 
rate. These upazilas are scattered all over the country. 
Poverty in Bangladesh often feature in the international media. Nationwide, real per capita 
income rose more than 50 percent between 2000 and 2010 (World Bank 2011). The incidence of 
poverty, which was as high as 57 percent at the beginning of the 1990s, declined to 49 percent in 
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2000, 40 percent in 2005, and 31 percent in 2010 (Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 2011; World 
Bank 2008). One good alternative indicator to the $1.90 poverty line is the number of 
undernourished people. The number of undernourished people in Bangladesh is 26.3 million, 
which is around 16.4% of the population (FAO, 2015, Table: A1). The latest numbers show a 
very small decreasing rate over the 2005 to 2007 figures. 
Despite the significant reduction in absolute poverty, deep pockets of poverty remain in the 
country. Alam & Iqbal (2015) recently found that “aggregate data disguises local realities – 
while poverty rates have decreased significantly at the national level as well as divisional level, a 
large number of sub-districts have seen an increase in poverty in the period 2005-2010” (p. 1). 
Urban poverty too steadily increased. Even though living in a slum does not equate with being in 
officially-defined poverty, the fact that 37.4% of the population of the Dhaka metropolitan area, 
and 35.4% of Chittagong’s population live in slums (Angeles et al., 2009)  is a good indicator of 
quality of life (including financial) of the urban residents. 
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Figure 15 Map of poverty at sub-district level (upper poverty lines, 2005 and 2010) 
 
Source: Reproduced from WFP, 2005 (left) and 2010 (on the right) 
 
Poverty in Bangladesh has well-known regional pattern. Even though data at smaller geographic 
levels such as sub-district is available since only 15 years ago, it is widely accepted that the 
geographic pattern of poverty as seen in the above map has remained the same over the decades. 
This contrasts with the fortunes of some countries such as England and the United States where 
industrial restructuring in the 1970s produced a changed landscape by the 1990s. One significant 
development in Bangladesh in the recent decade is that seasonal migration by the poor has 
increased. To what extent it is equalizing poverty rates across remains to be seen. However, as 
evident in Figure 15, the concentration of poverty has remained much the same between 2005 
and 2010. However, sub-districts with poverty increase and decrease can be found in all parts of 
the country. Despite that the coefficient of correlation, between 2005 and 2010 poverty rates at 
sub-district level (508 data points, see Appendix 03) is still close to 0.5, If not for some extreme 
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values, this co-efficient would be higher, indicating that migration over a decade has not done 
much in equalizing geographic pattern of poverty. 
5.4 System of Governance 
Bangladesh has a centralized system of parliamentary democracy. The country is divided into 64 
administrative districts, which are sub-divided into 489 sub-districts (upazilas). The sub-districts 
comprise of unions (4,550 unions in the country). The country is governed by one and a half 
dozen ministries that have their offices at sub-district level.  
The local governance system comprises two kinds of local governments: (a) urban and (b) rural. 
Figure 16 shows the jurisdiction of administrative units at different geographic scales. The units 
in the boxes that are placed side by side have mutually exclusive jurisdiction. For example, the 
geographic boundaries of a city corporation and a sub-district do not overlap. Also, a 
municipality (urban government) does not overlap with a union, which is a rural unit. 
Parallel to the local government jurisdictions, the country also has 300 constituencies for seats in 
the national parliament. Outside the densely populated cities where a single city is divided in to 
several constituencies, typically two sub-districts are represented by one member in the 
parliament.  The job description of Members of Parliament (MP) comprises law-making and 
accountability. They are not tasked with looking after development work such as road 
construction, or relief distribution. However, it is a well-known fact that junior bureaucrats look 
after law-making, while MPs lobby ministers and secretaries of ministries of the central 
government for funds and projects in their constituency. 
It is widely known, but never admitted in public that the MPs, and politicians in higher positions 
have no incentive to see strong local governments at sub-district or district level. Because the 
MPs opposed it (Inqilab, August 05, 2006), sub-district level local government did not see an 
election for nearly two decades, between 1990 and 2009. There is a local government unit at the 
district level that has very little responsibility and funding. No elections are held for the positions 
of district administrators. 
As identified before, one or two sub-districts is a geographic size that contain or has potential to 
be a local economy. They can be viewed as forming an administratively defined micro-region. 
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As mentioned, the politicians who are members of parliament view strong leaders at sub-district 
or district level as their competitors. The bureaucrats based in the capital city also have no 
incentive to see a strong, well-financed administrative unit at the district level. As public choice 
theory35 alerts us, given the situation in Bangladesh, strong government at the district level 
would be hard to implement because of this dual threat. 
The government at sub-district level has seen changing fortunes over the years. However, one 
tension that has always existed is the one between the elected Chairperson of the sub-district and 
the government bureaucrat sent as the of sub-district executive officer. Often their powers and 
responsibilities overlap. Dysfunction and acrimony is never far away. 
Figure 16 Administrative division in Bangladesh 
 
 
                                                 
35 One relevant lesson from public choice theory is that public officials in public domain would act in self-interest, 
just as an individual would do in the market place. 
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Local governance finance bears testimony to the weak local governments in the country. The 
local governments have been given very few sources for tax revenue. Most of the revenue 
sources of the government accrue to the central government. Most public expenditures are 
conducted by the central government. A review of local government finance in 13 countries had 
following observation about Bangladesh: 
The absence of detailed budget data sources makes it difficult to disentangle exactly what 
share of public sector expenditures finds its way to the local public sector to fund frontline 
public services in Bangladesh. Estimates for FY 2010–11 suggest that approximately 3.1 
percent of public spending in the country is done by Union Councils and urban local bodies. 
In addition, roughly 8.3 percent of public expenditures take place through deconcentrated 
bodies at the [district] and [sub-district] level, whereas an additional 7.5 percent of spending 
is contained in central line ministries budgets in direct support of 'local' front line service 
delivery. These estimates suggest that in total, only about 18.9 percent of public expenditures 
are devoted to the local public sector. (Jamie Boex, 2013: 17) 
The poor tax base of local governments has made them dependent on government grants. 
Consequently, politics revolves around securing government funding or expenditure in the 
territory of the local governments. Local governments have become a political tool for the 
central political parties, who reward their local cadres with positions in the local government, 
specially the union council, the smallest unit of local government that comprise a cluster of 
villages. 
While the local governments are rather poorly staffed and underfunded, the central government 
in the decades past has been, to use Myrdal’s famous term, “soft” meaning that the governments 
were incapable of framing right laws for collective welfare and/or are incapable of enforcing 
them even when they exist. Indeed, the famous original use of the term by Myrdal (1968)  was 
slightly different when he characterized it as a condition where “national governments require 
extraordinarily little of their citizens. There are few obligations either to do things in the interest 
of the community or to avoid actions opposed to that interest. Even those obligations that do 
exist are enforced inadequately if at all.” (p. 896). Myrdal, however did not conceive of a state 
that is strong but the strength of the government is used for appropriation of assets, resources and 
surplus. In recent years, the reach of the government has increased significantly. The institutions 
of the government such as police, and taxation department have increased their reach. However, 
the stronger state is showing a tendency for assisting accumulation by dispossession (as 
formulated by Harvey, 2004)). By many accounts Bangladesh politics and government is 
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increasingly gaining that character, as evidenced by the fact that 63% of the MPs in the current 
parliament are business man. The state is widely believed to be a vehicle for accumulation and 
dispossession. 
5.5 Government Policies 
5.5.1 Agriculture 
Like most other developing countries in the 1960s, what is now Bangladesh experienced 
exchange rate, and trade and tariff policies that were aimed at capturing the surplus from 
agriculture and transferring it to finance the incipient industrial sector. Such policies provided the 
macro-incentive structure under which agriculture was practiced until policy reforms in mid-
1980s. 
The agricultural policies were aimed at influencing both the inputs and outputs of the agricultural 
sector. In 1963, the East Pakistan Agricultural Development Corporation (EPADC), a parastatal, 
was created with sole authority and responsibility of procuring and distributing agricultural 
inputs such as 1) fertilizers, 2) seeds, 3) agricultural equipment and, 4) pesticides (Ahmed, 
1998). Until late 1970s, there was a rigid and extensive organization with accompanying 
bureaucracy that controlled virtually all of these inputs throughout the country. Importation of 
these inputs by private parties was prohibited. 
The first waves of “liberalization” of the input markets took place in the early eighties, when 
private entrepreneurs were allowed to import non-nitrogenous fertilizer and irrigation pumps. 
Gradually most inputs were opened up to businesses throughout eighties and nineties. Curiously 
enough, after liberalization (i.e. removal of subsidy) the prices of equipment such as shallow 
tube-well and power tiller actually went down (Gisselquist, 1992 cited in Raisuddin, Tawfiq-e-
Elahi, & Haggblade, 2000). Such reduction in prices in domestic market coincided with 
reduction of price in the international market. 
The government’s intervention was even more pronounced in the output markets. The dominant 
policies to control the output market were (1) exchange rate control, and (2) direct purchase of 
rice and jute by parastatals at fixed prices. The mainstay of the policy was government purchase 
program that bought rice directly from the market. The stated objective of such purchase 
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program used to be price support to peasants, especially in the years of good harvest when price 
tends to fall. But researchers observing the “quantity, pricing, and manner of procurement” have 
claimed that it is a device “to maintain a certain level of public stock for distribution targets of 
the public sector [e.g. among the armed forces, urban poor, government employees]” (Ahmed, 
1998, p. 56 in Faruqee, 1998). Likewise, government had near monopoly over purchase of jute. 
Soon after the removal of exclusive government control on import and export of food grains, the 
price of rice in the domestic market approached world market price. 
As it turned out, much of the impact of these policies were in the case of grains, primarily rice, 
and jute, which used to be the main export item until ready-made garments replaced it in the late 
eighties as the largest export good. Agricultural activities such as vegetables and fruit production 
were never subjected to the price control. Despite this absence of policy disincentive, non-grain 
agriculture did not flourish for reasons that include lack of know-how, the inertia of tradition, 
and absence of market because of lack of purchasing power in the rural communities, and 
geographic isolation from consumers with purchasing power. One government intervention that 
changed the incentive pattern for such non-grain agriculture was transport infrastructure, though 
the construction of roads apparently was not guided by any conscious policy, as Bangladesh does 
not have a formal infrastructure policy to date. 
Recent developments resulting from the policies include introduction of hybrid seeds by private 
sector businesses who are marketing channels for international corporations such as Syngenta. 
Such seeds are not limited to the staples alone. Several vegetables (such as eggplant and tomato) 
are grown from such seeds.  
5.5.2 Macroeconomic Policies 
The first wave of market-oriented liberalizing policies in Bangladesh appeared in the early 
1980s. The policies embraced almost all aspects of government intervention in the economy. 
Development expenditure declined, agricultural and food subsidies were withdrawn, many state 
enterprises were privatized, and quantitative import restrictions were reduced or removed for 
many goods (Mahmud, 2004). This dissertation is not an appropriate space for a detailed review 
of policy reforms since early 1980s. But policies directly related to the non-agricultural sector 
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are briefly discussed so it can provide the backdrop for the spatio-temporal pattern of the 
economy in the rural regions in Bangladesh36. 
Government owned banks began to open branches in rural areas in the 1970s. However, the 
interest rate for rural branches was set at 18% while (urban) industrial loan came with a 10% 
rate. The international consultant who instituted this reasoned that rural people take loans from 
village lenders at a much higher rate any way. After structural adjustment was underway, many 
of the rural branches of the government banks were closed to leave a void that was eventually 
filled with micro-lending NGOs37. As late as mid-2000s banks were collecting deposits from 
rural areas and lending it to urban based entrepreneurs (Inqilab, May 21, 2006). Currently the 
micro-lending non-government organizations are chief sources of credit in the rural areas around 
the country. 
5.5.3 Import and Export Liberalization 
Bangladesh withdrew quota restrictions in the late 1980s and reduced tariffs in the first half of 
1990s. But since then, the pace of further import liberalization slowed down. The domestic 
industries still receive some protection as the taxation and supplementary duties are applied at a 
higher rate on imports than on domestically produced substitutes. The tariff reforms also put 
lower rates on capital goods and primary commodities (raw materials). Furthermore, a number of 
products such as fresh fruits and vegetables, light engineering products, jute products and fabrics 
used for exported garments receive cash incentives for exports. 
Bangladesh joined the World Trade Organization in 1995. As a signatory to its charter, 
Bangladesh opened the domestic market for most goods. A few exemptions were granted such 
as, provision for a ban on import of poultry and eggs, and textile goods until 2009. The 
                                                 
36
 Much of this description is borrowed from Mahmud, Wahiduddin (2004), Macroeconomic Management: From 
Stabilisation to Growth?, Economic and Political Weekly, September 4. A short review by Hossain and Alauddin 
(2005) provided a useful supplement. [Hossain, Mohammed A. and Mohammed Alauddin. 2005. Trade 
Liberalization In Bangladesh: The Process And Its Impact On Macro Variables Particularly Export Expansion, 
Journal of Developing Areas, 39(1). 
37 This information came from a memoir of a retired Bangladesh Banker who did not have the exact numbers for 
number of branches opened or closed by year. However, even without numbers to show the extent, this piece of 
information reveals another small factor that contributed to the progress of the rural economy to be stifled. 
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government still exercises its powers to occasionally ban exports of raw materials. In recent 
years, the government banned export of raw jute, that favored the manufacturers but 
disadvantaged the farmers. The rural region studied here (i.e. southern Noakhali) does not have 
any jute production in recent years. However, government’s stance to ban export of agriculture 
products, while perhaps good for the urban manufacturers dependent on the product, works 
against rural producers, and represents urban bias.  
5.5.4 Public Expenditure 
Beginning in the late 1980s, the size of development spending (as opposed to current) decreased 
steadily. Furthermore, sectoral allocations of development spending also changed. The 
allocations for sectors such as agriculture, water resources, manufacturing and energy declined 
significantly from 1980-81 onward. The government has virtually pulled out of the 
manufacturing sector, while the fall in allocations to agriculture in the second half 1980s reflects 
the reduction or elimination of agricultural subsidies. 
However, public expenditure, i.e. both development and non-development expenditure 
combined, increased steadily since the 1990s. The development expenditure  
… rose steadily from 6,024 crore taka in 1991/92 to 19,472 crore taka in 
current prices in 2005/26, which means a growth rate of 2.1 per cent per 
year and more than a threefold increase in absolute term. In 2005/06, the 
top four expenditures in Bangladesh were rural development, power, 
transport, and education respectively. (Hassan, 2008, p. 9). 
Still, Bangladesh has the world’s lowest public expenditures, at around 14 percent of GDP in 
fiscal year 2014 (World Bank, 2015). The government commitment to continuation of such 
expenditure is important for poverty alleviation and rural regional development. The efficiency 
of the government and its bureaucracy to carrying out such expenditure has long been a concern 
too. 
5.5.5 Macro-Financial Policies 
Financial institutions can potentially have a significant impact in the economy. Bangladesh 
allowed the first private bank in 1982. Currently, about 56 scheduled banks operate in the 
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country, of which there are 39 private banks. Private sector banks account for nearly half the 
deposit in the country. While the government-owned banks and some special purpose banks 
(such as agricultural, industrial) had a poor record of loan recovery and financial discipline, the 
privately owned banks are reluctant to serve the rural areas, and the agricultural, and small 
industry sectors. Between 2001 and 2003 the government collected more and disbursed less in 
the rural areas 38, putting a squeeze on financing in rural areas. A 2007 World Bank study, cited 
in a newspaper report without a mention of the title, found that 50% of the deposit collected in 
the rural areas are disbursed in the urban areas (Ittefaq, May 28, 2007). Such trend has been 
curbed in the last 7/8 years, specially via loans to industrial units in the rural areas. However, the 
participation of the banks in the rural economy, specially agriculture is still miniscule. 
5.5.6 Infrastructure Policies 
Bangladesh does not have an infrastructure policy per se. The Roads and Highways Department 
(RHD) in the Ministry of Transport built and maintained highways and local roads apparently 
without the benefit of a coherent policy. A rural development strategy was drafted in 1984 that 
recognized infrastructure as one of the pillars of poverty alleviation (Planning Commission, 
1984). Since then a well-funded and prestigious Department (Local Government Engineering 
Department, LGED) grew in the Ministry of Local Government, and Rural Development that 
was entrusted with the task of building and maintaining local infrastructure in the country. There 
have been conflicts of jurisdiction between RHD and LGED that has been resolved in 2009 with 
a guideline as to which agency will build and operate which roads, but a comprehensive 
infrastructure policy is missing. 
Despite the lack of an articulated policy, the government’s involvement in providing physical 
infrastructure date back to many centuries ago. Given that infrastructure was seen as a public 
good, it was the government who was expected to provide it. But much of the infrastructure 
building in rural areas provided means to another end: Providing employment during the months 
of relative inactivity in crop production cycle. Programs such as Food for Works, Rural Works 
Program, or Test Relief Program are essentially programs emanating from the same principles 
                                                 
38 The Daily Inqilab, January 03, 2004. 
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even though they were undertaken by different ministries of the government. Such infrastructure 
programs are generally food-assisted and seen more as a means of food security than as 
infrastructure development. Often, the projects were poorly designed, and the level of technology 
used in them was low (Mujeri, 2002). 
However, the physical infrastructure such as roads, markets, and storage that LGED build were 
not seen as targeted programs for food security, rather as a strategy for economic growth. With 
considerable financial support from donors, LGED constructed, improved, and repaired roads, 
and rural markets at unprecedented rate. Table 4 below shows data from the period when LGED 
spent the most and Bangladesh emerged as the country with highest rural road density in the 
world.  
Table 7 Rural infrastructure development by the Local Government Engineering 
Department 
Program Cumulative 
till June 1997 
1997/1998 1998/1999 1999/2000 
Road (km) 7,370 3,900 6,018 7,667 
Bridge/culvert (meter) 85,684 33,192 34,757 46,448 
Growth Centres (rural 
large/strategic markets) 
480 143 213 176 
Source: Ministry of Finance 2001 in Mujeri, 2002. 
As per the figures in the table, Bangladesh experienced nothing short of a transport revolution in 
the 1990s. There are few people in the region today who are, to borrow Rigg’s description of 
Southeast Asia, “isolated from the market or, for that matter the tendrils of the state” (Rigg, 2006 
in Tacoli). The improvement of roads also has significant changes in the rural production 
systems, and sources of livelihoods. 
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5.6 Provincial Politics, and Regional Policy 
Bangladesh is one of the most centralized countries in the world for its size. The local 
governments have very little de facto power, finances (section 5.4 above) and capability. The 
districts (64 in number) and divisions (6 of them) are not even local government units. Almost all 
expenditures (i.e. projects) are carried out by the central government. Such power of central 
government has encouraged a kind of provincialism where the focus of the provincial/regional 
level citizen organizations is solely on getting more allocation from the central government. 
Civic associations typically named “association to fight for development of (greater) district X” 
are common. They lobby the government for investment in their area. This has incentivized 
citizen associations at different levels to lobby the central government for things such as piped 
gas supply, an airport, or simply being given the status of a higher administrative unit. Most of 
their energies are spent on lobbying the central government even though some have active 
present as non-political citizen association.  
Such lobbying happens in the context of an absence of any regional policy. As the poverty map 
suggests there are pockets of poverty in some parts of the country. Policy makers and political 
leadership in the country often emphasize reduction of regional inequality. Projects are often 
formulated with purported goal of reducing regional inequality. However, there is no official 
regional policy. Projects are often named with a suffix of “… for regional development”. 
However, they often are sectoral projects. Data on location of government expenditure is 
difficult to collect. But experts believe that much of the money is spent in the capital city 
anyway. A recent analysis of budgets (Khan, 2014) showed that during the Fiscal years from 
2006-07 to 2008-09 (up to March), Dhaka district got the highest allocation of Annual 
Development Program totaling 4160 crore taka, which is 8.4% of total allocation. In non-
development budget (i.e. social and administrative expenses) which typically three times as 
much as development budget, Dhaka had a share of over 23% during the same period. 
5.7 Conclusion: Prospect for Rural Regional Development in 
Bangladesh 
Based on the preceding review of the bio-physical, and demographic condition on the one hand 
and the economic policy and nature of incorporation of Bangladeshi state into the global 
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economic order on the other, a few observations emerge as to the prospect of rural regional 
development in Bangladesh: 
(1) Almost the entire territory of Bangladesh has densities high enough to keep per capita 
cost of any infrastructure or services low. In this respect, Bangladesh stand in marked 
contrast with thinly settled areas found in some parts of the world, where some argue that 
it is not a good use of scarce resources to invest in. 
(2) The country’s current economy is based substantially on RMG (80% of national exports) 
and remittance (14 billion on an average in recent years). About 90% of RMGs are 
located either in Dhaka or Chittagong, contributing to the fact that these two were the 
fastest growing cities among the large urban centers in the country. This kind of urban 
growth created expansion of slums, and urban poverty. While RMG is propping up an 
otherwise not-so-robust economy, other sectors of the economy need to and has the 
potential for creating income for households as well as the national economy. 
(3) The current state of governance in the country is one of the most centralized in the world 
for a country of this size. The two local government bodies at the level of sub-district and 
union levels have jurisdiction over territories that are not large enough to have a local 
economy, and synergy via reciprocal linkages between firms and small settlements. The 
level of training of the personnel of these local government bodies is also low. Local 
governments also get most of their funding from the central government. Two alternative 
scenarios can be envisaged for rural regional development in such a setting: (a) a muti-
sectoral project with the goal of economic synergy at the level of rural regions. However, 
after the project, it will face the well-known challenges that development projects face, 
namely, who retains the ownership? (b) try to institute a local governance reform with 
more power to coordinate at the level of district. The more powerful politicians who vie 
to be Members of Parliament tend to find strong local government bodies at the district 
and sub-district level a threat to their power. This theme is taken up later. 
(4) Much of Bangladesh’s recent growth has come at the expense of severe damage to the 
environment, as evidenced in the rise of brick kiln’s in the share of GDP and 
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employment, increased water and soil pollution, and water-logging in both rural and 
urban areas. 
It is within this backdrop that RRD and rural regional planning needs to be explored in the case 
of Bangladesh. 
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Chapter Six: The Case Study Rural Region (Southern 
Noakhali) 
Guided by the analytical framework for rural regional development that was put together in 
Section 3.6, we study a rural region in Bangladesh. The region comprises the southern four sub-
districts of the district of Noakhali (except the island sub-district of Hatia). We described the 
overarching state of Bangladesh in the previous chapter. Within that overarching structure, we 
investigate how the prospects for rural regional development are enhanced or thwarted in this 
rural region, and how rural regional development might be instigated. We identify the political, 
economic, social processes that took place or are taking place in the rural region. 
As identified in Chapter Three, household is the unit that allows a window into poverty and 
prosperity. This chapter begins with an analysis of household livelihoods and links them with the 
processes at higher scales. We identify these processes for southern Noakhali with an eye on the 
generalizable truths about rural regional development. 
6.1 The Case Study Rural Region: Geography and Demography 
The study area comprises the four southern sub-districts in the District of Noakhali in 
Bangladesh, namely Noakhali Sadar, Companyganj, Kabirhat and Subarnachar. It is roughly 570 
square miles of flat land in the southeastern part of Bangladesh, on the northeastern tip of the 
funnel shaped Bay of Bengal. This location makes the region vulnerable to cyclones and tidal 
surges. The largest town in the study area, Maijdee town, is 20 miles (one hour in regular traffic) 
away from the highway connecting the two largest cities in the country, namely, Dhaka and 
Chittagong. To the north of the region is the northern half of the Noakhali district. The largest 
trading center in Noakhali district (namely Chowmuhani town) is roughly 5 miles to the northern 
boundary of the study region.  To the south is the estuary of the river Meghna which is 
constantly eroding and accreting, with accretion outnumbering erosion. Much of the southern 
parts of the study area accreted and rose out of the bay in the last half a century (more on this in 
the next section). 
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Figure 17 The southern four upazilas of Noakhali district, Bangladesh 
Note: The road network shown here is based on data from a decade ago. Many segments of the roads 
were constructed and/or paved since then. 
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The population, area, and the resultant population density of the 4 sub-districts that comprise the 
case study region is as follows (based on Census 2011). 
Table 8 Area, population and density of the four sub-districts of the rural region 
Sub-District Area (in square mile) Population Density (Per sq. mile) 
Noakhali Sadar* 129.75  525,934 4053 
Kabirhat** 71.53 196,944 2753 
Companyganj** 146.85 250,579 1706 
Subarnachar 222.19 289,514 1303 
Total 570.32 1,262,971 2266 
Note: *Noakhali Sadar includes the largest municipality and district headquarters (Population in 2011: 107,654) 
**Kabirhat and Companyganj sub-districts have a municipality each (population in 2011 was 17,448 and 
29,877 respectively) 
 
The average density figures somewhat mislead by way of masking the dense settlements in the 
northern parts, because whole of Subarnachar and the southern parts of the other three sub-
districts have much lower densities. Such low densities result from the fact that they are newly 
accreted land that are still in the process of being settled, and splintering of family land among 
siblings over generations has not occurred. The two sub-districts just north of the study area have 
densities of 5968 per sq. mile (Begumganj) and 4598 per square miles (Senbag). The areas in the 
northern parts of the study area have similar high densities. 
The region is mostly flat. The southern parts of the region are vulnerable to erosion of the river 
Meghna, but also experience accretion. It is estimated that Bangladesh gained 1,000 square 
kilometers of new land in the Meghna estuary since the early 1970s, much of which is because of 
the construction of two cross-dams in 1957 and 1964. These cross-dams connected the mainland 
with islands a few miles off the shores. Much of the rural region’s southern parts are accreted 
land resulting from these two cross-dams. 
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Figure 18 Accretion and erosion in the southeast estuary of Bangladesh, 1973-2005 
(Reproduced from CEGIS, 2005) 
 
 
As inhabitants of a floodplain, people in this area throughout their history either carried out small 
hydrological projects, or adapted to nature. However, the first large-scale hydrological project to 
stabilize land by empoldering was undertaken only in the late 1960s. As a part of this 
countrywide program, some chars39 in southeastern Bangladesh were made flood-free via 
poldering in the late 1960s and 1970s. Two rivers, Meghna in the west and Chhoto Feni river in 
                                                 
39 A char (Bengali word) is an accreted area of land. 
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the east form the western and eastern boundaries of the Noakhali Zila. Within the 570 square 
miles of the study area, there is no naturally occurring canal system. An 18-mile canal was 
excavated in 1660 to divert water south to the Bay of Bengal. The canal (named the new canal) 
gave the district of Noakhali its name40. Other smaller canals were historically excavated and 
widened throughout the history of settlement in these parts of Bangladesh. 
Figure 19 The study region with approximate location of Noakhali canal 
 
Source: Google Earth 
 
New accretions continue to occur naturally. The satellite image below shows the accretion 
process in the last 40 years. It shows only about 1/6 of the study area, and half of the accreted 
area (there is more accreted land on the east).  The dramatic developments are evident. 
                                                 
40 “Noakhali” means the place of new canal. 
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Figure 20 Landsat images of Subarnachar sub-district (1975 and 2001) showing the extent 
of accretion and land grab by aquaculture "projects" 
 
 
The northern parts of the study area were settled at least several hundred years ago. However, the 
settlements in the southern parts are barely a few decades old. Most of the study area is low land 
that remains under water during and after rainy season. Homesteads, roads, and structures are 
built on land raised with earth-filling. In the northern areas of older settlements salinity is low 
and irrigation possible during the dry months (roughly November to March). However, in the 
southern areas salinity and lack of irrigation keep nearly 40% of the land fallow as per the data 
from the sub-district agricultural offices of Subarnachar and Companyganj. In the southern most 
sub-district, Subarnachar, 65% of the land is suitable for only one crop a year. Land there is 
either flooded and/or too saline for much of the year. 
Accretion downstream also means that some of the drainage channels, specially the Noakhali 
canal, that flow south have been constricted. This natural cause has been exacerbated by human 
encroachments on Noakhali and other canals. The result is that in the last two decades water 
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logging has increased (Khan, 2005) to the point that only one crop in dry winter (boro season) is 
possible in some northern areas. Such change in cropping pattern as well as net yield has put 
stress on the households owning land in such areas. 
6.2 Land Grab in the Accreted Land, and Community Activism 
By government laws since the early 1970s, any accreted land becomes the property of the 
government. By its own rules, the government is required to distribute such land to the landless 
in parcels of fixed size. In the 1970s the size of such parcels was 2.5 acres. It gradually was 
reduced in the face of increasing demand for land. Such egalitarian policy of the government was 
being sabotaged by the elites from both the nearby towns and the locality. In the early years 
(especially 1970s), in the absence of the state’s law enforcement in these remote lands, local 
warlords emerged with their lathiyals [an army of peasants who use thick sticks, lathi in Bangla, 
as their weapons in skirmishes]. Lathiyali as a system parallel to the state is well-known on 
accreted lands around Bangladesh. Zaman (1991) offers a precise definition: “a semi-feudal 
system of relations between landlords and peasants in which the local talukdars (independent 
proprietors) and jotedars (superior tenure holders), acting as power bosses, use their patron-tied 
dependents as lathiyals to organize violent land conflict to grab new depositional land”. In 
exchange for serving as the foot soldiers, the lathiyals can live on the land of the 
talukder/jotedar. In the southern chars of Noakhali, such lathiyali system, together with their 
collaborators from the nearby towns shaped much of the de facto land ownership patterns. 
Such sabotage of state policies and formation of essentially parallel state is only part of the story 
of the study area. It is not that the elites established their effective control on land without 
resistance. In a remarkable story of community mobilization work, an NGO (named Nijera Kori) 
was able to organize the landless into a power bloc that could not be ignored during allocation of 
accreted land. With community mobilization and advocacy campaign in the study area since the 
late 1970s, Nijera Kori made the landless people aware of their rights and engaged with the 
government in negotiations to secure their rights to land. With the help of Nijera Kori, a 
community of former landless grew. The struggle of such communities for access to land and 
safeguarding their land from human-induced environmental catastrophe continued well into the 
2000s (Adnan, 2011). For example, a community in Char Dhaner Shish in Subarnachar upazila 
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filed a lawsuit in 1999 against a powerful land grabber who set up a shrimp farm blocking a 
natural canal that threatened permanent water logging of their lands. Other such examples of 
people resisting the powerful abound from the char areas, especially in the Subarnachar sub-
district. By the time the interviews started in 2011, the violence subsided a little. Some of the 
violence went south with new accretion. However, in the areas settled and allotted earlier, 
powerholders continue to exert influences. One common form of violence is the powerholders 
harvesting paddy rice grown by landless people with the fabricated claim that the land is owned 
by the powerholder. Such violence is possible where land is still being allotted. The people with 
no other alternatives cultivate these lands, only to see a powerful person to show up with his 
army at the time of harvest. 
Powerholders, instead of staying independent and parallel to the state as they were in the 1960s 
and ‘70s, are now part of the state. One person accused of most atrocities in Char Elahi was also 
an elected official at the union level. An interview could not be arranged with him, but people 
living on government land described him as having connections to both the major political 
parties in Bangladesh. The people who leased large tracts of land from the government include 
mayors, and current and former members of the parliament. In other southern parts too, 
especially Char Clark union (in Subarnachar upazila), violence still flares up. However, in the 
northern parts of the study area, settlements are several generations old. While disputes over land 
linger in rare cases in these parts, it is nowhere near the occasional lawlessness that erupts in the 
southern parts.  
Between 1984 and 1986, Nijera Kori helped 30 cooperatives secure allocation of land from the 
government (Adnan, 2011). The members of the cooperatives later chose to divide up their land 
into personal plots. When asked during field interviews why they abandoned cooperative 
ownerships, some of the former cooperative members said coordinating collective action among 
a group that came together only recently from different parts of the district was proving to be 
difficult. 
Over the three decades, land allocation continued as more and more accreted land became high 
and dry enough for settlement. Data provided by the district administration office (current until 
Nov 2011) listed following number of allottee households since the 1970s (Table 9). 
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Table 9 Number of households allotted government plots since the 1970s to 2011 
Sub-district Number of households allotted 
Subarnachar 33,306 
Kabirhat 634 
Noakhali Sadar 387 
Companyganj 13226 
Source: District office (State Acquisition branch), Noakhali. 
When shown to people in the areas where allotments were made, they said this is “on paper” 
statistics to mean that many of the allottee households are decoys used by the powerful to do 
paperwork to keep control of the land. This study did not try to do a detailed survey of the de 
facto possession of land. But people in some southern areas of Subarnachar (except Char Jabbar, 
which is the island around which accretion occurred) showed areas of land that are in effect 
owned by powerful people both in the locality and the absentee owners in northern towns. Some 
of these powerholders are now deceased. Some sold their land to capitalist investors who began 
to come to take advantage of large tracts of land which stand in contrast with the rest of this 
populous and dense country. 
In the southeastern part (i.e. Companyganj and Kabirhat upazilas) where poverty is higher, most 
of the shops in the small rural markets were found to be owned by northerners, who were renting 
them out to villagers. In other words, through ownership of strategic properties in the 
communities, the absentee owners were having access to surplus in the village communities. It 
represents a form of leakage from the community, even though it is not a leakage from the rural 
region, if analyzed as one aggregated territorial unit. 
Until late 1990s there was little capitalist interests in the southern accreted lands (charlands). 
However, in the late 1990s a movement of the rich and powerful from the nearby towns took 
advantage of a 1992 policy41 that allowed for declaration of shrimp zones in the interest of the 
national economy. Passed in the early days of Bangladesh’s integration into global economy, this 
                                                 
41 Shrimp Mohal Management Policy, 1992. 
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law wanted to enhance Bangladesh’s comparative advantage in shrimp farming. Under the 
purview of the law, and following a petition organized by some of the rich and powerful within 
and outside the study area, a 12,000 acre shrimp zone was declared in the southern coastal areas 
of Noakhali district. This declaration allowed for non-landless individuals to lease up to 30 acres 
of land from the government to cultivate shrimp. This declaration provided the legitimacy for the 
rich and powerful from the nearby towns to grab land via long term lease from the government. 
Though the limit is set at 30 acres, satellite pictures, confirmed by field visits, show one farm 
spanning over 1000 acres (Momen, 2012). It is ironic but somewhat predictable that there was 
little shrimp, and mostly inland fish species were being cultivated. The comparative advantage of 
shrimp farming was merely a pretext. Freshwater prawn farming increased around the charlands 
much later, in the 2000s. But when the land was being leased, shrimp was scarcely being farmed. 
Thus, a law inspired by globalization ended up being exploited as a pretext for grabbing land. 
The way the land allocation processes were conducted, and the profile of the de facto owners of 
land reveal two things of interest for our purposes: 
(1) While the allocation of land to landless people show the intent of the state, the issue of access 
to and de facto control over land demonstrates how the state can be at the service of the elites. 
(2) The capitalist interests (as opposed to homesteading and cultivation) in the land is increasing 
since the late 1990s. We return to discussion of this trend in later sections. 
Both trends, as elaborated later in this chapter, are likely to continue. 
6.3 Roads, Transportation and Settlement Pattern 
Bangladesh has a higher density of roads than any other country in the world. Such density is a 
function of the high density of settlements in a populous country. Outside the urban areas, there 
are 20,735 km of national highway and district roads in Bangladesh. There are a further 78,495 
km of rural roads (WB, undated42). 
In southern Noakhali too there is a dense network of roads. The road that connects Maijdee town 
with the Dhaka-Chittagong highway is considered a regional highway, even though it is one lane 
                                                 
42 Source: WB based on Roads and Highways Department and Local Government Engineering Department. 
http://go.worldbank.org/943MNTEY80 
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in each direction for its entire length. Other roads are feeder roads in the villages. It needs to be 
noted that the digital data underlying the maps in this document does not contain the roads built 
in recent years in the southern communities where land accretion, consolidation, and settlement 
is an ongoing process. Therefore, the feeder roads in Figure 17 show only a part of the road 
network. 
Among the feeder roads in the southern parts, only a small portion is paved with tar macadam. In 
the northern areas, paved roads are more common43. In northern parts, only the roads and 
pathways at the bottom of the hierarchy (i.e. the ones connecting homesteads with a rural road) 
were found to be earthen. However, in the southern parts, specially the southeastern parts, much 
of the road network is not paved. During rainy season these roads become muddy. And the 
supplies that are transported from the north (including the staple rice) become expensive in these 
village communities that already have higher poverty rate than the rest of the region. For 
example, in the rainy season in the southeastern Char Elahi Union, the cheapest rice was being 
sold for Tk. 40 a kg, while only 12 kms to the north in the Basurhat town, the price was Tk 
30/kg. Residents interviewed perceive paving of their roads as the top priority ahead of direct 
help with livelihood. The ability of the district office of the Local Government Engineering 
Department (LGED) is constrained by inadequate funding. As per one of the engineers at the 
Noakhali district LGED headquarters, given the fund allocation from the central government, a 
road segment can be repaired every 7 years. Repair and maintenance at least twice as frequently 
would be required for adequate surface quality. 
The length of roads in different parts of the study region are as follows. 
                                                 
43 Data on road length disaggregated by surface type was not available at the level of unions. Therefore, the 
observations during field research could not be confirmed with data. 
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Figure 21 Length of Roads of Different Surface-Types (in Km) 
 
Source of data: Table 8.01 of Noakhali District Stats, Census 2011 
Note: The sqkm figures in parentheses are landed area, defined as total area minus forests and rivers. 
 
In the above chart, the reason the Subarnachar and Companyganj sub-districts have significantly 
less road is that these two sub-districts have large areas of accreted land in the south, where 
infrastructure has not expanded. In fact, the length of road and the population density are almost 
perfectly correlated for the four data points (four sub-districts). The earthen roads are not shown 
in Figure 22 below (or Figure 17 above) because the old geographic (GIS) data that was used to 
create the map did not have many of the roads observed during field research. 
The northern parts of the study area are one of the most densely populated areas in the country. 
In these dense parts, homesteads and small amounts of cultivable land comprise most of the land. 
There are no forests. Roads, water bodies, some commercial uses, brick kilns and roads 
effectively exhaust the land use. In the absence of a more precise estimation via remote sensing 
data, simple arithmetic would tell us that for the 1.2 million population in the area there is a need 
for 40 sqkm of homesteads (including kitchen gardens and ponds) in the current design of 
housing. Almost all the homesteads are on land elevated via earth-filling. Such homesteads alone 
would take 5% of the total landed area (i.e. total area minus forests and rivers). 
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What enables such density amid a low local GDP is the migration out of the region. The extent 
of migration is reflected, though not neatly estimated, in the sex ratio. Outside the municipalities 
in the study area, every union (the smallest geographic unit) has sex-ratios significantly below 
100. The sex-ratio for working age population is expected to be much more skewed. However, 
census data tables do not allow for computation of age-specific sex ratios at the geographic level 
of union. 
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Figure 22 Sex-ratio at union level (based on Census 2011 data) 
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The land value went up steadily in the past two decades. The rate of land value increase is 
similar in both the small towns and the villages tens of kilometers away from the towns. The rate 
of increase in the market price of land is not commensurate with the rate of return expected from 
the land even if non-farm opportunities are considered. The price of land is too high even with an 
assumed rate of return as high as 10% (which is roughly the interest rate banks offer to long term 
depositors). The reason for such high value is that remittance money has increased the demand 
for land for building new residences. The conversion of agricultural plots to residences, while not 
quantified in this study, must be considerably higher than the national rate of just less than 1%. 
During the field research, many residential structures were found to be constructed in the last 
decade. More importantly, remittance receiving households (as well as some other households 
with steady income) consistently expressed an interest during the interviews to build a new 
residence nearby. This would almost always mean conversion of agricultural plot to residential 
use, often with earth-filling. 
The major modes of transport are public buses, three-wheelers, and human powered rickshaws. 
There are two bus routes that run through the study area. One runs through Subarnachar and 
Maijdee, the other from Kabirhat to Feni, a town close to the Dhaka-Chittagong highway. It is 
interesting that even though Sonapur and Kabirhat are connected by a feeder road, no buses run 
between these two places. Thus, somebody wishing to take a bus from Sonapur to Feni must take 
another mode (probably three-wheelers running on fixed routes) of transport to get to Kabirhat 
and take a bus from there. This curious arrangement is a result of three-wheeler owners and 
drivers succeeding in stopping bus coverage in the Kabirhat-Sonapur segment of the feeder road. 
The local member of parliament is said to have supported such an arrangement. This increases 
the cost of travel for commuters. But on the flip side, this arrangement allows three-wheeler 
drivers to earn more in the absence of competition from the much cheaper buses. However, the 
biggest beneficiaries are the owners of the three-wheeler fleet who can rent it to low income 
drivers to operate. 
6.4 Economy  
Like the rest of the country, the study area historically had an agrarian economy where crop 
agriculture dominated. However, rural economies always had many non-agricultural activities. 
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Examples include small scale processing and manufacturing such as rope-making, pottery, boat-
making, among hundreds of other activities. This rural region is no exception. 
The state of the economy and the dynamics of the change process are important to examining the 
prospects for rural regional development. The official statistics do not provide much help in 
understanding the economy. For example, the data on “sector of employment” divides the 
economy into three sectors: (a) agriculture, (b) industry, and (c) service44 (see Figure 23 below). 
Every respondent is forced into one of the three categories even though a person can do 
agricultural hired labor for a week, then pull a rickshaw for a month, and then work as a hired 
worker in a construction project. To use another example, a teacher at a local school who also 
farms his land in effect belongs to both “agriculture” and “service” sectors irrespective of how 
s/he perceives her occupation. Such individuals are in such a high number (as confirmed in our 
field survey, reported in the next section) that having three mutually exclusive categories in data 
collection and reporting of sector masks the reality. However, we report the data from Census 
2011 anyways below (Figure 23).  
                                                 
44 Question 25 on Census enumeration form used for Census 2011 includes three mutually exclusive categories 
(namely Agriculture, Industry, Service). The three categories add up to “total” in statistical tables, meaning that 
multiple responses to the question is not allowed. See appendix IV (p481) of the Population and Housing Census, 
2011Report (Union Series) for a copy of the enumeration form. 
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Figure 23 Number of people working in different sectors as reported in Census 2011 report 
 
 
When contrasted with the findings of the interviews and observations during the field research, 
the share of agriculture in the above figure appears significantly over-estimated. It is likely that 
the Census collected data with the traditional notion that if agriculture forms any part of the total 
livelihood package, a household is considered “agricultural”.  A recent study found that at the 
country level “the share of farm income in total rural income has dropped from 40% to 36% over 
2000-2010. During the same period the share of non-farm income rose from 34% to 40%, and 
that of remittance (domestic and foreign) income from 8% to 11% (Hossain, Sen, & Sawada, 
2012). Interviews in the study area suggest that such figures are likely higher in southern 
Noakhali. 
While the agricultural labor data is hard to find, data on cropping pattern, pisciculture, livestock 
and horticulture exist. Noakhali traditionally is not a rice self-sufficient district. If the southern 
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parts, which were accreted only recently, are not included, Noakhali’s deficit will grow further, 
because the northern settlements with high inflow of remittance depend very little on the local 
crop production.  The main crop is the planted aman variety of rice that is planted in August (i.e. 
toward the end of monsoon). Other crops such as boro variety of rice, which is planted in late 
November, are significant albeit with a much smaller acreage. While the per acre yield is high, 
the high population density, increasing water logging, and lack of irrigation has kept per capita 
cultivable land low. 
Figure 24 Major cropping patterns (across seasons) in southern Noakhali 
 
Note: 1. Planted or transplanted aman are rice varieties that are planted as seedlings toward the end of monsoon. The 
seedlings are grown during monsoon in a separate plot, typically a raised one that does not go under water during 
monsoon. 
Source: Compiled from data provided by the four upazila agricultural offices (Year: 2011) 
 
In recent years, poultry, pisciculture, and to a lesser extent livestock increased significantly. 
During the field research in 2011-’12 and subsequent interviews over phone, it was striking how 
many “projects” (shorthand used by people to describe captive fisheries farms) were undertaken 
within the last 10 years. A “project” can be undertaken in one of these ways: (a) a pre-existing 
pond can be prepared by drying up, treating the soil at the bottom with appropriate chemicals, 
and release of fingerlings after filling with water, (b) excavating an agricultural plot to create a 
fisheries pond, (3) cordon off low crop land during the time it is inundated to raise fingerlings for 
up to 5 months. The recent proliferation follows several pioneers in the previous decade. 
Poultry farms too have increased manifold around the region, creating a demand for, but also 
being facilitated by manufacturing of poultry feed. Poultry farms around the country and in the 
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study area vary in size. Some are as small as 2000 square feet, while some are multistoried 
buildings occupying several acres. In places, poultry farms with their odor and discharge of 
effluent is harming environmental quality. In the absence of any land use zoning control, there is 
no law governing the siting of a poultry farm. 
In the newly accreted southern parts of the region, recent years have seen significant increase in 
acreage for cash crops such as peanuts, water melon, and soybean. The actual impacts of these 
cropping practices on the livelihoods are understood in the context of household livelihoods 
strategy discussed in the next section. 
The manufacturing activities in the study area comprise very little heavy industry. Since the data 
was collected for Census 2011 several major industries were established and/or went into 
operation. We present the Census 2011 data on some of the notable industries in the 4 sub-
districts being studied as a backdrop to the discussion that follows. 
Table 10 Manufacturing sector in the region 
Type of 
industry 
Noakhali Sadar Kabirhat Companyganj Subarnachar 
Textile Mill 2 (777 jobs)    
Rice Mill 97 14 30 44 
Handloom 20 (20 jobs)    
Husking crafts 
mill 
783 1455 260 116 
Bidi (handmade 
cigarette of 
lower grade 
tobacco) 
 1 1  
Pottery 8 11  27 
Bamboo and 
cane 
5 (12 jobs) 188 (564 jobs) 47 (22 jobs(sic) 82(245 persons) 
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Wooden 
furniture 
174 (490 
persons) 
132 (132 
persons) 
59 (295 persons) 290 (844 
persons) 
Saw mill 37 (182) 36 (133) 52 (276) 62 (315) 
Auto rice mill    3 (71) 
Semi-auto rice 
mill 
5(60)    
Rice mill 9 (72) 3 (3) 10 (108) 17 (167) 
Oil Mill   2 (15)  
Bakery 15 (154) 5 (39) 15 (81) 148 (1362) (sic) 
Printing press 6 (42 persons)    
Tailoring shop 311 (1244) 175 (620) 145 (422) 240(530) 
Flour mill 10 (39)    
Plastic industry 8 (32)    
Pharma industry 2 (22)    
Source: Various tables in BBS, 2013 (District Statistics, Noakhali 2011) 
It is noticeable in the table above that furniture making, tailoring (many clothing items are 
tailored to order in many parts of rural Bangladesh), and bakery are in large numbers in all the 
sub-districts. This corroborates the national figures for sectors of employment in non-
metropolitan areas (in Figure 14) i.e. “wearing apparel”, “food and restaurant” and “furniture” 
among the top seven sources of employment. In fact, during field research, every village market 
center was found to have several of these. As a remarkably consistent feature of the rural market 
layouts, furniture making shops were found to be on the outer perimeters of almost all the 
markets. In addition to the above industries, brick kilns were also observed during the field 
research.  
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The district has two garments factories, both producing sweaters. One was established in 2003 
and the other in 2012. Both are located to the south of Maijdee town. Defying any logic of 
garments factory location, the factories were established there because the owners’ ancestral 
home is in that sub-district. The owner is one of the most-renowned industrialists in the country, 
as well as a politician who was elected to the parliament from a constituency in Dhaka City. The 
official statistics from Bangladesh Garments Manufacturers and Exporters Association show 
nearly a thousand machines and employees working in the two factories that are merely a 
kilometer apart. However, people around the area give a much higher number based on their 
perception. 
One category of enterprises that did not find their way into official statistics (i.e. District 
Statistics, 2011) but we came across in the field research is dairy processing. Perhaps they are 
counted as “hotels and restaurants” and therefore considered a “service” (not manufacturing). 
However, the activity of dairy dessert-making is a processing activity with a backward linkage 
with livestock rearing in the region as well as the newly accreting land in the south, including 
isolated island like accretions. Other, small-scale manufacturing not found as an exclusive 
category in the official statistics is blacksmith. They can be found in most village markets 
because they continue to produce goods that are essential for the lifestyle of the households. 
 Perhaps the largest source of livelihood not reflected in the official statistics is transportation 
services. Driving a three-wheeler or pulling a rickshaw is the source of livelihood for many, 
especially since extensive road paving in recent years. There are more than 4200 rickshaws in 
Maijdee municipality45 alone. In addition, there are motor-operated three-wheelers operating on 
fixed routes that serve all major feeder roads. There are three-wheelers for hire too. 
Overall, the economy of the study area is one that has agriculture as a major component. 
However, the nature of agriculture rapidly shifted to a non-crop one in the last decade. A retail 
sector has emerged along with significant number of services, including advanced medical 
services such as relatively higher tech pathological and imaging services for medical diagnosis. 
                                                 
45 As per the officer responsible in the municipality, the number of rickshaw-owners renewing annual license varies 
from year to year. The number rises dramatically if the municipality can get the local police to conduct a drive 
against un-registered rickshaws. 
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Much of the consumption of retail goods and services is supported by international as well as 
domestic remittance. Amid the rapid growth of economy there is still poverty or vulnerability to 
poverty. Further discussion on livelihoods, poverty and vulnerability is taken up in Section 6.6. 
6.5 Major Commodity Chains 
The major economic activities in terms of use of land, number of persons involved in the 
economy are rice, soy bean, peanuts, vegetables and water melons, and different fish species 
including prawn. Some smaller commodity chains that were observed are some artisanal mat-
making, and large basket making for carrying fish. As a window into the political economy of 
the rural region, the commodity chains of these activities are studied below. 
6.5.1 Rice 
Rice, the staple food for nearly whole the population of the Bangladesh used to be the main crop 
to be cultivated by any agricultural household irrespective of the type of tenancy. In southern 
Noakhali most households with access to land cultivated at least some rice in one of the three 
seasons. 
For agricultural inputs, there is a network of seed sellers in the study region. The government’s 
agricultural offices offer subsidized inputs such as seeds, and urea fertilizer. However, as the 
sub-district agricultural officers admitted, the amount distributed is grossly inadequate. Thus, a 
market for inputs, where commodities are priced higher, operates parallel to the government 
programs. 
Rice is the staple food for all households. Households with significant income from non-farm 
sources such as a well-paying job or remittance from abroad, irrespective of their landownership, 
sell little or no paddy upon harvest. Households such as these who can afford to not sell rice, will 
hold onto rice for household consumption. However, most of the households specially the small 
farmers were selling rice soon after the harvest to pay off the loan they had to take at the 
beginning of the season to buy agricultural inputs. Though in decline, there is a traditional 
financing mechanism called dadon (output-tying loan) where the grower is offered credit at the 
beginning of the season with the condition that the harvests must be sold to the creditor at a 
lower price than the market price plus some form of interest often in kind. In the past two 
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decades, with the increased reach of the micro-lending NGOs, fewer small peasants are taking 
loan from the dadonders (people who offer dadon). On paper, there is a Bangladesh Bank Policy 
that requires all banks in Bangladesh (whether or not they have branches outside metropolitan 
regions) to offer farm credit. However, in effect this requirement has increased sleight of 
paperwork by the banks to show disbursement in rural areas. Whatever loan is available for 
disbursement, the poorest peasants who were interviewed in this study did not have access to. 
However, some middle farmers admitted to receiving loans from government banks that covered 
only a small portion of their production cost. 
The marketing chain of paddy (and after milling, rice) have a few actors that have been there for 
decades if not centuries. 
Table 11 Major actors in the marketing chain of rice 
Actor Role 
Grower Cultivates rice and can sell 
Faria 
Itinerant trader who collect paddy from village 
markets 
Bepari 
Itinerant trader who collect paddy from village 
markets and farias. They have enough volume 
to do some sorting of rice 
Aratder 
Large wholesaler who collect from beparis, 
farias, and even large growers 
Millers (both small and recently established 
auto-mills that can process upto 500 tonnes a 
day) 
Does dehusking, and often parboils rice. Sells 
rice 
Government’s food department 
The share of the government’s purchase in 
recent years is barely 4%-9% of the 
production 
Wholesale rice sellers Sells rice to retailers 
Retailers Sells to consumers 
Source: From Murshid, 2011 (who studied part of the study area) and confirmed in field research 
The flow of paddy and rice is not as linear as this table might be taken to suggest. In some places 
the growers will sell directly to mill. In others, middlemen are involved. The share of the total 
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volume passing through the above actors varies from place to place. In some northern parts of 
the study area, some seasonal rice processors will do the work of the mills, albeit to a much 
smaller extent with rudimentary technology. These rice processors are employed by the growers 
who do not sell in the market and consume rice from their own land.  
The determination of production costs, selling price, and flow of paddy and rice require 
significant investigative work because the respondents sometimes did not want to divulge their 
trade secrets. But most of the time they do not do accounting and keep track of expenses the way 
a larger firm would do. There was significant recall bias too in the answers given by the 
respondents. For the purposes of this dissertation, we are interested in rural productivity and 
poverty focused value chain analysis, as opposed to detailed spatially disaggregated analysis of 
flow of paddy and rice. The prices vary with type of rice (boro, aman, and a few less cultivated 
varieties), and location within the study area that is close to 570 square miles. More importantly 
the prices vary across years. The estimate of production cost also varied widely from one 
interviewee to the next even in the same village. The average cost among the rice growers in the 
(of the non-probability) sample was Tk 630 per maund (37.32 Kg) in the 2011 Boro season 
(March to June). 
The selling price for 2011 was particularly low nationally and made headlines in newspapers. 
Growers made very small to no profit, and in some cases incurred losses that year. In better 
years, they earn a profit of about Tk. 12000 per bigha46 on an average. 
The marketing chain of rice in the southern charlands was studied in the late 1980s and early 
1990s by Crow & Murshid (1994). Later published as a book (Crow, 2001), the study offers a 
detailed picture of how paddy and rice marketing worked in the conditions that existed then. By 
the time the field study for this dissertation was conducted in 2011-12, the conditions changed. 
The findings of this study corroborates the findings of a repeat study by Murshid (2011). The 
major changes between early 1990s and 2011 are that the role of paddy wholesalers (aratders) 
drastically reduced, and large automatic rice mills were established by large capitalists. As 
mentioned earlier, large Bangladeshi conglomerates are getting into rice milling in recent years 
                                                 
46 A widely used unit of area in Bangladesh. Equals 14,400 sqft. 
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by procuring automatic mills imported from China and Europe (The Daily Star, Jan 22, 2015). At 
a cost in the region of US$2.5 million, these mills require no human contact between feeding 
harvest from the field and getting packaged rice in bags. There are also semi-automatic rice mills 
where substantial portions of the processing are done by the machine. 
The reasons for such major changes in the value chain is as Murshid (2011) proposes, and 
corroborated by interviews in this study: 
“Twenty years ago, the paddy aratdars in Noakhali were charged with the job of 
procuring supplies either from outside districts or from the chars. While in terms of 
distance, the chars were not far away from the market town, access was difficult due to 
poor roads. Moreover, these were often newly settled areas with loosely organised 
communities, representing greater risks in exchange, especially when it came to trade 
with outside entities. It was under these circumstances that paddy aratdari proliferated at 
the time. These conditions have now changed with better infrastructure, communications 
and the advent of large automatic mills deep inside the chars.” Murshid (2011, p. 9). 
The appearance of the auto-rice mills in Subarnachar also is reversing the flow of paddy. 
Previously paddy used to be transported out of the charlands to the northern rice mills that used 
crude technology requiring significant manual work. By 2011, some paddy was transported south 
to the automatic machines as they can process more than the local production of paddy. 
However, large and some middle farmers who prefer to eat rice from their own fields use the 
traditional smaller rice mills, or use their own homestead yards, or occasionally seasonal millers 
who parboil and process paddy using crude technology. 
What did not change much is the institutions that are detrimental to the small peasants and 
sharecroppers. For example, despite the increased reach of the micro-lending organizations, the 
small peasants were seen to be taking dadon, as well as other forms of interest where they agreed 
to pay off the loan in cash and an amount of rice per Tk. 1000 (often up to 30 kg of rice per Tk 
1000 at the end of the season). Furthermore, government purchase program is by design not able 
to help the poor. It is convenient for the Government to buy rice as opposed to paddy. However, 
only the millers, not the growers, can sell rice. The high price the government is willing to pay 
does not translate into high price for paddy that the small growers must sell immediately after 
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harvest. Aware of this inequitable impact, the government in recent years started buying some of 
its purchase as paddy47.  
These exploitative relationships and meager profit with significant work load (3 and a half 
months of gestation period with many transactions and action items) amid volatile prices confirm 
that rice cultivation is not a way out of precarious existence in the current state of affairs. Higher 
yield in some years suppresses the price and yields little extra profit. 
6.5.2 Soybean 
There is an increasing number of poultry farms and fish farms in Bangladesh. Starting in the 
early 1990s, the number of poultry farms grew rapidly to about 100 to 120 thousand in 201548. 
This high number would have been higher if the viral flu episodes of 2007, 2009, and 2011 did 
not happen. Most of the commercial operators used to be small and medium operators with 
investments of US$1000 to US$5000 in the earlier years. However, since the avian flus of 2007 
and 2009, many small operators have gone out of business. There is a trend of large capitalist 
concentration in the sector. 
Together with poultry, aquaculture has increased in both the country and the study area. 
Soybean is a significant ingredient (along with, among others, rice bran and mustard oil cake) in 
fish feed for many of the aquatic species cultivated in Bangladesh. Despite the burgeoning 
market for soybean oil, the bean produced in the country is used as input in the feed industries, 
while the major soybean oil brands import crude degummed soybean oil to produce a refined one 
for cooking. Soybean is cultivated in approximately 7,500 hectares in the study area. All of it is 
in the southern parts. Soy bean is cultivated almost exclusively by middle and large farmers 
because of its needs for relatively expensive inputs specially irrigation. 
In 2007, a poultry feed producing factory came into operation in the Subarnachar sub-district. 
Another large agro-feed factory was built just north of the study area in early 2016. These 
                                                 
47 For example, the government will procure 700,000 tonnes of Boro rice and 600,000 tonnes of Boro paddy at Tk. 
32 per kg and Tk. 23 per kg respectively in 2016-17. Source: 
http://bdnews24.com/business/2016/04/24/government-to-procure-boro-rice-at-tk-32-per-kg 
48 World’s Poultry Science Association-Bangladesh. Reported in the Daily Star (Feb 20, 2015). 
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poultry, fish, and livestock feed manufacturers use local soybean. In addition, a large volume of 
soybean is sourced from outside the district, mostly imported from Latin America and India.   
6.5.3 Vegetables and Water Melon 
The commodity chains of these products comprise a small number of actors. Some of the traders 
in the largest vegetable markets in the study region as well as in Chittagong offer loans at the 
beginning of the cultivation season (October in the case of most, but not all vegetables). At 
harvest these traders bring their own trucks at the farm gate and haul the produce away, mostly to 
Chittagong. A small portion gets into the district headquarters market and local markets. In the 
case of water melon, which is cultivated only in the southern parts of the study area, wholesale 
buyers come from Dhaka too. 
6.5.4 Fish 
Ponds are a ubiquitous feature of the region. House construction requires raising a platform via 
earth-filling and in the process, a pond is created. However, since a cluster of homesteads that 
leads to creation of a pond is owned by many households, ponds are mostly jointly owned, 
requiring collective action. Sharing of production costs (money as well as labor for maintenance, 
and guarding against pilferage) and benefits require cooperation, which is not always available. 
In the last 10-15 years, use of both jointly and individually owned ponds for aquaculture has 
increased primarily because knowledge spillover, and increased availability of inputs such as 
fingerlings around the country. 
 Total pond area in the district of Noakhali is 12,322 hectares, of which 9857 hectares are 
cultured (BBS, 2011). This ratio should hold for the 4 southern sub-districts that comprise the 
study area. In fact, based on the recent trends, more of the ponds that remain fallow will be 
brought under aquaculture. 
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Figure 25 Number of fishermen and production of fish in 2010-2011 
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In addition to ponds created during homestead constructions, recent years have seen proliferation 
of fisheries projects, where nets are used to create pens in times of high water levels in fields. 
Many returnee migrants are getting into pisciculture as a source of livelihood because it is 
profitable, requires less work and fertilizer, as many interviewees reported. The level of 
technology is not intensive. Thus, the need for daily operation and maintenance that is 
characteristic of intensive techniques, e.g. aeration of water, is absent. 
There is very little processing involved in the way fish is marketed in Bangladesh. There is no 
canning operation except for salted hilsa in another district in the country. Except the fish feed, 
ice for preservation, and fish carrying baskets woven from bamboo, it has very little backward 
linkage. Upon harvesting, traders take fish as inputs to the distribution network within the 
district. The large fish farms in the south have their own marketing channels that stay almost 
independent of the region that host them.  
Prawn began to evolve as a commodity chain in the mid-2000s almost solely at the instigation of 
the Greater Noakhali Aquaculture Extension Project (GNAEP, funded by DANIDA). The project 
had been in operation since 1998, but later changed its focus to a pro-poor modus operandi and 
livelihoods support, as opposed to supporting large-scale “plantation” model of aquaculture. 
Poor households were trained to raise post-larvae to juvenile stage in backyard ponds or even 
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large earthen pots. The juveniles are then sold to grow-out pond owners, who are also large 
landowners. 
Noakhali did not have a shrimp or fish processing plant until 2006. Some of the sweet water 
prawn produced in the area was being consumed locally. Some (quantity could not be 
ascertained) of it was being sent to shrimp processing plants in Chittagong via a network of 
traders. In 2006 a processing plant49 was established by a large private conglomerate with the 
help of the GNAEP. The plant remained closed for a few years after the owner of the 
conglomerate that owned it was given a prison term in 2008 for embezzlement of fund in another 
company. This put the prawn producers as well as the producers of carps at a disadvantage. 
However, in 2013 the processing plant went into operation again. This study did not have the 
time to investigate the impacts of this re-opening on the income of small producers. 
6.5.5 Poultry 
Bangladesh experienced rapid growth of poultry and aquaculture beginning in the late 1990s. 
The number of poultry birds (i.e. ducks and chicken combined) rose from 233 million in 2005-6 
to 279 million in 2010-11 (Bangladesh Economic Review, 2011). Still Bangladesh is a net 
importer of chicken meat and eggs. In the last two years, three prominent conglomerates in 
Bangladesh have started selling pre-marinated refrigerated chicken via retail chains. None of the 
processing plants are in Noakhali. 
The poultry farmers in the region buy feed from the ubiquitous feed stores in the larger rural 
markets. Meat and egg produced in Noakhali are mostly for local household and restaurant 
consumption. 
While poultry farms have produced a significant income source for many, and have helped 
increase the supply of meat in the market, it also has been one of the biggest sources of 
environmental degradation in the area. While not inherent in poultry farming, the design of farms 
and the way operations are conducted allow the droppings to be discharged into the surrounding 
environment. Water bodies which work as commons in that anybody can wash and take bath in 
                                                 
49 Noakhali Gold Foods Ltd. 
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have become unusable in some areas. Some control of such discharges (perhaps as use of 
droppings as input in composting) needs to be introduced. 
6.6 Livelihoods Profiles, Assets, and Vulnerabilities 
The study area is small holder dominated area. In this respect, it contrasts significantly with the 
northern, especially northwestern, parts of Bangladesh where large land owners own significant 
amounts of land. Such relatively less skewed land ownership pattern in the region leads to a 
mode of production where 90% of the farming households cultivate either exclusively own land 
or some leased land (e.g. on crop-sharing terms) in addition to own land (Figure 26 below).  The 
land grabbing by absentee townspeople in the newly accreted areas is reflected in the relatively 
high number of tenants in the Subarnachar sub-district 
Figure 26 Land ownership and tenancy in the region 
 
Source: Agricultural Census, 2008 
The livelihood structure is significantly, but not wholly, influenced by the above landownership 
structure. We used a series of interviews of households to build a picture of different profiles of 
“capitals” in the sustainable livelihoods framework (namely, human, financial, natural, social, 
and physical) and the vulnerabilities that households have. Through these interviews and 
observations, a picture of livelihood patterns, perceptions, and decisions of the households of 
different asset and vulnerability profiles emerges. 
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In the preliminary interview of residents, it transpired that the choices of livelihoods varied 
somewhat, though not exclusively, by ownership of land. For the sake of keeping number of 
groups small we created two categories of households in terms of landownership. Within each 
group, we created two sub-categories based on where most of the family income came from. 
Thus, we had four groups of people to interview: 
(a) Small-holders and functionally landless households with significant source of livelihoods 
outside the district 
(b) Small-holders and functionally landless households with principal source of livelihood in the 
locality 
(c) Middle-farmers or/and large sharecroppers with sources of income in the locality only 
(d) Middle farmers with significant sources of livelihoods outside the locality 
 
Middle-farmer and large sharecroppers with sources of income in the locality only 
In the literature on agrarian transition, the middle farmers are seen as the ones with no to small 
amounts of surplus. In most crop cultivating bio-physical systems that would put ownership at 3 
to 7 acres of land. The Bangladesh Agricultural Census defines them as owning 2.5 to 7.5 acres. 
Land ownership data at sub-district level is not available. In the district (Noakhali) of which the 
study region is a part, only 6.2% of the households are of this ownership category50. During field 
visit, we requested to be shown such households. While there was no intention of precisely 
estimating the proportion of middle farmers and large farmers among all households, it appeared 
that around 4 to 7 households out of a hundred were of this category. We found households of 
this category at this small ratio, even though they are generally prominent to locate as they 
generally have a large house and are well-known in the locality. 
The principal crop for most middle farmers is rice. In the planting season that starts toward the 
end of monsoon (August), transplanted aman variety of rice is cultivated on 70%51 of the 
cultivated land. During the dry season (Rabi, roughly November to February), areas in the north 
                                                 
50 With large farmers comprising 0.86% of households (Bangladesh Agricultural Census, 2008) 
51 Compiled from Agriculture Offices of four sub-districts that comprise the study area (for the August to Oct. 2011 
season) 
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and some irrigated pockets in the south see a variety of crops that include, in the order of 
acreage, soybean, boro variety of rice, vegetables, legumes of different types, peanut, and chili. 
Farmers would take a loan52 in the beginning of the season to buy the inputs. At the end of the 
harvest season, they sell some of it to local rice traders at “farm-gate”. The volume sold is 
influenced by the amount taken as loan by the households. Because of the presence of many 
sellers at this time of the year, the prices are low. However, the farmers with loans are bound to 
sell a large portion of the harvest to repay their loans. They did not have the means or 
connections in the larger markets to take advantage of the higher prices there. It is interesting to 
note that it is not lack of market information that prevents these selling farmers from getting a 
better price. Thus, availability of cell phone, which all households in this category owned, did 
not help much. As one farmer told me when I mentioned the availability of price information in a 
distant larger market via cell phone, I was dismissed with the question “what’s the point of 
having information?” (Momen, 2012b). The farmers do not produce enough to have economies 
of scale in transportation to distant buyers. 
Cooperatives would have been one way to solve the problem, but there was never enough 
leadership among farmers, and the unwritten loyalty to traders also precludes any consideration 
of that idea. 
Even as agriculture is the principal source of income, households of this category had other 
sources of income too. The source of such additional income, its amount and its seasonality 
depends on a few factors. If there are enough members in the household, perhaps one will set up 
a shop in the local market. Women in such households are increasingly getting into income 
earning activities even though traditionally households of such landholding perceived themselves 
as too well off to do it. Such activities include crafts of different kinds. In the households where 
children are now grown-up, they are often in a city holding jobs of different kinds. 
In addition to rice, many of the households in this category are venturing into non-crop 
agriculture, including aquaculture and poultry. The conversion of land away from rice cultivation 
                                                 
52 In our non-random sample of households in this category, nearly 75% took a loan. 
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is highest among this group. Some of the new uses introduced are sweet-water prawn cultivation, 
tilapia and carp farming, non-cereal agriculture such as soybean (in Subarnachar exclusively), 
and even poultry farming. 
Is there a typical middle farmer in the study area? This is the group that is most amenable to a 
generalized description compared with the other groups described below. They employ 
agricultural workers. They also often have another source of income other than income from 
land. Such occupations include teaching at a local school, a job at an NGO, running a poultry 
farm, or having a business in the local market. Perhaps the biggest vulnerability for this group 
would be lack of control over price of inputs, and the selling price that they can command. In 
parts of the northern older settlements, perhaps one source of vulnerability is the recent increase 
in water logging because of blocked drainage channels downstream. This vulnerability in the 
natural “capital” is not unique to this group alone. We discuss it in the conclusion of this section. 
Small-holders and functionally landless households with principal source of livelihood in the 
locality 
Functionally landless households are the households that have no cultivable land even when they 
have a place of residence. Among the functionally landless, a large number had their sources of 
livelihoods in the locality. This group is the most heterogeneous in terms of sources of 
livelihoods. They engage in a wide range of activities. This may include petty trading to 
agricultural labor, or pulling a cycle rickshaw, and more rarely, driving an auto-rickshaw. 
Households in this category have much less education than the other categories. In many of them 
children were found to be working to earn an income for the family. When the household is 
headed by a female, such households are further disadvantaged. 
Construction of roads in the late 1990s made pulling a rickshaw or driving an auto-rickshaw 
more feasible. They rent these vehicles and often spend a substantial part of the year engaging in 
this. Another major source of livelihood is petty-trading, often dictated by season. Examples of 
such petty-trading include selling small amounts of fishes or vegetables, or some household 
utensils at a market place or from a non-motorized tri-cycle van. 
Traditionally, the rainy seasons offered an interesting opportunity for the poor people. When the 
agricultural plots are under water, they are recognized in most parts of the study area as well as 
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the country as “commons”. The poor would often catch fishes and harvest aquatic edible plants. 
However, more and more agricultural landowners are now cultivating fish in pens during the 
rainy season. Consequently, they are being taken out of commons. Such practice of fish-farming 
is increasing in the north-central part of the region. Households of this category found such 
erosion of commons diminishing their opportunities at livelihoods. 
People of this category cherish migration to any foreign country. Very few can save up enough, 
or have access to a loan to buy passage. Drawing loans from multiple micro-credit organizations 
simultaneously is common to the point of being the norm. Some, especially the young males will 
likely work in another district or city at some point in their lives, especially the ones who learn to 
drive an auto-rickshaw. Some make their migration permanent. Others, especially the ones with 
at least a place to live, were found to return. 
Middle farmers with significant sources of livelihoods outside the locality 
 Among the middle farmers (i.e. approximately 7% of the households), nearly half had income 
outside the rural region, as per the non-probability sampling. More and more households are 
seeking income beyond the rural region. Such families typically have one or more sons or 
daughters (often with a post-secondary or higher degree) profitably employed in a city or in a 
foreign country. While countries in the Arab Peninsula were the early (1970s) destinations of 
migration, the East and East Asian countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, and Taiwan, 
and Europe increasingly became a destination since the early 1990s, with a brief hiatus following 
the Asian Crisis of 1997 and 1998.  In recent years, migration to South Africa has increased 
significantly. It is estimated that there are 80,000 Bangladeshis living in South Africa now. 
Noakhali is one of the districts from where many people have emigrated to South Africa. Within 
Noakhali, the interviewees reported, almost all the migrants are from the northern parts where 
poverty is less.  
For such households, agriculture carries increasingly lower importance in the livelihoods profile. 
They often offer the land for sharecropping to the landless or small-holders. 
Small-holders and functionally landless households with significant source of income outside 
the district 
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This is the biggest group. In the southern parts of the region, a large number of males in such 
households work in brick factories outside the region for the entire dry season. They generally 
contract for Tk 40,000 ($550) to Tk 60,000 ($750) for the 5-6 months of dry season. They 
receive some of the money as an advance payment that they leave with their family to get 
through the days of their absence. Because of borrowing from the labor contractor throughout the 
year, many of the workers remain indebted, and are obliged to work the next brick-making 
season. However, a lump sum earned this way helps some households make investments for 
future in the form of purchasing a small plot of land, or upgrading and repairing the residence, or 
paying for the passage of a member of the household to the Middle East. 
Other households would find work in different districts in the country in different occupations 
that include working in transport and petty-trading. Some recent developments see interesting 
home-based livelihood opportunities such as weaving ceremonial head-gears (tupi in Bangla). 
Tupi-making is an emerging business in some parts of Bangladesh that exports to countries in the 
Arab Peninsula. The women in rural households do hand-embroidery on pre-designed pieces of 
clothes that are then collected from door to door, and taken to a factory where they are stitched, 
washed and packaged for shipping to the Arab countries. The women in their leisure time can do 
the work for 2-3 tupis, earning them upto US $16 a month. A tupi typically sells for US$10 to 
US$12 in the Arab countries. 
6.7 Profile of Households that are in Poverty and Predicament 
The study area had poor households that are income poor and socially deprived. The official 
upper-poverty-line poverty rates as per the Household Income and Expenditure Survey of 2010 
(WB, WFP, & BBS, 2014) for the four upazilas are between 8% (Companyganj upazila) and 
19% (in Subarnachar). However, this poverty line of 2105 calories of consumption is extremely 
low. In other words, the estimate of poverty is significantly underestimated. 
Beyond these officially defined poor, there are households that have barely enough nutrition to 
not be counted as poor, but do not have much else. There is no typical poor or precarious 
household but certain characterization is possible in light of the field research. Resource-poor 
precarious households (a) have very little or no land, (b) have low level of education and nearly 
no skills in trade, and (c) are often poor for generations. Their often seasonally variable roster of 
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occupations includes rickshaw-pulling, wage-laboring, street-vending and small scale capture 
fisheries. They include women headed households, households with a stroke of bad luck (such as 
an illness, or being swindled out of money by unscrupulous man-power exporting agents). None 
of these occupational groups have any cultural attachment to the occupation they have adopted. 
Hence, poverty alleviation does not have to deal with the guilt of “destroying a way of life” if it 
is necessary and possible to move them from an occupation that has offered them nothing more 
than a precarious living. 
As identified here, per official statistics (i.e. using the 2105 calories poverty line), the southern 
parts have highest levels of poverty (Figure 16). However, deep and chronic poverty was 
encountered all over the study area in varying numbers. Often poor households existed as close 
neighbors to non-poor ones in the same cluster of households.  Some such households depended 
on a special notion of commons where agricultural land when under water can be accessed by all 
for catching naturally-occurring (as opposed to farmed) fish, and for harvesting edible aquatic 
plants. In what might be a portent of a larger trend, some owners are now cultivating fish on their 
submerged land in seasonal pens, and thereby removing their land to private domain from 
commons even in the rainy season. This empirical observation opens our eyes to a new 
phenomenon: Changing social institutions can result in loss of livelihoods, which in turn can 
increase precariousness (figure below). 
Figure 27 Changing Common Property as a Contributing Source to Loss of Livelihoods 
Opportunities 
Note: Following figure adds (in light of field research) to Figure 4 by adding the box in dotted 
lines. 
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This last aspect of loss of entitlement through the loss of commons is reflected in the above 
figure. The dotted box shows an additional source that diminishes livelihoods opportunity. i.e. 
changing agrarian institutions can bring potential squeeze on the livelihoods options for many 
poor households. 
6.8 The Rural Market Places, Towns and Rural-Urban Interaction 
There are three towns in the study area. The largest one, Maijdee town, with a population of 
107,654, (Census, 2011) is also the district headquarters. Other two are two municipalities in the 
Kabirhat and Companyganj sub-districts. The southern-most sub-district, Subarnachar, is entirely 
rural. As identified in the discussion of commodity chains (Section 6.5), much of the commodity 
chains by-passes the towns. A tally of types of trade license renewals by the Maijdee 
municipality during the second half of 2011 shows that it is mostly “service” type of businesses 
that constitute the urban economy. The government and administrative services provide the basis 
for the urban economy, while manufacturing and processing constitute a small portion of the 
urban economy. 
The other two towns are even smaller, and the town economies are oriented toward serving the 
consumption needs of the hinterland. 
Increasingly the towns are seeing more and more items of luxury such as ceramic bathroom 
fittings from Europe, refrigerators, and designer faucets. They are also serving the consumption 
needs of rural households. During field interviews, we found families who moved to these towns 
from village homes because they could afford to rent a place in the town. Two major reasons 
given for such move is that (a) they wanted their children to attend a school in the town and (b) 
superior urban amenities. However, one longtime resident who is also a journalist told us that 
moving to a town from the village home, even if to a rented place is perceived as increasing 
prestige. Often these households are remittance receiving households or households with 
considerable income from rural sources. In this and other similar ways, towns are becoming sites 
of services and consumption. 
However, the towns’ involvement with the production process and commodity chains is rather 
limited. For example, among the market places with soybean wholesaling storage-cum-shops, 
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only two (Maijdee, and Chowmuhani, which is 5 miles off the study region) are in the towns. 
Better road connection means that commodities can be collected in the rural markets, and taken 
to their processing plants with no need to handover to another middleman in the towns. 
The rural market places (bazaars) play an important role in the rural regional economy. There are 
108 government-managed rural markets in the region as per the District Administrator’s Office: 
31 in Sadar upazila, 39 in Subarnachar, 21 in Kabirhat, and 17 in Companyganj (as of 
November, 2011). They are of different sizes. All of them have some permanent shops and 
trading spaces. Each bazaar on two days of the week, known as hat days (that are known in the 
locality) attract a larger number of sellers and buyers. The sellers can be as small as requiring 12 
sqft space on the ground. A low-income person can be seen to be selling as small as a kilogram 
of assorted fish, or as few as one chicken. Some might be selling local hand made products such 
as half a dozen strainers/colanders made from the bark of two local plants (mostak and hogla). 
Urban sellers with manufactured products come too. The full extent of the diversity of the 
economic activities in the village communities is on full display on a hat day. A significant 
portion of such trade is rural-to-rural and has a network character (as described in in the 
discussion of reciprocal rural-urban linkages in Section 3.4.10). For example, artisanal basket 
weavers in the western parts of the study area can be seen selling their products in other rural 
markets in the region and beyond. 
The poor people who sell their small amounts of products (such as a kilogram of fish, or two 
chickens raised at home) in markets like any user of market space are often asked to pay a toll. 
Rural markets in Bangladesh are leased out by the government to private parties for collection of 
tolls. It is widely known that the contracts to collect tolls are won by corrupt means and/or 
coercion. Thus, rural markets produce an opportunity for rent-seeking. As an important hub of 
local economy, the rural markets thus contribute in some way to create (Ricardian) rent. Many of 
the poor households interviewed mentioned such toll as something that constrains their chances 
at an income. In this regard, rural market development and cheap or free access to it, as in RUPP 
(section 3.4.6), takes on significant importance. 
6.9 Development Interventions by the Government and NGOs  
6.9.1 DANIDA’s rural development projects including the Noakhali Integrated 
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Rural Development Project and Greater Noakhali Aquaculture extension 
Project (GNAEP) 
The Integrated Rural Development Project was the largest project that the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA) took anywhere in the world. Brunbech (2011) offers a detailed 
description of how the project came to be conceived in the late 1970s, and how some of its 
components succeeded while others went awry. The Danish agency saw the project as a “basic 
needs”53 project, while the then Bangladesh government wanted it to be another productivity 
increasing IRD project. To accommodate differing preferences, the project became a motley 
collection of components that included: 
(a) A highly successful elementary schooling component that helped increase literacy in 
Noakhali district throughout the 1980s. However, the Ministry of Education could not take up 
the component at the conclusion of the project in the 1990s, 
(b) Agriculture support projects with the modus operandi of standardized agricultural extension 
of the time, 
(c) As a later introduction in the early 1990s, a piscicutural extension work (Demaine, 2009).  
DANIDA fully supported the GNAEP and brought it to operation in 1998. In the following 
years, the carp and tilapia production in the district increased manifold. However, it helped 
mostly the large land and pond owners, as small ponds (less than a few hundred square feet) dry 
up after the rainy season. To reach the poor, the project later helped with establishing a prawn 
commodity chain. A central part of the project was to help the poor, mostly female headed, 
households raise prawn post-larvae during the months their small ditches have water. The 
juveniles are then sold to pond owners, whose production was meant to reach a processing plant 
that DANIDA helped establish (the Noakhali Gold Fish Co.) in 2006. This project also attempted 
to obtain international certification of quality and traceability of prawn and its feed. The prawn 
commodity chain in the district is entirely of DANIDA’s creation. 
                                                 
53 As described earlier, the basic needs approach, articulated by Streeten (1979), emphasized direct provision of 
basic needs such as health services, and education to the poor to fight poverty. This stance was argued in the 1970s 
in contrast with the “increase rural (agricultural) productivity” theme of Integrated Rural Development.  
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6.9.2 Char54 Development and Settlement Project (CDSP) 
The Char Settlement and Development Project (CDSP) was undertaken in the southern parts of 
the study area where new land is accreting for the last five decades. The Project was undertaken 
with multi-agency involvement to, among other things, stabilize and protect new accretions in 
three different parts of the study area that comprised 12,750 acres. More recent and unstable 
chars further south remained, on paper, under the Forest Department’s jurisdiction for 
afforestation. Like all chars before, most of the forest lands were already settled by desperate 
people, despite harsh conditions there. 
Like the Land Reclamation Project (1978-1993) before it, the CDSP’s goal was to settle more 
landless households and provide livelihoods support. There were infrastructure components 
where water management infrastructure—30km of embankments and two sluices—were 
constructed, while a total of 104 km of drainage canals were re-excavated. The Project built and 
improved 75 km of rural roads and constructed five bridges. It also built 17 cyclone shelters, 212 
deep tube wells and installed around 4,000 toilets. 
Regarding the objective of settlement, one core aim of the program was to settle 5,000 landless 
households on khas land. According to the project documents, by September 1999, 4,450 
landless households were settled in three polders. Each household received different amounts of 
land not exceeding two acres. The deed of registration was made in the joint names of the 
husband and the wife. 
CDSP’s other major settlement component was 34 clustered villages with 990 houses in them. In 
all of them, the allottees got little or no agricultural land. There was land around the cluster 
villages that on paper was khas land. However, it is a sad commentary on the state of affairs that 
the government was not in actual possession of the land, and had to design housing projects that 
fitted that deficiency. The Project included multiple components that included awareness 
building about health and nutrition, training of village birth attendants, support to primary 
schools, help government’s agricultural department in demonstration and extension on improved 
farm and aquaculture practices, support to livestock vaccination and development of community-
                                                 
54 Bengali word for accreted (depositional) land. 
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based water management institutions. The CDSP was extended for a second phase for another 5 
years, from 1999 to 2004. In its second phase, it extended further south and east with two new 
sites added for empoldering55. The project also undertook a host of interventions in unprotected 
chars56 that were not yet ready for empoldering (CDSP, 2005). 
The experience of CDSP highlight several themes related to the framework for rural regional 
development that was laid out toward the end of Chapter Three. The settlement component 
succeeded in settling many genuine landless people in plots of at least an acre. The roads and 
drainage components also set the basis for human settlement for future. However, despite best 
efforts of the CDSP, significant amounts of land were captured by the townspeople (as described 
in Section 6.2). This reflects the relative helplessness of a project in the face of a corrupt state. It 
is perhaps possible for rural regional development to happen even in the face of a corrupt state. 
However, in the given context of high importance of land, the corrupt state perhaps undermined 
the long-term prospect of rural regional development by creating an unequal land ownership 
pattern in the southern parts of the rural region. 
6.10 Issues in Rural Regional Development for Southern Noakhali 
District 
The examination of the state in Bangladesh and the political economy of the rural region studied 
here allow us to deduce an answer to the question of prospects for rural regional development in 
the region. To do that we go back to several issues below.  
6.10.1 The Assets and Vulnerabilities Shaping Livelihoods 
The livelihood options of the households, as described above, can be summarized as follows: For 
most households, it is small-holder agriculture supported by one or more low-reward labor 
intensive non-farm livelihood options (rickshaw pulling, petty trading and similar occupations). 
Another strand is migration of one or more household members. Subsistence agriculture, i.e. 
producing for own consumption while staying independent of markets, has virtually disappeared. 
                                                 
55 South Hatiya (SA) area and Muhuri Accreted Area (MAA) area. 
56
 Among these were Char Torabali-Gangchil, Nijhum Dwip-Bandartila and Char Moradona. 
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Many still do not hire labor, but they are forced to run their small farms as an enterprise, where 
inputs must be purchased, and output must be enough to reproduce. 
With household welfare as the goal, the long list of issues to inform a rural regional development 
strategy must start with the ones pertaining to household livelihoods.  Such issues, as put 
together in the synoptic (though not analytic) Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, are the assets 
and vulnerabilities that shape the livelihoods outcomes for households. As the review of 
livelihoods pattern and their underlying determinants in this chapter reveal, other than “human 
capital” and “financial capital” most of the assets are in the domain of the community or larger 
geographic scales. 
The resource-poor households have very little human and financial capital. Interview of 
households show that they have their perception of “capitals” they are missing or inadequate in. 
Often the “capitals” that interviewees thought they lacked were the ones that the government can 
provide. Examples include physical infrastructure, law enforcement, and fairness in the conduct 
of the state apparatus (such as in disbursing low interest rate agricultural loans, upkeep of roads 
and drainage systems). Most interviewees see the level of their education or skills as a given, and 
do not perceive it as something they can change. Perhaps they know it is too late in their lives to 
address that. It is telling that households in poverty or near-poverty rarely identified education 
for their children as a priority. Perhaps education is too long term an objective, and they have 
more short term concerns. 
Some of the inadequacies of capitals as identified by the households are: 
(a) Water-logging in parts of all four sub-districts, perhaps most prominent around Noakhlai 
canal and the Maijdee and Kabirhat towns, 
(b) Lack of irrigation (deep tube well) throughout the region, 
(c) Disrepair of roads in the region, 
(d) In the newly accreted lands, the collusion between the state apparatus and the power elites in 
capturing land, and threat of violence, 
(e) River erosion in the south of Companyganj sub-district. 
Water logging is increasing in parts of the region because of two major reasons: (1) The 
Noakhali canal (approximately 18 miles), which was first excavated in 1660 can discharge very 
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little of the water it carries south to the bay. The area close to the bay has accreted and the canal 
does not have an outlay downstream. In addition, the bed of the canal has also risen through 
sedimentation. Dredging the canal will increase its capacity to hold water during the months of 
high rainfall (May-August), and provide water for irrigation afterward into the Kharip 2 season 
(August to November). In the eastern part of the region, during the years of heavy rain, the 
deluge overwhelms the silted Bamni and Chhoto Feni rivers and causes flooding. 
The region does not have any Ministry of Agriculture-administered deep tube-well irrigation. 
The only deep tube wells are installed by large private operators57 who do large-scale 
pisciculture. The lack of irrigation is most acute in the Subarnachar sub-district. As was observed 
during field visit, during the dry boro season, some small farmers and sharecroppers use small 
pitchers, often as small as 3 gallons in size, to carry water from a pond to irrigate land. It is hard 
work walking a few hundred feet to and from the pond for a few gallons of water. Others 
innovated to transport water from hand-powered tube well in their homestead via polythene 
pipes to the fields. Despite these valiant efforts, some 163 thousand acres remain fallow in the 
region for want of irrigation. This is complicated by the fact that in the southern parts of the 
region, sweet water cannot be found at depths shallower than 250 feet. 
The region has a high density of rural roads, a large portion of which is paved with tar macadam. 
From time to time they fall into disrepair. Small traders who transport their products such as fish, 
and vegetables to rural markets are most inconvenienced by the muddy and potholed roads. It 
adds to their cost and time of travel. In much of the southern areas, even the feeder roads (let 
alone village roads) are muddy during the rainy season. As most items the poor consume are 
transported from northern markets (including the staple rice), it puts a burden of higher price on 
them. 
Thanks to the work of the sensitization by the NGO Nijera Kori and a few others, the landless 
people are aware of their rights to any accreted land that rises from the sea. This community 
                                                 
57 The District Statistics 2013 published by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics list zero deep tube wells (DTWs)  in 
the table “4.13 Number of deep tube-well scheme 2010-11”. However, during field visit we came across 
privately installed DTWs. 
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mobilization has created what can be called “social capital”.  However, in other areas of the 
district, the “capital” is often truncated. 
As documented here the state is appropriated in the service of the powerful. This fact perhaps is 
the most serious impediment to the prosperity of the rural region. The sustainable livelihoods 
framework does not list a “government capital”, but having a supportive government is 
indispensable. Lack of a supportive state can produce significant vulnerabilities. In the case of 
water-logging and depletion of irrigation sources, it is the absent government “capital” that is 
compromising natural “capital”. In the case of the state being used as a tool for elite land grab, 
the absence of a fair government is compromising the natural and physical “capital” that is so 
vital for the households. 
Another failure of the political process was reflected in the discovery of “selling of votes” in a 
few high-poverty villages. The poor voters in this part of the region (southeast) accept money 
from candidates before local government and national polls. By accepting money, they abandon 
all their claims to the candidate, who can use his (all office-bearers to date are male) elected 
position to pursue personal goals without obligation to serve his constituents. This “selling of 
vote” and consequent failure of democratic political process stands in contrast with the 
communities in the south central and south western parts (i.e. Subarnachar upazila) of the region, 
where awareness of politics and collective action even against the powerful to preserve 
community interests is high. 
Localized in the southeastern part of the sub-district Companyganj, a few thousand households 
are losing their land and homes to erosion on the banks of rivers Chhoto Feni and Bamni. This 
erosion made hundreds of households destitute. 
As the description in this section demonstrates, household livelihoods can only partially be 
shaped by intervention at household level via human and financial capitals. This means that 
widely popular micro-credit can work only to a limited extent in the absence of other “capitals”. 
6.10.2 Local Enterprises and Value Chains 
Most commodity chains are short within the study area. For example, milk either gets to local 
consumption or is processed for sweets, butter or purified butter locally. In the northern parts, 
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high density of settlements means that there is scarcity of land for livestock rearing. The demand 
for milk is several times larger than the local production of milk, as evidenced by availability of 
pasteurized milk packets brought from other parts of Bangladesh and sold at groceries in the 
study area. The milk from large buffalo stocks in the southern charlands get sold to a dairy 
company that established a chilling vat less than a decade ago. During times of political agitation 
on the streets in the towns and highways to Dhaka City, they stop buying milk from milk 
producers (that include livestock owning households) because they cannot transport the milk to 
the processing center in Dhaka. During such days when the milk chilling facility does not buy, 
the local price of milk goes down. This is a story that gets repeated and generates news reports 
every time transport stops because of political violence. 
For agricultural produces, too, the segments of the value chains within the region are rather short. 
Because of advance output-tying loans from the large traders from cities, the growers are 
obligated to sell to the traders at a lower price. For the grower, it is an acceptable arrangement 
because it promises them security. In such transactions where the price is low, most of the value 
added is down the chain especially in wholesaling and retailing. In other words, the value-added 
is outside the study region. 
Artisanal activities such as pottery, mats, basket-weaving from indigenous plants have niche 
markets. Industrial products have gradually replaced artisanal products over the decades. A trip 
around rural market towns will reveal the extent of manufactured goods from cities and 
increasingly, abroad that meet local consumption. There have been attempts at boosting some of 
the local artisanal activities such as hogla58 (a type of reed) based mat, bio-degradable rope, and 
utensil making. However, with the rise of cheaper plastic, it has been an up-hill battle. Some of 
the unique artisanal activities are nearly extinct. For example, mostak59 plant that grew around 
the ubiquitous ponds used to be the raw material for making the famous cool mat, and utensils 
(such as strainers, colanders, and bowls). With new house construction, the habitats of the plant 
are decreasing. With the increased availability of plastic goods, households are letting go of the 
skills of past generations.  
                                                 
58 Scientific name: Typha angustata 
59 Scientific name: Schumannianthus dichotomus 
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6.10.3 Major Processes in the Economy 
Overall, there are several processes in the economy that have implication for the cornerstones of 
RRD identified in Chapter Three: 
(a) The economy has potential for growth.  However, the multiplier effect of the current 
economic activities is not captured locally, creating leakage. 
(b) Remittance from abroad is a key determinant of household welfare. Census data cannot give 
any hint that can quantify migration. Data of remittance disaggregated at sub-district level is 
not available from census sources. However, there is data from a special government survey 
on migration and remittance. Per this survey in 2013, less than a quarter of the remittance in 
Chittagong Division of which the rural region is a part is invested. Of such low investment, 
nearly three quarters are used in house construction, repair and improvement. Average 
investment of remittance receiving households in Chittagong Division was Tk. 74,401 ($960) 
in 2013 (BBS, 2014). 
(c) Field observation and interviews reveal that there are pockets of areas where from there is 
little international migration, and these are also the areas with higher levels of poverty. Once a 
household has money from abroad, moral hazard effects are apparent. As evidenced in the 
land value, and from the attitudes expressed in interviews, significant amounts of money go 
into purchase of land and construction of homesteads in addition to financing luxury 
consumption. 
However, some households, especially the ones with a perennial large pond and land were 
investing some remittance money in the cultivation of carps and prawn. Some of these same 
households found crop agriculture not remunerative enough, and gave their land to 
sharecroppers. The low-tech semi-intensive aquaculture practiced in Noakhali is less labor 
and supervision intensive than rice cultivation, and the per acre net returns is much higher 
than crops. This creates enough incentives for some remittance receiving households to invest 
in it. 
This phenomenon gives rise to the question of what other economic activities might 
encourage investment of some remittance in the local economy. Processing and 
manufacturing, because of internal economies of scale will tend to attract large investors. It 
will likely be a scale neutral activity that will offer such opportunity to remittance receiving 
households. At the current time, there are few that appear to be attractive to such households. 
(d) Despite teeming micro-processing and artisanal manufacturing such as mat-weaving by 
women in their spare time, there is little in the way of manufacturing. Industrial products, 
often from conglomerates, are replacing the last holds of artisanal products such as wood and 
rattan baskets, and pottery. The overwhelming numbers of jobs in retail and wholesale tells us 
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that the marketing and distribution of mostly outside goods (together with service such as 
repairs, hair-dressing, and restaurant) dominate the economic landscape. 
Perhaps the major concern for the region is ecological destruction. The water table is receding to 
further depths. Water logging was reported to be a major problem. Pollution of water in some 
parts is so much that many respondents reported water in the submerged crop fields causing skin 
irritation. Some of the sources of such pollution is siting of incompatible land uses next to each 
other without mitigating measures (poultry farm next to residences), inability to manage wastes 
in the face of growing densities, and increased use of insecticides and fertilizer. 
For many households with migrants, especially in the northern parts of the region, land is not as 
important as a source of livelihood any more. In fact, households with more land tend to have 
international migrants in the household. Consequently, conversion of agricultural land to 
residential and other uses is common. Judging from the aspirations of households interviewed, 
this trend is slated to continue if migrants can save up enough money. Land being a scarce 
resource, encroachment on to ecologically sensitive public lands such as canal is common. The 
state has been incapable of preventing such destruction of the environment. 
In the national and local economy, even though corporate financial reporting is less than robust, 
a cursory look at products at stores, and product advertizements reveal that corporations are 
diversifying. Conglomerates will continue to capture larger segments of the markets. Will it 
trickle down as prosperity via jobs created in marketing network and in retail? Perhaps yes. It 
remains to be seen if such jobs will be paying a decent enough salary. 
6.11 Conclusion: Southern Noakhali and the Local and Global 
Processes of Policy Relevance 
The major processes in study area are summarized in a descriptive and synoptic way in Figure 
27. It is hard to establish cause-and-effect relationship among the processes. However, a synopsis 
offers interesting insights that are relevant to rural regional planning. The region is integrated 
with the world economy as an exporter of labor for low-paying jobs. It’s integration to global 
commodity chains is negligible. The level of welfare is perhaps most directly tied with the (de 
facto) policies of the central government of Bangladesh. As the governance currently stands, the 
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region is in effect completely dependent on the state for public finance. Apart from some 
community-based political action, the local politics virtually revolve around the national politics. 
Amid all these the region’s environment and infrastructure are becoming increasingly fragile. 
This in turn is threatening the ability to achieve much of the three cornerstones of RRD (Figure 
6) for southern Noakhali. 
 
Figure 28 A synoptic view of the major processes of policy relevance in southern Noakhali 
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Considering such economic, political, and social reality, what can be done for rural regional 
development? We take up the question, and return to the general question set out in the 
beginning of this dissertation in the next chapter. 
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Chapter Seven: The Prospects for Rural Regions within 
Changing Economic Structure, and a Framework for 
Rural Regional Development 
7.1 Introduction 
Is it possible to create an opportunity structure for all households in a rural region to earn an 
adequate livelihood while ensuring that it is sustained? Is rural regional development, in the 
sense defined in Section 3.6, a realistic policy goal given the global, national, and local context 
outlined here? If yes, what would a rural regional development policy framework look like? The 
overarching goals of this dissertation were to (a) identify the markers of rural regional 
development and (b) offer a plausible outline of planning (in the broader sense of the word) to 
achieve rural regional development. A survey of literature on globalization, history and political 
economy of agrarian transition, rural transformation, and development experience helped 
identify the markers of development (Section 3.6.2). Such survey also led to a framework to 
locate rural regional development in the context of the global and national forces, as well as to 
relate household welfare to RRD. In this chapter, we discuss the nature of planning (in the 
broadest sense of the term) for rural regional development in the context of the concrete case of 
the southern contiguous part of Noakhali district in Bangladesh. In the process, a few 
generalizable guidelines for RRD emerges. 
The study of southern Noakhali makes it possible to both pin down some of the cornerstones of 
rural regional planning as well as to speculate some paths forward. In advancing an outline for 
rural regional planning, one starting point would be to examine what facilitates and constrains 
household livelihoods and local firms’ profitability/income.  
The model of RRD developed from literature review in Section 3.6 integrates both household 
level variables and the factors at the community, rural regional, national and global levels. The 
framework identified household level characteristics such as “capitals and vulnerabilities” (as in 
the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework), the characteristics of the regional political economy 
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and geography, and the national and global policies and forces all having a role in poverty 
alleviation, and regional prosperity. 
Considering southern Noakhali, what are the context specific insights that emerge? As discussed 
in the previous chapter, southern Noakhali, as a rural region did not experience much RRD. In 
fact, some of the markers of rural regional development, such as retention of multiplier of local 
economic activities, are not visible to any considerable extent. Most of the household income 
comes from outside the economy that requires substantial emigration from the region, with all its 
attendant adverse impacts on families and community social life. There are significant leakages 
in some of the value chains such as soybean and fish. Some of the precarity of many households 
is purely from lack of “capitals” such as skills or cash. Elite capture of land in the southern parts 
of the study area creates a condition of low income for many households even though there is 
considerable production in the economy. Amid all these, the towns perform very little in 
productive organization of the rural region and are restricted to being places for consumption of 
services and goods. As the literature survey suggests, such (what we argue to be) undesirable 
economic, social, and spatial orientation of rural regions is more the norm than exception in 
contemporary Bangladesh as well as the world. The instances of regional prosperity in an 
agrarian society is rather few and far between. Given the preceding description, southern 
Noakhali as a case of mixed success can still offer insights to illuminate a policy and planning 
framework. In the following sections, we identify the insights that transpire from the case of 
southern Noakhali. 
7.3 Immediate Needs of the Households and Firms 
One way of looking at planning is its role in increasing “capitals”. Based on the study of 
households as well as the rural region of southern Noakhali, a generalized description of the 
“capitals” important to households and firms of different types emerge. Table 13 lists some of 
the capitals needed and speculates how they might be effected. 
Much of the table is self-explanatory. However, some of the “capitals” in the table need to be 
repeated for extra emphasis. The road to income comes from a combination of (i) jobs, (ii) 
operating an enterprise, and (iii) entitlements granted by the state/society or charity. For each of 
these routes, it becomes clear that the needs of the households are subject to factors that often lie 
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beyond the household, and even the geographic scope of a rural region. In the interest of saving 
space, no ethnographic history of individuals was included in the previous chapter60. It is obvious 
from all such histories recorded during the field observation that people are highly 
entrepreneurial within their constraints. However, entrepreneurship and hard work are not 
enough to help many of them rise above precarity and vulnerability.  
 
 
                                                 
60 Please refer to Momen (2012b) for ethnographic descriptions of two males. Both reveal a remarkable degree of 
desire and hard work to take advantage of different opportunities in different seasons. 
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Table 12 The specific nature of "Capitals" required for the poor 
 “Capital” and its 
current state 
Possible sources of the 
“capital” 
How to bring it out Who will do it Conditions to be fulfilled for a 
poverty reducing role 
H
u
m
an
 c
ap
it
al
 
 
Low institutional 
education 
 
Educational institutes 
(elementary, middle, and 
high schools) 
Investment in education 
(not just quantity, but 
also quality) 
Government 
NGO schools such as BRAC 
and DANIDA’s schools have 
succeeded 
Obtaining education should not 
stand in the way of household 
income, as children are expected 
to make an income. 
Lack of skills in 
trades that take 
advantage of local 
agro-ecological 
resources 
Skills training such as 
the one in provided in 
GNAEP (prawn post-
larvae) 
Skills training (which is 
often offered as a 
component of value 
chain approach) 
Government or the NGOs 
with experience of 
conducting such programs 
In conjunction with other 
assistance such as financial help, 
information, “match-making” 
with businesses upstream and 
downstream. 
F
in
an
ci
al
 C
ap
it
al
 
In
co
m
e 
Jo
b
 
Ag labor is one option 
as a source of job, and 
ag wage is rising 
Farms (both large ones and 
the medium farmers) must 
employ 
At present wage level, the annual 
income is still not enough to 
provide for the basic needs 
because jobs are available during 
small windows (planting and 
harvesting seasons) 
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Manufacturing, 
processing, and service 
firms. 
Entrepreneurs facilitated by appropriate law, 
source of finance, and 
infrastructure 
Local retailing and 
services resulting from 
increased consumption  
Private parties, mostly as 
small and medium 
enterprises 
Consumer demand stays high, and 
economies of scale in retail does 
not obliterate small firms and 
stores 
New processing and 
manufacturing 
Tends to be medium- to 
large-scale that needs large 
sums of money hence large 
capitalists 
when land is available, and wage 
is high enough 
Jobs in another district 
or internationally 
Migrant support from 
governments and NGOs 
Current uncertainty of outcome 
(e.g. swindling) need to be 
removed 
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O
w
n
in
g
 a
 b
u
si
n
es
s 
For the poor, the 
options are 
microenterprises such as 
road-side vending, 
shrimp post-larvae 
production 
Households, financed and 
facilitated by government or 
NGOs 
Continued availability of 
microcredit 
Micro-enterprises in certain 
sectors such as vegetable and 
fruit, and fish selling is crowding 
the market out. 
Independent labor such 
as pulling a rickshaw, 
tricycle van. 
Individuals as well as owners 
of transport who rent out 
Good roads, as well as fair reward 
for the labor 
Entitle payments to 
the extremely 
vulnerable 
Government Major changes in the 
government priorities, 
and availability of 
funding 
Government The bureaucracy has to reach the 
deserving individuals 
Loans Governments, banks, 
micro-finance 
institutions 
Allocation of funds Governments/MFIs At the right interest rates, at the 
right times, and without any 
exploitative terms 
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N
at
u
ra
l 
ca
p
it
al
 
Land (access to land) 
Currently large 
number of functional 
landless 
 
Government allocation 
from government land 
Confiscatory land reform 
is untenable given the 
political climate 
Changing institutions 
such as sharecropping 
With road and 
electricity more land 
can be brought to use, 
specially the accreted 
land that government 
owns (even though mis-
appropriated in many 
areas 
Rights movements by NGOs 
at different political scales. 
Government’s ability to fight 
against or work around elite 
interests. 
Increased water-
logging 
 Drainage, both via 
engineering works and 
land use enforcements 
Government or (at least 
theoretically) the village 
communities 
Evicting encroachers in some 
places will also test the mettle of 
the state (which is strong but 
colonized by the elite) 
Land and water 
degradation from 
fertilizer and 
insecticide use 
Averting further 
degradation will require 
new ag. technology and 
practice  
Innovations or 
adaptation of current 
practices through both 
research and extension 
Government, communities, 
NGOs 
Environmental preservation 
should not be costly to the poor 
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pollution from 
industries such as 
poultry 
Preventing effluent to 
escape from farms 
Creating incentives for 
the farmers 
Environmental regulations, 
awareness building 
Asymmetric power relations (esp. 
when an absentee farm owner has 
no stake in the quality of 
environment) to be removed 
Conversion of 
agricultural and open 
land to settlements 
design of rural housing 
to change to a more 
compact form 
Some working models 
to show new more 
compact design, and its 
financing 
Government 
Private builders, with 
government subsidy if 
necessary 
The new design does not have to 
be high-rise. Rather, low-rise 
designs already built elsewhere in 
the world might provide a model. 
P
h
y
si
ca
l 
Road infrastructure Construction or 
upgrading or 
maintenance of roads 
- Government, in some cases, 
local communities too 
significant investment required 
Land, waterbody and 
other means of 
production such as a 
boat,  
Possibly some tenancy 
reform 
Alternative access to 
land 
As a thorny political 
issue, hard to 
accomplish in the 
present climate 
The government The social institutions such as 
dadon, usurious lending, and 
sharecropping  
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Electricity Electrification  Government for electricity  
Solar power by both 
government and NGOs or 
businesses 
Cost needs to stay low and 
availability in times of need such 
as irrigation season guaranteed 
S
o
ci
al
 c
ap
it
al
 
as the most vaguely 
definable “capital”, 
it is hard be specific 
with this. 
Households of 
different 
characteristics will 
need different 
relationships and 
associations 
With human capital 
social capital also 
increases 
 
 
Community 
mobilization centered 
on rights 
Government, NGOs There is potential for power 
struggle. 
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The analysis of household capitals unmistakably encourages rural regions as the locus of 
planning as described in the following section. In other words, the macro-structure subsumes the 
micro-characteristics of individuals and households, and one of the central tasks of rural regional 
planning is to bring about a structure that is conducive to enhancing household capitals. 
7.4 The “Capitals” and the Geographic Scale for Policy  
Many of the “capitals” of the households such as finance, education, and skills are attributes of a 
household or an individual. But providing them as policy intervention will require interventions 
at immediate community or at regional levels. The quality of education, especially the 
availability of schools and teaching staff is poor in some parts of the study area even by the 
relatively lower standards of rural Bangladesh. During the interviews, poor households expressed 
no expectation of getting education for children. Perhaps their immediate needs are too 
demanding, and they see no upward mobility through education. Vocational skills that often help 
find jobs in factories both domestically and abroad are available via several vocational training 
(polytechnic) institutes in Maijdee. There is a science and technology university in the southern 
tip of the Sadar upazila. However, entry into the university is administered via a nationally 
conducted admission test, and most of the students are from other parts of the country. However, 
presence of a university offers the chance of university education for some households who 
would otherwise never even try it as the consideration of cost of boarding and travel in another 
part of the country can discourage them from doing so. 
The for-profit privately owned vocational training schools, in and around the Maijedee town 
currently produce emigrants to other parts of the country or even abroad. Locally based 
manufacturing and industries, if incentivized to be established, would create synergy with these 
already existing schools. 
Provision of good quality education is a community level and even regional level policy 
intervention. In the recent decades in Bangladesh, free education for girls and free food in 
exchange for school attendance have increased school enrollment and reduced dropping-out. 
However, the quality of education and its practical use in obtaining satisfactory literacy and in 
obtaining social mobility is questionable as numerous interviewees confirmed. Without schools 
providing the literacy and some knowledge of civics, much of civic engagement for common 
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causes such as landless households asserting their rights to government land can only happen 
thorough community mobilization with external help. This civic engagement happened in the 
part of the region where accretion happened (Subarnachar upazila). We surmise that two factors 
unique to the accreted areas contributed to the success of mobilization: (a) the threat of the elite 
capturing land that the community has legal right to, and (b) the homogeneity of interests among 
households. However, can community mobilization happen in other areas where there is no large 
definable threat such as the presence of a land grabber? There are examples of communities 
coming together for repair and maintenance of community infrastructure such a bamboo made 
foot bridge across a canal, or repair of a small section of road with voluntary labor. The 
challenge would be to bring such transient community organizations into a structure where they 
function as a unit of governance. 
In the southeast part of the region, there are communities of high-poverty villages, where voters 
“sell their votes” (Section 6.7). Amid such miscarriage of democracy, the role of the (local) 
government as a player is severely undermined. The role of communities to lobby for their own 
good is compromised too.  
The physical and natural “capitals” are more evidently in the domain of community, region, and 
even national levels. The road network within the study area showed needs for expansion, repair 
and improvement. The dilapidated and muddy state of feeder roads came up repeatedly in the 
interviews as a grievance. The rural feeder road system that have fallen into disrepair or are 
earthen increases cost of living for all households, especially the ones in poor homestead 
clusters. These communities pay higher in the rainy season for the grocery that are transported on 
these virtually unpliable muddy roads from the larger markets. Uneven surface on feeder roads 
also make rickshaw or bicycle pulling harder, laborious and time-consuming. These hardships 
fall particularly on the poor households. On these findings in field observation and interviews, 
there is reason to believe that feeder road improvement is pro-poor. 
Even widening an existing set of feeder roads between Sonapur and Basurhat to trunk roads will 
likely benefit the poor. The Sonapur-Bashurhat road (which will shorten distance to Dhaka-
Chittagong highway) if widened into a trunk road will help marketing of produces (such as 
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vegetables, and fish) from the area around Sonapur and to the south of Sonapur to higher paying 
markets to the east including the port city of Chittagong. 
The uninterrupted supply of electricity is another regional infrastructure that can help the rural 
region. The southern parts of the study region are not part of electricity grid. Electricity in 
general increases productivity. It will, among others, allow irrigation with the use of deep 
tubewell, bring large areas of currently unirrigated land to irrigation and make cultivation more 
intensive. Since much of the land is owned or sharecropped by small farmers, the benefits will 
likely be pro-poor. However, one caveat remains from experience in other parts of Bangladesh 
where government subsidized irrigation pumps were often offered to large farmers for operation 
and maintenance, and they tended to charge small farmers more than the stipulated amount of 
money. It is however likely that because of the pre-existing community building exercise by the 
NGO Nijera Kori, the chances of elite capture of such government run deep tube wells will be 
lower in southern parts of the region than any other part of the country. 
Caution, in light of literature, has to be sounded too about the possibility of road and electricity 
re-orienting the entire land-abundant southern part of region as the site of production of large 
capitalists. Will such roads and electricity create a situation where the regional resources and 
profits will be drained “out of the local economy61? One short answer is that none of the value 
chains discussed here point to any possible takeover by the downstream actors outside the rural 
region. But again, complete re-orientation of economy is possible. What is certain is that none of 
the outcomes should be seen as inevitable. The choice of planning intervention will determine 
the socio-economic life in the region. Building just a trunk road and supply of electricity will 
simply play into the hands of large capitalists, who can use the geographic space to create 
industrial-scale value-added and siphon the profits out of the region. However, when coupled 
with other planning interventions such as support for small and medium industries, community 
mobilization, feeder road improvement and similar planning interventions, it is possible that 
“backwash” in the form of resource capture by outside interests can be prevented. 
                                                 
61 A process described as “backwash effect”, made famous by Myrdal (1957). 
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In summary, many of the infrastructure that impacts households and firms in the study region are 
at the level of communities and the region. This points to a need for regionwide planning into the 
focus. The planning of these “capitals”, such as road and waterway network, electricity, and rural 
markets needs to have a synoptic view of the region and beyond. 
7.5 A Note on Delineation of Regions 
Delineation of a region is often an exercise fraught with an element of arbitrariness. In the case 
of delineating the study area for this study, two nearby towns, Maijdee and Bashurhat and the 
contiguous area surrounding them turned out to be the study area. For the sake of being 
coterminous with statistical aggregation units, and to conform to the administrative boundaries, 
four sub-districts were chosen. On the east and south, there are some natural boundaries. In the 
south, there is the Bay of Bengal, and on the east, is the Chhoto Feni River. However, on the 
west is the district boundary of Noakhali with the Laxmipur district, and in the north, the 
northern boundaries of the Noakhali Sadar, Kabirhat, and Companyganj sub-districts define the 
boundary of the study region. Five miles north of the northern boundary of the study area lies the 
Chowmuhani town, that meets some of the needs for urban function of the people in the northern 
parts. However, this study is not focused on any basic and non-basic industry analysis where a 
rigidly defined geographical unit is taken as an absolute, and in- and out-flow of money across 
the border is analyzed as a way of understanding the economy. In such an analysis, often called 
base analysis, where a boundary is drawn influences the results (i.e. ratio of basic to non-basic 
activities) of the analysis. Such sensitivity to demarcation of boundary demands how a region is 
determined to be an exercise in precision. 
However, for the purposes of this exploration into the plausibility of rural regional planning in 
Bangladesh, boundary has a much less implication, if any at all. 
7.6 The Importance of Community 
Notwithstanding the difficulty in how it can be defined, communities proved to be a building 
block for RRD. In the analysis of southern Noakhali, it becomes evident in at least two different 
ways: 
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(a) Using region as the unit of analysis in certain analyses misses some of the variable important 
for the well-being of the population, specially the poor. For example, the capture of land in the 
southern areas by elites from the north (specially from Maijdee town) will not be reflected in 
an economic base analysis, because the resultant flow of income to Maijdee is deemed intra-
regional, and hence will not register as a leakage. Also, missed will be the rent that the 
northerners collect from their land in the rural markets in the high-poverty villages (e.g. at 
Char Elahi market described earlier) in the south. The use of communities as a unit of analysis 
allows highlighting such sources of poverty and precariousness. 
(b) The success of poor communities in getting access to government land is a glowing example 
of the kind of success that community mobilization can bring. Communities appearing as a 
political force in the political economy of the rural region offers a promising way to remove 
some of the causes of poverty that the social institutions in collusion with an approving state 
allow to set in. Is it possible to mobilize communities in other parts of the rural region? As 
mentioned, the southeast (i.e. in the southern parts of Companyganj upazila) the poor villagers 
have no organization, and sell their votes at the time of elections. The goals and manner of 
community mobilization is an area of study that should draw research interest. From sporadic 
reports in newspapers, it seems that communities around Bangladesh volunteer in repair of 
village roads and foot bridges across canals and rivers. However, when the extent of work is 
too big and too expensive (such as excavating an 80 feet wide canal like the Noakhali canal), 
voluntary resources within the community is not enough. There does not appear to be any 
theory of community mobilization in such agrarian contexts. Rural regional development can 
perhaps benefit from such theorization. 
 
Communities are not homogeneous in some parts. A middle or even a large farmer and 
functionally landless person were found to reside in the same homestead cluster. Despite 
being neighbors, the poor borrow from the richer neighbors on usurious terms. Their 
economic interests vary. However, territory-based cohesion rather than class-based cohesion 
rules. Often, lobbying for community infrastructure in their locality give households of 
different social power a common purpose to mobilize for. The poor rarely mobilize to uproot 
the social institutions that produce their precarity. 
7.7 The Role of Towns, Rural Market Centers, and Regional Spatial 
Planning 
As identified in Chapter Six, the municipalities of Maijdee, Bashurhat, and Kabirhat in the study 
area, and the large trading and industrial town of Chowmuhani 5 miles to the north of the study 
area act as a wholesale market place for some of the commodity chains such as soybean, rice and 
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fishes. Other than these, the towns are mostly places of consumption and a node for downstream 
distribution in the retail marketing chain. They also are places of consumption in the sense that 
schools, restaurants, hospitals, and other services comprise a significant portion of their 
economy. Their connection with the hinterland, therefore is mostly through consumption. 
The manufacturing activities in these towns and elsewhere in the study region are not based on 
local produces. For example, the biggest manufacturing facilities such as the Delta Jute mills (in 
Chowmuhani municipality) exists even though the district of Noakhali (not just the study area) 
does not produce any jute (District statistics 2011). One large automatic flour mill in the Sonapur 
Industrial Estate and another in southern Maijdee buy imported wheat (from as far as Canada via 
the Chittagong port). A coarse soap factory located in the same industrial estate imports lard 
from Dhaka City. Very few of the local products are used as inputs in the medium to large 
manufacturing units in and around the study area. However, outputs of these industries are sold 
in local markets as well national markets. For example, the flour from the mills sells to the ever-
growing number of restaurants in the district. 
Looking at the case of southern Noakhali, what would be the role of towns if rural regional 
development is to happen? Currently, the towns are significantly detached from the hinterland’s 
agriculture. Much of agricultural marketing by-passes the towns. Many of the traditional urban 
functions such as banking and other financial services are less important now because of the 
advent of mobile-banking, and increased reach of remittance service providers such as the 
Western Union. It is no wonder that some of the small towns in Bangladesh for the first time in 
their history lost population during an inter-censal period (2001-2011)62. In contrast with the 
regions in Bangladesh that lost urban population, the study region and the areas surrounding it 
receives significant amounts of remittance. Hence, the consumption and service based economy 
of Maijdee and other towns and even the larger rural markets will perhaps continue to thrive. 
However, unless some planning intervention complements and creates synergy with such 
municipal growth, it will likely not create much of an interconnected set of economic activities in 
                                                 
62 From a cursory look of the census data. No comprehensive analysis of all 320 municipalities plus the city 
corporations was done. 
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the region. In other words, the types of retail and services in Maijdee and other towns will have 
nominal linkages with the regional economy. 
The role of the towns is intertwined with the role of the rural markets. As trading places, rural 
market centers play a central role in the rural economy. Many of the grievances expressed by the 
small and medium farmers and people of other means of livelihoods were about the rural market 
centers. Some of the grievances were about the physical condition of the markets such as lack of 
pavement. In the markets where there is no or inadequate paved surface, the market becomes 
muddy in the rainy season making the simple act of selling, say, a few kilograms of fish in the 
rural market a difficult task. More than the physical obstacle for small sellers, the major 
constraint for poor occasional sellers is the high amount of money they are asked to pay as toll 
by the leasees of the market places. Government-owned rural markets in Bangladesh are leased 
out to private parties who can collect money from market users. For the poor seller, having 
access to a market place without having to pay a high fee is more valuable than many expensive 
investments that can be conjured up. 
When the roads to the local market is muddy, it makes it time consuming and costly for people to 
sell there. Despite such troubles, some of the rural market centers, especially the ones with paved 
trading spaces and roads continue to have some processing and manufacturing. For example, 
furniture making and tailoring, appeared to be a ubiquitous feature of the larger markets. Rural 
market centers, confirmed by all interviewees, are increasing in the number of shops and in terms 
of availability of types of goods and services. 
What will be the role for towns and the rural markets in bringing about rural regional 
development? It looks increasingly likely that “towns and a hinterland dependent on it for central 
functions” model of spatial structure will not take place as more traditional urban functions are 
spatially defused (e.g. financial services done through cell phones). With some of the processing 
activities happening in rural areas (whenever electricity is available), it is likely that the new 
landscape is heading toward one of scattered mixed land use. Such land use will have 
environmental consequences, if their siting is not coordinated and controlled. 
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7.8 Planning for Synergistic Rural Regional Development: The Do-
Nothing Scenario 
In the following sections, we consider what will planning look like for rural regional 
development. Planning here is used in a broad sense, which means that it is not seen as a 
government activity alone. The actions of multiple actors such as different units of the 
government, and different sizes and types of civil society organizations are considered here. 
However, before speculating about the shape of planning, it would be worthwhile to speculate a 
scenario in the absence of any additional intervention on the part of all levels of government and 
civil society organizations. 
The need for rural regional planning and the nature of it can best be understood when contrasted 
against such a “do-nothing” scenario. There is already some poverty alleviation and development 
work being carried in the region, most notably the work of the government ministries, and the 
Char Development and Settlement Project (CDSP)63. Nationally there are processes within 
advancing capitalism (such as appearance of conglomerates) that have set in. In such a setting, 
“do-nothing” would mean “doing-nothing-NEW”. 
The current development effort from the state can be describes as: (a) Scattered road construction 
and infrequent and belated maintenance, (b) Micro-loans from NGOs, (c) Some health services, 
and (d) some agricultural and piscicultural extension work including recent attempts at low-tech 
mechanization such as promotion of power tiller, and hand thrasher, and (e) support for small 
and medium enterprises. 
The major processes underway are: 
(a) conversion of agricultural land to meet the increasing needs of construction of residences, 
non-crop agriculture, manufacturing and businesses, and 
(b) increasing market share of the conglomerates, albeit from a low base. There is abundance of 
capital in the hands of the growing conglomerates in the country. They are constrained by land 
and infrastructure in their expansion of manufacturing. 
                                                 
63 Described in Section 6.9.2. 
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With the growing strength of the capitalist class, will capital chase lumpen64 geography such as 
Southern Noakhali? The answer, we speculate, lies in the technology used in manufacturing and 
all sectors of agriculture. As machines for large-scale production become more affordable for the 
capitalists, such manufacturing and processing becomes economic and preferred in almost every 
manufacturing sector. Large-scale manufacturing requires large tracts of land. In Bangladesh, 
large tracts of land near Dhaka and Chittagong are rarely available. In fact, lack of land is cited 
as one of the reasons why large (in the hundreds of millions of US$) funding commitments from 
foreign corporations are not happening. However, at lower levels of economic undertaking such 
as a few hundreds of thousands of US$, there is already a tendency for such investments to come 
in. For example, automatic rice mills are being set up replacing smaller manual or semi-
automatic rice mills. Other examples include fish and poultry feed factories, large hatcheries, and 
poultry farms sited on several acres of land. The only garments factory in the region was 
established because the owner’s ancestral home is in the area (south of Sonapur), and he is said 
to have political ambitions that can be furthered by job creation in the area. Investments larger 
than these are unlikely to come at present level of road and electricity infrastructure. 
Continuation of this above scenario would only mean continued dependence on out-migration, 
both domestic and international. The international migration is contingent upon the world 
economy being able to support it. If the major labor-importing countries occasionally are unable 
to hire labor from these areas (or layoff workers), as was the case during the crisis in Saudi 
Arabia in 2010, there will be significant economic stress for the households in the region. The 
do-nothing-new will also see an increase in the market share of conglomerates both in the 
country and the study region. The continuation of status quo will also mean continued ecological 
destruction, because of increased conversion of land and construction in the absence of any land 
use control in the rural areas65. 
                                                 
64 Not used in the strict sense in which Walker (1978) used it. He used lumpen geography as territories that capital 
can use to keep the existing areas of manufacturing cheap. Here lumpen geography is used as a reserve area to 
expand to. 
65 There is no rural land use control law in Bangladesh. There is one being considered currently. 
200 
 
It is likely that the do-nothing-new approach will not improve the opportunity structure for all 
the households in the rural region. 
7.9 The Three Cornerstones of RRD and Planning 
Even though the field research provided important insights into the ecology, economy, and 
society in the region, how the three cornerstones of RRD identified in Section 3.6.2 can be 
achieved is still an exercise in educated guess, approached through informed speculation.  
7.9.1 Increasing Regional Economic Activity and Productivity 
While not a sufficient criterion, increasing economic productivity in the study region will help 
create an improved opportunity structure for the households in the study area. How can a rural 
region in advanced stages of agrarian transition increase productivity in an age of globalization, 
and within the kind of a state such as Bangladesh? 
There does not appear to be any theory of what new agri-based or other products can be 
introduced. There are stories of one single crop transforming an entire region such as grapes in 
the Chilean region of Limari (Gwynne & Ortiz, 1997). However, introduction of any product, 
agricultural or non-agricultural, require a careful analysis of both the potentials and pitfalls. For 
example, in the case of Limari region, the opportunity to export grapes during North American 
off-season provided an opportunity for fast growth of grape production. However, such growth 
was also aided by large corporations and improvement of irrigation systems. Relevant to the 
third cornerstone of RRD discussed below, the reformed grape sector also forced small peasants 
to sell their lands and become wage labor in large vineyards or in the city. 
In the case of southern Noakhali region some of the new activities that appears to have potential 
are fresh water prawn, mostak plant whose bark is used to weave cool mat, hogla plant whose 
stem can be the fiber to weave coarse mats, and livestock rearing in the abundant open newly 
accreted land. However, the production of rice itself can be raised with irrigation in certain parts 
of the region, especially if irrigation and drainage can be improved. If the price of rice can be 
kept predictable (by keeping the import policy somewhat predictable), rice itself can show higher 
monetary value of production. 
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All these products can have comparative advantage because these products have suitable bio-
physical and meteorological conditions in the region. However, cost (which is the basis of 
opportunity cost used in the analysis of comparative advantage) also depends on how production 
is organized. Planning, again in the broadest sense, is crucial to creating such comparative 
advantage. Large scale plantation mode of production brings within-firm economies of scale. 
However, they also adversely impact the laborers by creating a monopsony in the labor market. 
At the level of production of rice and most fishes, practitioners in the study area mentioned that 
there is very little difference in the production cost between producing on a small piece of land 
or pond and on a large tract of land or water body. This is even more so in the case of some 
artisanal manufacturing and processing such as mat-making using hogla or mostak plants. Much 
of the economies of scale come after production, i.e. in processing and marketing. Hence, there is 
room for facilitation of post-production processing, especially for fishes and prawn that can be 
sold to foreign markets. The safety and hygiene standards in the North American and European 
markets require large plants that need large investments. It is hard to imagine if such large plants 
can be financed and managed as part of a development project, where profits and value-added 
can be shared among the producers in a cooperative arrangement. Therefore, private ownership 
of large fish and prawn processing plants is the more likely scenario.  
7.9.2 Retention of Multiplier Effects 
This is perhaps the most important of all factors in RRD. An analysis of value chain provides an 
understanding of how leakages happen. In southern Noakhali, for some agricultural product 
chains such as soybean, the output-tying loans66 forces the producers to sell at a lower price to 
wholesalers than they otherwise would have commanded. The higher price of the beans at the 
fish and poultry feed factories in urban areas outside the rural region represents missed value-
added in the rural region. Vegetables too, because of their perishable nature, showed big 
difference between price at farmgate and urban retail markets. 
However, a large source of leakage is the elite capture of the resources. As mentioned earlier, 
almost all the large (dozens of acres to hundreds of acres) aquaculture projects are owned by 
                                                 
66 Dadan in Bangla. See Glossary. 
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people from the towns in the region. Their income from the lands in the study area represent 
leakage from the communities, even though technically it is not a leakage from the region. This 
represents the biggest barrier to retention of linkages in the community, if not the region. 
The source of such barrier is a state that has been captured by the elites. It perhaps needs 
repeated pointing out that the state is not weak or soft. With its bureaucracy and law enforcement 
abilities, the state has great control over its territory, unlike fifty years ago when Myrdal used his 
famous characterization of “soft state”. In the face of such captured state, the planning options 
might seem to include only the radical ones. However, facilitation of peasant and citizen 
movements have shown success elsewhere in the world. How to facilitate such movements and 
how they can take place is beyond the information collected in this study. 
7.9.3 More Equitable Access to Resources for All 
With the lack of availability of land because of dense nature of settlements, gains from land or 
tenancy reform will be minimal in the northern parts of the region. Thus, land reform does not 
carry the same crucial importance it did in different places and times. There is not enough land 
for the people who are willing to cultivate through leasing the land or as sharecroppers. Noakhali 
has a several centuries old tradition of migration out of the area, which enabled the high density 
that land alone could not support. However, the volatility of employment in the Arab and North 
African countries, as tragically experienced in 2010, is a reminder that uncertainty is real for 
many households. 
Given the nature of the Bangladeshi state, it is hard to imagine how the illegally grabbed lands in 
the south can be brought back to the ownership of the government. However, given the 
importance of non-farm opportunities, it is possible to imagine policy and program support for 
activities that do not need land as much. What will work and how it will work in creation of such 
economic activity tend to not have a theory. For example, in the Philippines, the famous 
Marikina shoe cluster helped many small shoe making factories, and firms upstream and 
downstream in the commodity chain to have access to increased incomes. However, they lost to 
the Chinese manufacturers only a decade later. In development practice, targeted interventions 
such as helping functionally landless households raise post-larvae (as GNAEP project did in 
Noakhali) can by-pass the dependence on land and at the same time avoid elite capture. 
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One aspect of commodity chain focused intervention that is rarely pointed out is that it is not 
often pro-poor (in the sense that it does not benefit the poor more than the non-poor). 
Commodity chain-wide support often brings more profit to the large traders who sell to a city or 
foreign market, and only a small income to the poor producers. However, commodity (or 
alternatively known as value) chain approach has become accepted as an expedient measure. The 
NGOs who help with marketing of artisanal crafts via coordinating with city-based businesses 
have accepted this as a way to help the poor. The study region will perhaps benefit from such 
arrangements as it will create linked sets of economic activities that will benefit the poor. 
7.10 Role of Governance and Form of Government 
What kind of governance will help achieve these cornerstones of RRD?  
Currently the smallest territorial unit where from decisions are made, and which is used as an 
administrative and budgetary unit is the sub-district (upazila). The union level, which is the 
lowest unit typically do not have any funding source to speak of, and only some small programs 
are implemented through them. Adjacent sub-districts rarely cooperate. In fact, they are often in 
competition with each other. Unless central government is taking up a project, in which it will 
have a project headquarters independent of local governments, neighboring sub-districts rarely 
cooperate for any cross-border planning. As reported in the case of Indonesia (Firman, 2009), 
neighboring local governments can have no incentive to cooperate. On the contrary, they can 
have incentive to be hostile to each other, or at least be competitive with each other. 
Can a plan that spans several local government bodies (sub-districts in this case) be 
implemented? As noted earlier, rural regional development is hard to imagine without the 
government leading it. But questions about the nature of bureaucracy and governance remain. 
For example, as the building block in development practice is projects, can rural regional 
development for a region be accomplished as one? Even if set as a program (as opposed to a 
project), which provides a framework for the bureaucracy to take up time- and fund-specific 
projects, it in the end has an end date. Should rural regional development be an integral way of 
the way governance takes place, or can it be approached as a project? It is necessary to speculate 
on what a project titled “governance reform for RRD” might look like.  
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With the above questions and possibilities in mind, a few scenarios can be envisaged. 
7.10.1 Two Governance Scenarios 
Scenario 1: Government devolved to district level. 
The outlook for this option is not very promising in the case of Bangladesh. The current finance 
minister has been advocating district budgets for several years. His ministry published the 
necessary background papers. In 2012-13 he offered one district budget for a north central 
district (Tangail district) as a taste of how things might be. However, in later national budgets he 
did not include any budget for even a single district. This surrender of a prominent minister 
speaks volumes about the prospects of district being the center of governance in the near future. 
As mentioned in Chapter Five (section 5.4), strong local government at sub-district or district 
level threatens the de facto power the members of parliament enjoy. Within this status quo local 
government reform looks to be a distant possibility. 
Scenario 2: Centralized government 
What will be the look of the study area under devolved governance? The district level 
organization (un-elected) in Bangladesh currently has no power, at least not in actuality. As 
noted, given the hostility from the members of the parliament, devolution at the level of districts 
or even sub-districts is hard to imagine taking place within the current political culture of 
Bangladesh. 
In that case, as an expedient measure the district councils can be made the planning agency, but 
not the executing agency. The plan that they make becomes a guideline for all the agencies that 
coordinate activities in the realm of the tools identified in the following section. By keeping the 
executive powers and budget access in the hands of traditional power-holders (central ministries, 
MPs, and sub-district level bureaucracy), this expedient and pragmatic option increases the 
chances of its success. 
If the central government continues to have the power it holds, central ministries will continue to 
have the money and power. As we have seen, local level civil societies can be useful, but they 
will need extra-ordinary levels of support to carry out the tools required in rural regional 
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development. Such support is unlikely. Hence under the scenario of “centralized government”, 
the focus of rural regional development strategy would be to be able to coordinate sectoral 
projects at district level or sub-district level for complimentary and synergistic effect. 
7.10.2 Vertical Coordination of Multi-Scalar Planning 
Perhaps the most important governance issue in rural regional development is the issue of 
vertical coordination of planning (in the broader sense) at different geographic scales. The world-
famous NGO sector in Bangladesh has generally done a good job of making village communities 
aware of their rights, in addition to other development works. Village communities even when 
organized into cohesive associations cannot induce planning at the larger scales. As mentioned, 
there are no planning decision-making unit at the district level in Bangladesh. In the countries 
where there is strong (often elected) government at district level, such as Indonesia and Ghana, 
the district level planning is rarely informed by smaller units. Regional infrastructure is useful, 
but it can help little with poverty alleviation if not informed by community level organizations. 
Some striking examples of the need of coordination of multi-scalar planning can be found in the 
planning of physical infrastructure. Roads, bridges, and waterways often need a larger scale than 
sub-district to plan. In Bangladesh, the district office of the powerful Local Government 
Engineering Department (LGED) can help coordinate the infrastructure planning of the sub-
districts within its jurisdiction. However, if there is any planning necessary for cross-district 
coordination of planning and budgeting, it can get tricky. For example, between Subarnachar (in 
the study region) and Ramgati (in Luxmipur district) there is a bridge across a canal that was 
constructed in 2002. The bridge is now in a dilapidated condition (pictured below in Figure 29). 
However, despite its importance, it has been hard to bring two district committees to plan and 
find budget for the bridge. 
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Figure 29 Photograph of a dilapidated bridge between two districts (over Bhulua canal, 
between Noakhali and Luxmipur districts) do not have fund for repair from either one 
 
Source: Dhaka Tribune, Sept. 07, 2014 
There are other situations that are less striking, but require the same principle of vertical 
coordination of multi-scalar planning. 
7.11 A Toolkit for Rural Regional Planning 
Based on the picture of rural regional development that emerges from the case, we can perhaps 
identify some of the tools needed to bring about rural regional development. 
7.11.1 Community Mobilization 
Development of rural regions, as an attractive normative goal, prompted the “rural territorial 
development” movement in the Latin America, as well as this research. However, in the course 
of the research, it became evident that while synergy of infrastructure planning and governance 
can be achieved at the level of regions, much of the reality of rural regions is experienced in 
communities. Despite the heterogeneity of interests in communities such as villages, their 
organization and mobilization into contributors to the political and governance processes is 
important to achieving RRD and removal of poverty and precarity. 
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As the success of community-based organization in Greater Noakhali Aquacultural Extension 
Project (Demaine, 2009) and the work of Nijera Kori showed, when need based community 
organizations function well, they provide the conduit for other services such productive inputs 
such as fertilizer distribution. More importantly they also can be important vehicles for 
representation in the governance system. 
However, the households in a village are not homogeneous, or do not represent same interests. 
Within the same village there can be a majority of resource-poor households, with a minority of 
large farmers and power elites. Experience of community-based organizations amid such 
inequality has shown that territory- and community-based associations can get colonized by the 
power elite, with the Comilla farmers’ associations being one of the most prominent examples of 
such colonization (Khan, 1979).   
Despite this pitfall and inadequacy of theories in community mobilization, it remains an essential 
tool for rural regional development. Without enhancing associational life at the level of 
neighborhoods or other small communities, regional scale interventions will likely by-pass the 
disenfranchised sections (often the majority) of the society. 
7.11.2 Regional Infrastructure 
Physical infrastructure can be a tool to help achieve goals of rural regional development. Road is 
perhaps the most obvious component of the regional physical infrastructure. The anti-poor 
impacts of roads (specially trunk roads) are well-known. Large trunk roads can help outside 
interests in extracting resources from a resource rich area (i.e. forests with timbers, or mineral 
rich area). As mentioned in Chapter Three, indeed colonial interests in resource extraction 
prompted road-building between forests and ports around the colonies. Even in the absence of 
colonial powers, roads have served large urban interests or the national governments. 
However, if built judiciously, roads are vital for the overall quality of life, and reduction of cost 
of production, distribution, and consumption in the rural regions. In the context of a more 
egalitarian society, roads can only improve communities’ welfare. Much of this road 
construction and repair needs to be at the level of village roads (feeder roads). 
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There are routes that need to be widened and paved better considering the current needs. While 
developing a regional “thoroughfare plan” is not an objective here, it is obvious, and was pointed 
out by many residents that a wide road connecting Sonapur and Chittagong highway will be 
required. From the Subarnachar sub-district, traveling east to Dhaka-Chittagong highway is 
cumbersome, because segments of the current east-ward road connecting Sonapur and Basurhat 
is narrow, and because their alignments were defined by edges of rectangular agricultural plots, 
these feeder roads are full of bends. Figure 29 shows the route proposed for the road. 
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Figure 30 Possible routes for additional trunk roads 
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Another regional infrastructure is irrigation. Around the world irrigation has important impacts 
on agricultural productivity. Because of its crucial importance, irrigation has also been subject of 
elite capture everywhere. In Bangladesh, it has found expression in large landowners getting the 
government-sponsored community deep tube wells on their land. They also get to operate them 
and can charge small farmers stipulated rates. This privilege often allows them to charge more 
than the stipulated fees. 
Southern Noakhali is mostly occupied by owner occupied small holders. In addition to them 
there are many owners who also do sharecropping on other’s land. Noakhali district, despite the 
presence of land grabbers has the least inequality of land ownership in Bangladesh. Amid such 
situation, road-building, especially feeder roads, will likely not disadvantage the small farmers 
and share-croppers. 
7.11.3 Economic Cluster Formation 
Industrial cluster formation as a concept has received a prominent position in the discussion on 
territory-based approach to planning. As identified in Chapter Three (Section 3.4.12), the 
literature centers on ex-post analysis of a collection of success stories. Can the southern Noakhali 
enlighten the literature on cluster formation?  
As seen in the case of southern Noakhali, and in empirical studies around the world, two things 
stand in the way of beneficial cluster formation in the rural regions: 
(a) The part of the value chain that is in the rural region is very short. Often transporting 
local produces out of the rural region without even minimal processing (not even sorting) 
is the norm. 
(b) In other instances, the processes that lend themselves to significant economies of scale 
(such as rice milling), increasing capital in the hands of the few are creating conditions of 
monopsony. 
As identified in Section 3.6.2, such tendencies are known around the world (e.g. urban tobacco 
traders won’t buy dried tobacco from the rural producers, because the traders want to capture the 
value-added). The local apparatus of the state is also at the service of such powerholders. The 
fact that producers can collectively retain some of the value-added is an idea that will likely not 
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have many believers at this point. The literature of cluster, including clusters in the developing 
countries, is centered on manufacturing. However, indigenous clusters in agriculture or artisanal 
work are rarely studied. We can hypothesize that if they are small and scattered enough they can 
avoid elite capture. For example, there was short project to help create small enterprises around 
the hogla (reed) producing part of the region that would manufacture ropes, bowls of different 
sizes, and mats out of hogla. A development NGO was aiding with building a marketing channel. 
However, with advancing plastic goods, the hogla products could not hold on to the niche market 
it created briefly. 
Can there be a theory of “indigenous” clusters? While we leave it on the agenda for future 
research, certain hypothesis can be offered about what hinders formation of indigenous clusters. 
One obvious hindrance is when most of the value chain is owned by one party such as the large 
fish farm owners in our rural region. Another hindrance is when the forward and backward 
linkages are small, as in the case of carp and tilapia production (where fish feed and fish basket 
comprise most of the backward linkage). It would perhaps take some form of action research to 
find a theory of indigenous cluster that the review of the existing development project could not. 
7.11.4 Rural Environment and Land Use Planning 
With the low-income world struggling with the planning and management of their cities, rural 
land use planning is rarely emphasized. However, many areas officially labeled rural have 
densities higher than many urban areas. While urban areas are growing faster and the press 
surrounding the ubiquitous “the world is urban now” is drawing attention to urban growth and 
urban poverty, rural areas are seeing population growth too. Economic growth coupled with 
population growth is introducing new economic activities (such as non-crop agriculture, poultry, 
artisanal work, and even tourism) in rural areas that are changing land use around the 
countryside. With increasing population, and especially with remittance money, conversion of 
agricultural land to residences is rampant, making settlements denser. 
Many of such land use changes are harmful either by being polluting, or by upsetting natural 
drainage, or reducing the overall beauty and charm of the environment. This degradation of rural 
environment is a threat to the future health, and overall quality of life. In the parlance of the 
Sustainable Livelihoods Framework, this is an erosion of natural capital. 
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Bangladesh does not have any law that directly addresses rural land use zoning or land use 
conversion. Existing town planning laws apply to areas designated as urban. In the absence of 
such deterrent the rural landscape is becoming polluted (e.g. by brick kilns, poultry farms with 
waste and effluent released in open canals), overall productivity of soil is threatened, and other 
sources of economic loss such as water-logging is being introduced. There are laws to control the 
siting and method of operation of brick kilns and (timber) saw mills. The consensus is that they 
are too lax, and even the stipulated lax standards are not enforced. A recent (a decade old) trend 
has been to remove the fertile topsoil of agricultural plots and use the soil for brick-making 
(Appendix 04). 
It is hard to see how rural regions can develop and sustain it without some measure of preserving 
the land and environment. The experience of the Southern Noakhali (and other parts of 
Bangladesh and many parts of the world) calls for rural land use planning to be on the agenda. 
However, such planning needs to stay sensitive to social power, and not be a vehicle for further 
aiding of elite interests. The models of land use planning seen so far, such as land use structure 
plan, are often oblivious to power relations in society. Given poverty is a major focus of RRD, 
land use planning needs to be conscious of social powers to be an aide toward rural regional 
planning.  
7.12 Prospects for Rural Regional Development 
One commentator in 2005 speculated that there are vast areas of “valleys” (i.e. rural regions that 
can be contrasted with the “peaks” of New York and London) that have “little connection to the 
global economy and few immediate prospects” (Florida, 2005, p. 48). Looking at the inability of 
the big cities such as Lagos, Dhaka, Mumbai and Karachi to alleviate national poverty, we must 
ask, why do these vast areas of human settlements that hosted human communities for hundreds 
of years must be written off as having few immediate prospects? As Florida himself recognizes, 
raising these “valleys” without cutting down the “peaks” is the challenge of our time. 
Even if, perhaps faulty, economic analysis springing from a neoliberal ideological springboard 
claims these rural regions to be of few immediate prospects, should we resign to such finding? 
Rural regional development needs to be an active policy goal, set normatively, and a research 
agenda made to serve the normative goal. 
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However, formulating a theory for development practice has always been hard. For example, in 
the introductory article to a special volume of the journal Growth and Change, (Ward & Hite, 
1998) asks: “is it more correct to assume that rural development actually has a body of theory, 
but that the corpus of that theory consists of hundreds if not thousands of individualized, 
informal models residing one by one in the minds of some or other practitioner in rural 
development?” (p246). What their introductory and concluding papers to the volume point to is 
that rural development theory must accommodate for contexts. Frameworks for rural territorial 
development (as in Scheijtman & Berdegué, 2008) or a “model of sub-national regional 
development” (Jain, 2009, reproduced in Appendix 1) readily draw attention to the more than a 
dozen boxes and arrows that these models have. Such lack of parsimony evidently confirms that 
rural regional development involves many variables, and areas of action. 
This study, which combines a review of literature and the study of a case also identify that RRD 
requires understanding of a wide array of factors. Perhaps the most important is the fact that 
there is significant leakage from rural areas. This leakage results from an array of social and 
political institutions and policies.  Some of the main ones identified in this study such as elite 
capture of resources, inequitable agrarian institutions and practices, and a centralized 
government dominated by national elites need to be given more visibility, since contemporary 
rural development practices tend to ignore them. Policy-making needs to be informed by the 
awareness of some of the well-known facts that were confirmed in southern Noakhali: (a) Lack 
of equitable access or provision of productive assets perpetuates precarity and poverty, (b) 
Geographic community based social organizations offer the first building block for removal of 
many of the obstacles to increasing income, (c) Household level interventions, while useful and 
effective can ultimately prove sub-optimal in the absence of regional infrastructure, (d) 
Devolution and regional scale planning go hand in hand with community planning because top-
down regional planning tend to be able to work with regional variables such as infrastructure 
only. 
Access to global labor markets have opened opportunities for some (not the poorest) rural 
households. Some regions have been connected to global commodity (value) chains. Few are 
beyond the influence of national markets for labor and goods, as well as the influence of the 
state. Within these changes, planning for rural regional development can still modify the forces 
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and help empower communities, as well as increase rural regional productivity and decrease 
leakage. In the current ideological climate, it might appear as a tall order, compared to some of 
the more easily understood paradigms that are concise and have the appearance of precision. 
However, planning for RRD with the above principles need to be the guiding light in 
contemporary development practice before it is too late. 
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Appendix 3: Rates of poverty (by both upper and lower poverty lines) 
in the sub-districts of Bangladesh 
Note: The table shows the poverty rates for only those upazilas (sub-districts) that existed in 
2005. New upazilas created by splintering existing ones after 2005 are not included here. The 
splintered upazilas do not have the same geographic area and population in 2010. However in the 
interest of keeping the computation simple, no adjustments were made. 
Upazila (in alphabetical 
order) 
2005 2010 Change 
UPPER 
pov. 
line 
(2005 
to 
2010) 
Change 
LOWER 
pov. 
Line 
(2005 
to 
2010) 
% Poor   
(Upper 
poverty 
line) 
% 
Extreme 
Poor 
(Lower 
poverty 
line) 
% Poor   
(Upper 
poverty 
line*) 
% 
Extreme 
Poor 
(Lower 
poverty 
line*) 
Abhaynagar 60.1 45.9 36 15.9 24.1 30 
Adamdighi 45.5 29 13.05 5.14 32.45 23.86 
Aditmari 55.7 35.5 35.95 17.31 19.75 18.19 
Agailjhara 33 16.6 51.11 38.24 -18.11 -21.64 
Ajmiriganj 50 31.6 32.61 26.38 17.39 5.22 
Akhaura 31.2 14.6 26.87 12.91 4.33 1.69 
Akkelpur 42.7 26.4 26.92 13.43 15.78 12.97 
Alamdanga 21.9 11 26 9.88 -4.1 1.12 
Alfadanga 49.3 37 29.92 15.47 19.38 21.53 
Alikadam 78.4 54.1 42.88 23.2 35.52 30.9 
Amtali 67.4 50.4 22.77 11.96 44.63 38.44 
Anowara 22.9 9.6 15.49 5.59 7.41 4.01 
Araihazar 25.5 14.1 34.39 19.76 -8.89 -5.66 
Ashuganj 28.3 13.5 21.81 9.57 6.49 3.93 
Assasuni 70.3 57.5 48.41 32.05 21.89 25.45 
Atgharia 47 26.6 31.2 15.98 15.8 10.62 
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Atpara 29.9 18.1 31.61 17.24 -1.71 0.86 
Atrai 46.9 29.9 13.48 5.02 33.42 24.88 
Atwari 47.9 31.1 24.05 11.15 23.85 19.95 
Austagram 31 19.4 33.7 20.51 -2.7 -1.11 
Babuganj 61 32.6 48.71 36.83 12.29 -4.23 
Badalgachhi 43.5 27 15.04 5.7 28.46 21.3 
Badarganj 66.3 50.1 48.32 30.61 17.98 19.49 
Badda 18 6.4 13.43 1.25 4.57 5.15 
Bagati Para 45 28.3 13.43 1.25 31.57 27.05 
Bagerhat Sadar 42.7 31.6 35.92 18.65 6.78 12.95 
Bagha 47.1 29.7 33.64 18.32 13.46 11.38 
Baghai Chhari 49.9 25.4 33.64 18.32 16.26 7.08 
Bagher para 43.1 30.4 42.52 20.92 0.58 9.48 
Baghmara 47.5 30.8 29.45 14.92 18.05 15.88 
Bahubal 47.6 29.3 24.08 19.27 23.52 10.03 
Bajitpur 22.5 13.1 28.22 14.78 -5.72 -1.68 
Bakalia 30.8 2.4 4.9 0.75 25.9 1.65 
Bakerganj 71.5 53.3 55.38 42.18 16.12 11.12 
Bakshiganj 63 48.5 50.39 34.35 12.61 14.15 
Balaganj 11.4 5.4 19.67 15.75 -8.27 -10.35 
Baliadangi 51.3 34 26.46 11.3 24.84 22.7 
Baliakandi 40.8 27.2 39.65 24 1.15 3.2 
Bamna 50.7 37 17.05 8.9 33.65 28.1 
Banari Para 56.5 34.5 52.25 38.12 4.25 -3.62 
Banchharampur 42.1 21.8 27.32 13.18 14.78 8.62 
Bandar 25.7 10.2 20.9 4.04 4.8 6.16 
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Bandarban sadar 47.7 26 30.81 15.6 16.89 10.4 
Baniachong 50.6 31.7 27.56 22.25 23.04 9.45 
Banshkhali 42.6 22.2 27.87 11.28 14.73 10.92 
Baraigram 49.2 32.1 36.11 22.11 13.09 9.99 
Barguna Sadar 66.6 44.4 19.24 9.89 47.36 34.51 
Barhatta 30.6 19 35.17 20.13 -4.57 -1.13 
Barisal Sadar (kotwali) 66.1 50.3 49.89 30.95 16.21 19.35 
Barkal 42.7 19.6 26.11 8.53 16.59 11.07 
Barlekha 32.3 17.9 25.68 20.79 6.62 -2.89 
Barura 32.7 15.1 37.86 20.23 -5.16 -5.13 
Basail 33.6 21.7 19.67 11.06 13.93 10.64 
Batiaghata 61.4 48.7 40.54 22.71 20.86 25.99 
Bauphal 61.6 40.7 23.95 13.86 37.65 26.84 
Bayejid Bostami 29.9 2.3 9.2 2.16 20.7 0.14 
Beani Bazar 11 5.4 15.87 11.77 -4.87 -6.37 
Begumganj 24.8 10 5.87 1.83 18.93 8.17 
Belabo 35.1 20.5 21.89 11.65 13.21 8.85 
Belai Chhari 51.5 31.7 34.71 14.6 16.79 17.1 
Belkuchi 50.6 34 42.46 26.4 8.14 7.6 
Bera 53.6 32.7 39.44 22.93 14.16 9.77 
Betagi 48 27.6 19.58 10.33 28.42 17.27 
Bhairab 22.3 13.4 33.91 15.44 -11.61 -2.04 
Bhaluka 54 39.5 31.08 14.82 22.92 24.68 
Bhandaria 44.7 34.2 41.95 29.94 2.75 4.26 
Bhanga 40.5 28.4 33.53 17 6.97 11.4 
Bhangura 50.6 30.3 33.52 18.27 17.08 12.03 
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Bhedarganj 37.8 24.3 56.31 38.25 -18.51 -13.95 
Bheramara 39.7 30 3.41 0.79 36.29 29.21 
Bhola Sadar 41.4 27.5 49.16 35.65 -7.76 -8.15 
Bholahat 41.6 25.3 20.82 8.87 20.78 16.43 
Bhuapur 42.7 28.8 34.38 21.41 8.32 7.39 
Bhurungamari 68.2 52 65.14 44.7 3.06 7.3 
Biman Bandar Thana 11.3 7.3 1.31 0.3 9.99 7 
Biral 49.6 32.8 38.84 20.59 10.76 12.21 
Birampur 49.9 32.9 35.89 18.97 14.01 13.93 
Birganj 54 37.1 43.14 24.81 10.86 12.29 
Bishwambarpur 52.2 29.7 30.39 24.68 21.81 5.02 
Bishwanath 12.8 6.2 12.54 9.66 0.26 -3.46 
Boalia 19.8 12.1 24.06 10.45 -4.26 1.65 
Boalkhali 13.8 5.5 10.48 3.76 3.32 1.74 
Boalmari 46.6 34 39.25 21.54 7.35 12.46 
Bochaganj 49.3 32.3 38.36 20.97 10.94 11.33 
Boda 55.5 38.5 26.59 12.03 28.91 26.47 
Bogra sadar 43.4 28.8 17.57 9.08 25.83 19.72 
Brahman para 29.5 13.6 39.93 21.67 -10.43 -8.07 
Brahmanbaria Sadar 33.1 15.9 26.01 12.2 7.09 3.7 
Burhanuddin 45.8 29.1 28.32 16.34 17.48 12.76 
Burichang 30.3 14.1 33.29 17.31 -2.99 -3.21 
Cantonment 12.1 4.6 1.54 0.04 10.56 4.56 
Chakaria 39.5 16.9 28.45 13.21 11.05 3.69 
Chandanaish 26.1 12.4 13.51 4.78 12.59 7.62 
Chandgaon 33.5 3.4 16.95 4.85 16.55 -1.45 
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Chandina 36.1 16.6 41.22 22.59 -5.12 -5.99 
Chandpur Sadar 26.3 13 45.51 25.86 -19.21 -12.86 
Char Bhadrasan 45.9 33.6 35.76 19.78 10.14 13.82 
Char Fasson 50.4 38 28.22 14.92 22.18 23.08 
Char Rajibpur 73.9 58.8 68.82 48.67 5.08 10.13 
Charghat 44.1 27.1 31.43 16.77 12.67 10.33 
Chatkhil 17.5 6.6 4.78 1.5 12.72 5.1 
Chatmohar 51 30.4 31.41 16.09 19.59 14.31 
Chauddagram 31 14.6 34.39 19.05 -3.39 -4.45 
Chaugachha 59.7 46 42.82 20.67 16.88 25.33 
Chauhali 54.2 36.9 45.51 28.06 8.69 8.84 
Chhagalnaiya 9.8 4 25.94 14.45 -16.14 -10.45 
Chhatak 47.5 27.6 23.62 18.59 23.88 9.01 
Chilmari 69 53.1 61.07 42.14 7.93 10.96 
Chirirbandar 50 33.5 38.54 22.64 11.46 10.86 
Chitalmari 6.6 2.4 50.01 30.03 -43.41 -27.63 
Chittagong port 28.5 2 12.43 3.58 16.07 -1.58 
Chuadanga Sadar 28.2 16.2 29.21 11.69 -1.01 4.51 
Chunarughat 46.7 28.6 27.5 22.51 19.2 6.09 
Comilla Sadar (kotwali) 17.6 7.5 24.43 12.62 -6.83 -5.12 
Companiganj 41 19.4 34.55 28.71 6.45 -9.31 
Companiganj 12.9 5.6 34.55 28.71 -21.65 -23.11 
Cox's Bazar Sadar 38.5 17.7 26.18 12.24 12.32 5.46 
Dacope 73.3 60.4 44.49 24.9 28.81 35.5 
Daganbhuiyan 12.4 4.7 16.28 7.51 -3.88 -2.81 
Damudya 29.6 18.1 47.91 29.38 -18.31 -11.28 
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Damurhuda 55.9 38.6 27.07 10.53 28.83 28.07 
Dashmina 76.6 63.8 21.76 11.35 54.84 52.45 
Daudkandi 33.3 15.3 38.52 21.04 -5.22 -5.74 
Daulat Khan 56.7 32.5 30.32 17.99 26.38 14.51 
Daulatpur 58.9 34.5 29.44 15.74 29.46 18.76 
Daulatpur 25.2 13.7 29.44 15.74 -4.24 -2.04 
Daulatpur 46.9 32.3 29.44 15.74 17.46 16.56 
Debhata 56.6 42.8 43.12 27.46 13.48 15.34 
Debidwar 29 13.3 41.38 24.48 -12.38 -11.18 
Debiganj 57.7 40.6 34.21 16.63 23.49 23.97 
Delduar 36.7 24.4 24.35 14.47 12.35 9.93 
Demra 21.5 8.2 19.94 2.82 1.56 5.38 
Derai 47 26.4 26.18 20.66 20.82 5.74 
Dewanganj 67.7 54.2 58.51 41.59 9.19 12.61 
Dhamoirhat 43.5 27 17.85 7.71 25.65 19.29 
Dhamrai 35 23.2 22.84 9.07 12.16 14.13 
Dhanmondi 2.5 1 1.37 0.1 1.13 0.9 
Dharampasha 52.1 28.9 25.5 20.15 26.6 8.75 
Dhobaura 68 53.7 58.2 38.44 9.8 15.26 
Dhunat 52 34.5 19.84 7.28 32.16 27.22 
Dhupchanchia 44.3 27.5 13.18 5.11 31.12 22.39 
Dighalia 68.7 41.9 39.27 21.87 29.43 20.03 
Dighinala 33.4 16 22.54 8.23 10.86 7.77 
Dimla 75.7 61.5 35.22 17.43 40.48 44.07 
Dinajpur Sadar 45.6 30.7 28.17 16.52 17.43 14.18 
Dohar 38.5 27.2 23.93 10.06 14.57 17.14 
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Domar 71 55.8 31.31 15.51 39.69 40.29 
Double Mooring 0.1 0 0.01 0 0.09 0 
Dowarabazar 51 28.7 29.91 24.3 21.09 4.4 
Dumki 36.4 28.6 22.03 13.14 14.37 15.46 
Dumuria 32.5 21 37.23 19.57 -4.73 1.43 
Durgapur 33.1 20.5 25.73 12.32 7.37 8.18 
Durgapur 45.9 28.5 25.73 12.32 20.17 16.18 
Fakirhat 65.9 55 36.39 19.2 29.51 35.8 
Faridganj 29.1 13.8 46.56 26.81 -17.46 -13.01 
Faridpur 47.7 27.9 31.51 16.61 16.19 11.29 
Faridpur Sadar 42.2 31 38.35 21.35 3.85 9.65 
Fatikchhari 36.6 18.7 17.61 7.08 18.99 11.62 
Fenchuganj 11 5.1 16.92 13.42 -5.92 -8.32 
Feni Sadar 11.4 4.3 18.59 9.38 -7.19 -5.08 
Fulbari 47.9 31.4 33.77 17.84 14.13 13.56 
Fulbaria 60.4 46.2 52.63 32.79 7.77 13.41 
Fulchhari 60 42.7 58.06 39.76 1.94 2.94 
Gabtali 48.4 31.3 15.64 5.72 32.76 25.58 
Gaffargaon 55.7 41.5 43.92 25.85 11.78 15.65 
Gaibandha Sadar 50 33.8 44.76 28.3 5.24 5.5 
Galachipa 76.8 68 25.96 14.39 50.84 53.61 
Gangachara 64.7 48 58.29 38.96 6.41 9.04 
Gangni 14.5 7.8 15.84 5.25 -1.34 2.55 
Gauripur 61 46.9 50.63 30.53 10.37 16.37 
Gaurnadi 59.4 37.7 55.45 39.88 3.95 -2.18 
Gazaria 35.3 23.2 26.83 14.75 8.47 8.45 
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Gazipur Sadar 18.4 7.3 22.11 8.15 -3.71 -0.85 
Ghatail 42.1 28.1 28.71 17.68 13.39 10.42 
Ghior 32.3 20.4 13.73 5.74 18.57 14.66 
Ghoraghat 51.6 34.6 41.83 24.31 9.77 10.29 
Goalandaghat 47.1 32.5 50.47 31.83 -3.37 0.67 
Gobindaganj 51 34.2 45.39 29 5.61 5.2 
Godagari 52.2 35.5 44.15 27.3 8.05 8.2 
Golabganj 11.4 5.5 44.15 27.3 -32.75 -21.8 
Gomastapur 43.1 27.4 26.05 12.24 17.05 15.16 
Gopalganj Sadar 40.8 28.2 41.11 25.2 -0.31 3 
Gopalpur 39.2 25.3 29.31 16.9 9.89 8.4 
Gosairhat 38.2 24.6 58.33 40.7 -20.13 -16.1 
Gowainghat 13.3 6 52.59 46.53 -39.29 -40.53 
Gulshan 8.6 2.9 3.34 0.79 5.26 2.11 
Gurudaspur 53.1 35.5 36.97 22.81 16.13 12.69 
Habiganj Sadar 40 23.7 16.88 12.24 23.12 11.46 
Haim Char 30.8 16.6 61.3 41.03 -30.5 -24.43 
Hajiganj 29.4 16.1 53.74 32.54 -24.34 -16.44 
Hakimpur 46.3 29.3 38.9 22.36 7.4 6.94 
Halishahar 28.8 2.1 5.59 1.09 23.21 1.01 
Haluaghat 60.8 46.2 50.33 30.6 10.47 15.6 
Harinakunda 31.1 17.6 26 10.6 5.1 7 
Haripur 55.6 38.6 29.72 13.08 25.88 25.52 
Harirampur 36.8 24.1 18.12 8.27 18.68 15.83 
Hathazari 30.1 2.3 1.11 0.09 28.99 2.21 
Hatibandha 56.5 36.9 38.08 18.42 18.42 18.48 
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Hatiya 48.7 25.5 16.02 5.91 32.68 19.59 
Hazaribagh 17.2 6.6 12.19 1.51 5.01 5.09 
Hizla 60.2 60.7 62.26 49.55 -2.06 11.15 
Homna 39.1 19.3 38.35 19.84 0.75 -0.54 
Hossainpur 23.8 13.5 32.99 18.51 -9.19 -5.01 
Ishwardi 45.9 26.9 26.25 13.23 19.65 13.67 
Ishwarganj 61.5 47.5 55.97 35.8 5.53 11.7 
Islampur 65.5 51.7 54.99 38.2 10.51 13.5 
Itna 34.8 22.1 34.86 21.08 -0.06 1.02 
Jagannathpur 46.4 27.2 21 15.81 25.4 11.39 
Jaintiapur 11.7 5.3 34.65 28.91 -22.95 -23.61 
Jaldhaka 74 59.3 43.54 24.87 30.46 34.43 
Jamalganj 52.1 29.7 24.62 19.44 27.48 10.26 
Jamalpur Sadar 50.3 36.7 49.76 32.66 0.54 4.04 
Jessore Sadar (Kotwali) 62.1 51.5 35.29 16.4 26.81 35.1 
Jhalokati Sadar 42.7 24 37.73 22.28 4.97 1.72 
Jhenaidaha Sadar 40.7 26.7 23.94 9.66 16.76 17.04 
Jhenaigati 47.2 32 36.91 21.64 10.29 10.36 
Jhikargachha 66 51.8 38.86 17.85 27.14 33.95 
Jiban Nagar 26.2 13.5 29.09 11.48 -2.89 2.02 
Joypurhat Sadar 44 28.3 26.03 13 17.97 15.3 
Jurai Chhari Thana 35 18 19.3 6.23 15.7 11.77 
Kachua 36.1 22.5 56.29 34.99 -20.19 -12.49 
Kachua 31.5 18.4 56.29 34.99 -24.79 -16.59 
Kafrul 13.1 4.7 6.98 0.42 6.12 4.28 
Kahaloo 44.1 27.6 11.68 3.97 32.42 23.63 
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Kaharole 50.4 33.5 44.29 25.57 6.11 7.93 
Kala Para 74.2 64.5 20.31 9.71 53.89 54.79 
Kalai 44.2 27.3 25.6 12.12 18.6 15.18 
Kalaroa 49 32.9 45.95 28.7 3.05 4.2 
Kalia 45.5 32.1 23.28 9.7 22.22 22.4 
Kaliakair 48.8 37.3 10.98 3.9 37.82 33.4 
Kaliganj 47.6 34.8 47.96 31.71 -0.36 3.09 
Kaliganj 27.6 14.8 47.96 31.71 -20.36 -16.91 
Kaliganj 52.7 32.8 47.96 31.71 4.74 1.09 
Kaliganj 74.9 62.5 47.96 31.71 26.94 30.79 
Kalihati 40.7 28 23.46 12.5 17.24 15.5 
Kalkini 42.3 29.4 33.17 15.84 9.13 13.56 
Kalmakanda 34.6 21.8 37.62 22.57 -3.02 -0.77 
Kamalganj 28 14.8 26.72 22.02 1.28 -7.22 
Kamarkhanda 51.3 34.2 32.47 17.64 18.83 16.56 
Kamrangir Char 51.7 30.8 21.98 2.6 29.72 28.2 
Kanaighat 12.4 5.6 45.77 39.73 -33.37 -34.13 
Kanthalia 40.7 18.5 34.19 21.44 6.51 -2.94 
Kapasia 52.9 39.1 27.05 17.82 25.85 21.28 
Kaptai 24.3 11.7 12.22 3.89 12.08 7.81 
Karimganj 23.7 13.7 27.14 14.04 -3.44 -0.34 
Karnafuli 6.5 0.2 27.14 14.04 -20.64 -13.84 
Kasba 33.3 15.6 25.54 11.93 7.76 3.67 
Kashiani 46.7 32.7 39.06 24.63 7.64 8.07 
Katiadi 23.5 13.5 31.57 17.07 -8.07 -3.57 
Kaunia 67 50.9 44.98 33.15 22.02 17.75 
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Kawkhali 27.9 17.2 52.16 39.55 -24.26 -22.35 
Kawkhali (betbunia) 44.1 21.2 23.43 8.73 20.67 12.47 
Kazipur 51 33.7 36.23 20.19 14.77 13.51 
Kendua Thana 32.4 20.1 40.91 24.08 -8.51 -3.98 
Keraniganj 36.7 20.2 25.86 10.2 10.84 10 
Keshabpur 51.4 37.2 42.04 20.44 9.36 16.76 
Khagrachhari Sadar 34.6 14.8 19.52 7.31 15.08 7.49 
Khaliajuri 29.4 18.3 37.22 22.27 -7.82 -3.97 
Khalishpur 53.7 30.6 41.05 23.54 12.65 7.06 
Khan Jahan Ali 58.1 33.7 31.88 16.76 26.22 16.94 
Khansama 54.7 37.6 46.48 25.79 8.22 11.81 
Khetlal 42.7 26.2 26.06 11.74 16.64 14.46 
Khilgaon 11.6 4.1 13.66 1.49 -2.06 2.61 
Khoksa 34.4 23.6 4.66 1.05 29.74 22.55 
Khulna Sadar (Kotowali) 50.7 28.9 35.47 18.84 15.23 10.06 
Khulshi 29.8 2.2 1.1 0.1 28.7 2.1 
Kishoreganj 71.8 56.2 30.86 14.74 40.94 41.46 
Kishoreganj Sadar 20.7 12.1 27.65 14.52 -6.95 -2.42 
Kotalipara 41.6 28 43.64 27.65 -2.04 0.35 
Kotchandpur 21.6 11.9 20.24 7.47 1.36 4.43 
Kotwali 9.9 0.7 5.88 1.1 4.02 -0.4 
Kotwali 3.9 1.7 5.88 1.1 -1.98 0.6 
Koyra 50 34.8 49.14 29.05 0.86 5.75 
Kulaura 30.8 16.4 28.11 23.11 2.69 -6.71 
Kuliar Char 21.1 12 32.73 17.24 -11.63 -5.24 
Kumarkhali 40.2 31.2 3.96 0.9 36.24 30.3 
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Kurigram Sadar 66.1 49.9 57.99 40.48 8.11 9.42 
Kushtia Sadar 22.5 14.1 3.04 0.73 19.46 13.37 
Kutubdia 50.3 24.3 31.09 13.76 19.21 10.54 
Lakhai 50.8 31.7 25.22 20 25.58 11.7 
Laksam 38.1 18 37.39 19.98 0.71 -1.98 
Lakshmichhari 53.2 27.4 30.96 12.62 22.24 14.78 
Lakshmipur Sadar 26.9 10.8 45.61 28.81 -18.71 -18.01 
Lalbagh 10.2 3.7 16.03 1.79 -5.83 1.91 
Lalmohan 47.5 27.5 27.78 15.2 19.72 12.3 
Lalmonirhat Sadar 49.1 30.4 31.3 15.1 17.8 15.3 
Lalpur 48.6 31.5 35.75 21.75 12.85 9.75 
Lama 59 35.9 40.95 21.58 18.05 14.32 
Langadu 56.7 30.5 29.29 9.93 27.41 20.57 
Lohagara 31.3 14.8 19.9 7.57 11.4 7.23 
Lohagara 58.2 46.9 19.9 7.57 38.3 39.33 
Lohajang 22.8 13.8 33.56 20.12 -10.76 -6.32 
Madan 31.8 19.9 41.57 23.55 -9.77 -3.65 
Madarganj 62.1 47.2 55.45 38.16 6.65 9.04 
Madaripur Sadar 33.8 22.3 35 17.48 -1.2 4.82 
Madhabpur 45.4 27.4 25.88 20.66 19.52 6.74 
Madhukhali 42 30.3 30.52 16.08 11.48 14.22 
Madhupur 41.4 27.2 36.42 21.48 4.98 5.72 
Magura Sadar 26.3 13.9 43.03 24.05 -16.73 -10.15 
Mahadebpur 45.4 28.8 15.62 6.12 29.78 22.68 
Mahalchhari 36.5 18 21.35 7.51 15.15 10.49 
Maheshkhali 60.7 34.8 40.2 21.36 20.5 13.44 
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Maheshpur 28.8 14.5 23.63 9.36 5.17 5.14 
Manda 47.2 30.2 14.7 5.39 32.5 24.81 
Maniarchar 32.5 14.3 14.7 5.39 17.8 8.91 
Manikchhari 41.3 19.9 30.11 12.76 11.19 7.14 
Manikganj Sadar 36.2 24 18.66 7.25 17.54 16.75 
Manirampur 54 39.6 40.21 19.45 13.79 20.15 
Manohardi 35.8 20.9 22.73 11.82 13.07 9.08 
Manpura 48.6 34.5 32.81 19.38 15.79 15.12 
Mathbaria 38.1 17.9 38.03 25.62 0.07 -7.72 
Matihar 23.4 11 33.33 15.18 -9.93 -4.18 
Matiranga 39.5 18.7 28.29 11.45 11.21 7.25 
Matlab 33.9 19.1 28.29 11.45 5.61 7.65 
Maulvi Bazar Sadar 26.8 14.1 49.93 28.58 -23.13 -14.48 
Meghna 33.2 15.5 37.32 18.96 -4.12 -3.46 
Mehendiganj 68.4 57.5 37.32 18.96 31.08 38.54 
Meherpur Sadar 10.3 4.9 15.13 5.06 -4.83 -0.16 
Melandaha 62 47.2 47.22 30.58 14.78 16.62 
Mirpur 8.6 2.8 3.35 0.72 5.25 2.08 
Mirpur 17.4 9.4 3.35 0.72 14.05 8.68 
Mirsharai 26 11.4 13.41 4.6 12.59 6.8 
Mirzaganj 41.7 24.7 17.77 9.58 23.93 15.12 
Mirzapur 36.6 24.5 26.75 16.01 9.85 8.49 
Mitha Pukur 62.2 45.5 45.45 28.95 16.75 16.55 
Mithamain 33.8 21.8 35.22 22.96 -1.42 -1.16 
Mohammadpur 11.7 3.9 50.77 30.59 -39.07 -26.69 
Mohammadpur 35.8 22.5 50.77 30.59 -14.97 -8.09 
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Mohanganj Thana 33.3 21 34.3 18.15 -1 2.85 
Mohanpur 45.7 28.5 24.87 11.96 20.83 16.54 
Mollahat 4.9 1.9 46.11 26.73 -41.21 -24.83 
Mongla 56.4 41.5 41.91 22.68 14.49 18.82 
Morrelganj 64 50.3 46.52 27 17.48 23.3 
Motijheel 3.1 1.2 1.3 0.13 1.8 1.07 
Mujib Nagar 11.5 5.9 13.56 4.48 -2.06 1.42 
Muksudpur 42.8 29.2 46.46 29.86 -3.66 -0.66 
Muktagachha 58.6 44.8 43.35 23.95 15.25 20.85 
Muladi 56.6 36.8 58.21 44.14 -1.61 -7.34 
Munshiganj Sadar 21.3 12.9 30.77 15.05 -9.47 -2.15 
Muradnagar 25.2 10.9 45.02 26.97 -19.82 -16.07 
Mymensingh Sadar 50.7 38 52.28 39.33 -1.58 -1.33 
Nabiganj 48.4 30.3 26.76 21.48 21.64 8.82 
Nabinagar 41.5 21.2 30.47 15.04 11.03 6.16 
Nachole 40.2 24.7 24.16 11.43 16.04 13.27 
Nagarkanda 47.7 35.1 35.87 19.17 11.83 15.93 
Nagarpur 48.4 33.8 39.85 26.38 8.55 7.42 
Nageshwari 70.3 55 64.96 45.45 5.34 9.55 
Naikhongchhari 72.8 49.6 46.05 26.27 26.75 23.33 
Nakla 46.5 31.6 46.76 28.54 -0.26 3.06 
Nalchity 50 33.1 46.52 32.54 3.48 0.56 
Nalitabari 53 37.8 41.76 24.13 11.24 13.67 
Nandail 60.5 46.6 60.66 41.75 -0.16 4.85 
Nandigram 46.1 29.3 16.09 6.27 30.01 23.03 
Nangalkot 25.8 11.1 45.1 26.15 -19.3 -15.05 
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Naogaon Sadar 49.9 33.9 17.44 8.27 32.46 25.63 
Narail Sadar 32.7 20.2 17.34 6.07 15.36 14.13 
Narayanganj Sadar 22.9 10.2 27.93 10.07 -5.03 0.13 
Naria 30.7 19.1 48.06 30.49 -17.36 -11.39 
Narsingdi Sadar 34.6 22.5 22.84 10.84 11.76 11.66 
Nasirnagar 42.9 22.3 43.71 24.98 -0.81 -2.68 
Natore Sadar 49.4 32.6 31.79 18.85 17.61 13.75 
Nawabganj 42 29.3 37.28 20.51 4.72 8.79 
Nawabganj 51.5 34.8 37.28 20.51 14.22 14.29 
Nawabganj Sadar 43.5 28.8 37.28 20.51 6.22 8.29 
Nazirpur 13.7 11.5 51.54 36.6 -37.84 -25.1 
Nesarabad (swarupkati) 20.3 11.3 43.31 30.1 -23.01 -18.8 
Netrokona Sadar 28.7 17.5 30.77 16.16 -2.07 1.34 
Niamatpur 50.9 33.8 19.45 8.4 31.45 25.4 
Nikli 26.4 15.5 30.04 17.03 -3.64 -1.53 
Nilphamari Sadar 69.2 54 36.45 21.04 32.75 32.96 
Noakhali Sadar 
(sudharam) 44.3 21.6 10.21 3.69 34.09 17.91 
Paba 28.6 13.2 33.4 17.06 -4.8 -3.86 
Pabna Sadar 45.2 26.7 27.81 14.29 17.39 12.41 
Pahartali 31.8 2.8 30.04 11.68 1.76 -8.88 
Paikgachha 49.6 34.4 42.4 23.26 7.2 11.14 
Pakundia 23 13.1 26.11 13.53 -3.11 -0.43 
Palash Paurashava 25.6 15.2 22.23 9.89 3.37 5.31 
Palashbari 50.3 33.3 44.75 27.07 5.55 6.23 
Pallabi 12 4.2 11.95 1.75 0.05 2.45 
Palong 28.7 17.6 11.95 1.75 16.75 15.85 
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Panchagarh Sadar 58.6 42 24.19 11.17 34.41 30.83 
Panchbibi 44.2 27.6 28.34 13.62 15.86 13.98 
Panchhari 37.7 17.2 23.41 8.38 14.29 8.82 
Panchlaish 31.2 2.6 0.76 0.06 30.44 2.54 
Pangsha 45.5 31.2 45.68 28.83 -0.18 2.37 
Parbatipur 49.5 33.5 39.75 22.08 9.75 11.42 
Parshuram 11.9 4.7 30.62 18.61 -18.72 -13.91 
Patenga 9.9 0.4 3.93 0.59 5.97 -0.19 
Patgram 53.3 33.5 33.29 16.99 20.01 16.51 
Patharghata 56.3 36.1 12.9 6.12 43.4 29.98 
Patiya 26.8 9.3 8.07 2.39 18.73 6.91 
Patnitala 48.5 32.4 18.56 8.06 29.94 24.34 
Patuakhali Sadar 52.1 41.3 36.94 23.32 15.16 17.98 
Phulbari 65.8 49.1 68.48 48.76 -2.68 0.34 
Phulpur 66.9 52.9 58.8 39.19 8.1 13.71 
Phultala 45.2 36.7 33.66 16.96 11.54 19.74 
Pirgachha 62.3 45.3 49.73 30.5 12.57 14.8 
Pirganj 62.1 45.6 23.25 9.6 38.85 36 
Pirganj 52.7 35.8 23.25 9.6 29.45 26.2 
Pirojpur Sadar 22.7 16.9 42.66 28.69 -19.96 -11.79 
Porsha 63.9 48.6 21.74 9.41 42.16 39.19 
Purbadhala 32.3 20 35.36 20.28 -3.06 -0.28 
Puthia 45.9 29.1 26.79 13.28 19.11 15.82 
Rajapur 54.5 38.1 42.03 29.77 12.47 8.33 
Rajarhat 64 47.3 67.69 48.63 -3.69 -1.33 
Rajasthali 48.1 25.7 20.54 7.21 27.56 18.49 
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Rajbari Sadar 41 27.6 38.67 23.05 2.33 4.55 
Rajnagar 31.5 16.7 22.32 18.02 9.18 -1.32 
Rajoir 33.3 21.4 31.38 15.44 1.92 5.96 
Rajpara 19.3 11 24.39 10.69 -5.09 0.31 
Ramganj 20.1 7.8 21.39 12 -1.29 -4.2 
Ramgarh 34.7 17.3 32.59 14.83 2.11 2.47 
Ramgati 58.1 32.2 30.37 15.96 27.73 16.24 
Ramna 4.7 1.7 3.82 0.2 0.88 1.5 
Rampal 47.6 33 41.13 22.46 6.47 10.54 
Ramu 59.7 34.6 34.32 17.85 25.38 16.75 
Rangamati Sadar 27.5 13.2 7.35 1.7 20.15 11.5 
Rangpur Sadar 55.3 40.2 37.12 25.78 18.18 14.42 
Rangunia 29 13.3 13.98 5.06 15.02 8.24 
Raninagar 46.4 29.5 13.29 4.88 33.11 24.62 
Ranisankail 54.6 37.5 25.8 11.06 28.8 26.44 
Raozan 17.7 7.1 8.52 2.92 9.18 4.18 
Raumari 73.5 58.1 57.01 35.99 16.49 22.11 
Rowangchhari 75.4 55.2 32.91 16.16 42.49 39.04 
Royganj 53.3 36 39.43 22.84 13.87 13.16 
Roypur 32.1 14 16.72 8.71 15.38 5.29 
Roypura 40.7 25.8 29.44 16.18 11.26 9.62 
Ruma 75.4 55.3 42.3 23.38 33.1 31.92 
Rupganj 24.9 14.6 22.52 8.69 2.38 5.91 
Rupsa 67.5 41.1 36.88 20.22 30.62 20.88 
Sabujbagh 13.8 4.9 11.64 1.13 2.16 3.77 
Sadarpur 47 34.4 36.94 20.54 10.06 13.86 
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Sadullapur 51.4 34.2 50.99 31.06 0.41 3.14 
Saghatta 52.5 35.3 52.75 34.08 -0.25 1.22 
Saidpur 59.2 43.2 27.72 16.17 31.48 27.03 
Sakhipur 44.5 29.6 26.04 15.51 18.46 14.09 
Sandwip 40.8 20.3 19.13 7.43 21.67 12.87 
Santhia 53.3 32.5 33.06 17.5 20.24 15 
Sapahar 58.6 42.4 21.36 9.01 37.24 33.39 
Sarail 40 20.7 31.08 15.49 8.92 5.21 
Sarankhola 62.8 48.7 48.01 28.24 14.79 20.46 
Sariakandi 53.5 35.7 21.6 8.72 31.9 26.98 
Sarishabari 52.7 38.8 21.6 8.72 31.1 30.08 
Satkania 30.5 14.6 15.16 5.51 15.34 9.09 
Satkhira Sadar 46.2 33.4 43.15 26 3.05 7.4 
Saturia 38.4 25 15.01 6.17 23.39 18.83 
Savar 16.8 6.7 34 17.97 -17.2 -11.27 
Senbagh 24.4 10.5 5.36 1.67 19.04 8.83 
Serajdikhan 36.6 24.2 28.84 16.52 7.76 7.68 
Shah Makhdum 17.8 8.2 30.93 13.37 -13.13 -5.17 
Shahjadpur 56.4 39.8 41.76 25.12 14.64 14.68 
Shahrasti 25.7 14.3 50.53 29.53 -24.83 -15.23 
Shailkupa 51 35.4 28.19 12.11 22.81 23.29 
Shalikha 9 3.9 44.21 24.67 -35.21 -20.77 
Sharsha 49.1 36.8 40.81 19.37 8.29 17.43 
Sherpur 49.4 32.4 15.72 5.62 33.68 26.78 
Sherpur Sadar 46.1 32 55.82 35.6 -9.72 -3.6 
Shib Char 44.5 30.3 38.76 20.22 5.74 10.08 
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Shibalaya 34.6 22.3 15.81 6.96 18.79 15.34 
Shibganj 47.6 30.6 25.98 12.17 21.62 18.43 
Shibganj 42.6 27.3 25.98 12.17 16.62 15.13 
Shibpur 29.7 17.2 18.9 9.85 10.8 7.35 
Shyamnagar 75.7 65.2 50.19 33.82 25.51 31.38 
Shyampur 14.9 5 12.88 1.22 2.02 3.78 
Singair 37.3 24.5 18.08 7.13 19.22 17.37 
Singra 51.1 34 37.75 23.43 13.35 10.57 
Sirajganj Sadar 51.2 34.4 36.72 21.64 14.48 12.76 
Sitakunda 21.5 1.5 11.46 3.64 10.04 -2.14 
Sonadanga 52.8 30.2 19.3 7.31 33.5 22.89 
Sonagazi 16.8 6.3 44.51 28.54 -27.71 -22.24 
Sonargaon 16.4 8.5 21.32 9.95 -4.92 -1.45 
Sonatola 50.1 32.9 23.73 10.34 26.37 22.56 
Sreebardi 47.5 32.4 49.08 30.42 -1.58 1.98 
Sreemangal 28.3 14.6 29.35 24.67 -1.05 -10.07 
Sreenagar 25.8 16.1 26.27 14.4 -0.47 1.7 
Sreepur 52.3 38.9 45 25.52 7.3 13.38 
Sreepur 44 30.6 45 25.52 -1 5.08 
Sujanagar 51.4 30.7 35.45 19.44 15.95 11.26 
Sulla 50.1 27.9 28.32 22.87 21.78 5.03 
Sunamganj Sadar 45.8 25.6 25.1 19.29 20.7 6.31 
Sundarganj 56.1 39 47.55 29.44 8.55 9.56 
Sutrapur 4 1.6 4.58 0.31 -0.58 1.29 
Sylhet 13.7 6.9 4.58 0.31 9.12 6.59 
Tahirpur 52.1 29.3 31.2 25.34 20.9 3.96 
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Tala 45.6 33 45.25 28.94 0.35 4.06 
Tangail Sadar 38.1 26 31.7 20.93 6.4 5.07 
Tanore 52 34.6 35.67 20.72 16.33 13.88 
Taraganj 66 49.7 52.44 32.42 13.56 17.28 
Tarail 29.2 17.8 26.08 14.73 3.12 3.07 
Tarash 51.4 34.1 35.75 20.01 15.65 14.09 
Tazumuddin 67.1 33.6 22.28 11.27 44.82 22.33 
Tejgaon 5.7 1.7 5.28 0.33 0.42 1.37 
Teknaf 73.1 52 38.15 19.74 34.95 32.26 
Tentulia 56.1 38.7 21.53 8.85 34.57 29.85 
Terokhada 40.7 26.7 49.6 30.03 -8.9 -3.33 
Thakurgaon Sadar 50.5 34.8 28.64 17.66 21.86 17.14 
Thanchi 76.7 55.8 53.05 31.7 23.65 24.1 
Tongibari 24.9 15.3 25.06 14 -0.16 1.3 
Trishal 57.5 43.3 47.78 28.82 9.72 14.48 
Tungipara 38.4 25.8 42.58 26.08 -4.18 -0.28 
Ukhia 68.7 43.3 37.81 20.15 30.89 23.15 
Ulipur 66.9 50 65.32 46.23 1.58 3.77 
Ullah Para 53 36.5 36.65 20.91 16.35 15.59 
Uttar Matlab 25.9 14.7 24.92 4.27 0.98 10.43 
Uttara 13 4.8 3.75 0.75 9.25 4.05 
Wazirpur 44.4 31 52.06 37.78 -7.66 -6.78 
Zakiganj 13.2 6.7 39.01 32.92 -25.81 -26.22 
Zanjira 32.2 19.9 54.03 34.88 -21.83 -14.98 
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Appendix 4: District planning in India 
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Appendix 4: Use of Topsoil for brick-making 
 
Source: Chaloman Noakhali, March 09, 2014 
 
